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Abstract
Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings,
including “the passions and other emotions resembling them.” These two terms for affective
mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often
treated by the scholarship as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and
‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his
work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former
are the transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute
their felt nature and their impulse. The latter are the particular passions fully realized, with
characteristic valence, and analyzed by Hume in terms of their particular belief structures and
various relations between ideas and impressions understood to be constituent of the particular
passions being characterized. The term ‘emotion’ for Hume generally denotes either the
attending feeling and impulse, sometimes distinct from the passion (particularly as ‘passion’
is being used to include the associated beliefs, causes and objects), or as a synonym for a
particular passion, typically when Hume is primarily referring to the felt nature of the
passion. Generally speaking, ‘passion’ is a more cognitive category of affective mental state,
while ‘emotion’ is more sensationalist. Part One takes an in-depth look at the textual
evidence in the Treatise to develop this characterization of ‘emotion.’ Part Two offers an
examination of ‘passion’ in Hume, through a look at the debate between sensationalist and
cognitivist readings of Hume’s theory of the passions, and associated tensions often
attributed to Hume. I will argue that when we grant Hume the conceptual emotion/passion
distinction, he has the tools to accommodate both highly sensationalist and highly cognitivist
understandings of affective mental states. I finish Part Two with the application of my
distinction to two more key topics in Hume studies: his sympathy mechanism, and his theory
of belief and motivation. I argue that interpretive puzzles in both benefit from the application
of my emotion/passion distinction.

Keywords
David Hume, passion, emotion, history of theories of emotion, sensationalist theories of
emotion, cognitivist theories of emotion, feeling
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Introduction
Hume opens Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature1 by reminding the reader of his
division of the contents of the mind into ideas and impressions. Impressions are then
further divided into original impressions (impressions of sensation) and secondary
impressions or impressions of reflection. Secondary impressions include, “the passions
and other emotions resembling them.”2 These two terms for affective mental states,
‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used with frequency in Hume’s work, though passion is
clearly the dominant term. The scholarship on Hume frequently treats them as denoting
the same type of mental state. To be more specific, passions are understood to be Hume’s
technical term for affective, motivating mental events, while the term ‘emotion’ is used
either synonymously, or as a way of describing particular passions or characteristics of
passions—an ‘emotional’ passion is one associated with a particular mental disturbance
or movement. But neither reading seems to reflect Hume’s characterization of the
secondary impressions (as quoted above) with enough subtlety. The category of
secondary impressions does indeed encompass all of the passions, but it also includes the
“other emotions resembling them.” Taken at face value, this appears to suggest that the
passions alone do not exhaust the category of secondary impressions. Rather, the
suggestion appears to be that passions are emotions, but not all emotions are passions,
and there are certain passion-like emotions that are also to be understood as secondary
impressions.

1

2

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), (Oxford: Claredon Press) 1978.
THN, 2.1.1.1; italics added.
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The appearance of the term ‘emotion’ in Hume’s characterization of secondary
impressions is one of many in Hume’s Treatise that seem to mean it to reference
something beyond, or at least not identical to, what is referenced by the term ‘passions.’
Hume’s discussion of secondary impressions throughout Book II focuses largely on the
examination of particular passions and types of passions. Yet the term ‘emotion’ is used
with frequency there, as well as in the other two books of the Treatise. The question is,
what did Hume intend by introducing this additional term? What are the passionresembling other emotions?
In this dissertation I will argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his
discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between
what I will label “attending emotions” and “fully established passions.” The former are
the transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute
their felt nature and their impulse. The latter are the particular passions fully realized,
with characteristic valence, and analyzed by Hume in terms of their particular belief
structures and various relations between ideas and impressions understood to be
constituent of the particular passions being characterized. The distinction between these
two kinds of mental events in Hume’s conceptual framework provides a way for us to
attribute to Hume two different senses or uses of the term ‘passion’: in one case ‘passion’
refers broadly to the felt experience of our particular passions, i.e., as identical to the
emotion that Hume argues is the essence of the passion, and , in the other case, ‘passion’
refers to the entire experience of particular passions, including not only the characteristic
valenced feeling, but also associations of impressions and ideas, and, importantly, a
particular belief structure. The term ‘emotion’ for Hume generally either denotes the
attending feeling and impulse, sometimes distinct from the passion (particularly as
‘passion’ is being used in the second sense), or is used as a synonym for the particular
passion in question (typically when Hume is using passion in the first sense).

The various discussions of my dissertation will all be occasioned by the intent to answer
the question, “What is the role of ‘emotion’ in the Humean picture of the mind?” But the
2

interest I believe to be found in these discussions is by no means limited to the interest
found in the answer to that question. Seeking to determine how we can best understand
the role Hume intends emotions to play in human mental life will inform a clearer
understanding of Hume’s work on the impressions of reflection generally, what we might
in contemporary discussions refer to as Hume’s theory of emotion. An understanding of
his work in this regard, which is found primarily, though not exclusively, in Book II of
the Treatise, has bearing on his account of motivation, and the notorious relationship
between passions and reason that he suggests obtains. This in turn is an essential part of
the foundation of his moral philosophy, something beyond the scope of this project, but
clearly essential to understanding Hume. Indeed, the potential scope of application of a
new interpretation of Hume’s thought surrounding his ‘impressions of reflection’ could
be seen to have an impact on most of Hume’s broader thought. Feeling plays a pivotal
role in all aspects of Hume’s philosophy. Therefore, a better understanding of his use of
affective language, and the details of his theory of mind as it pertains to feeling has the
potential to influence all areas in Hume studies.
Beyond the implications of this project for Hume scholarship, I take it that the project has
potential application in contemporary discussions in philosophy of emotion as well. This
is a topic I will take up again in the last section of this work, where I will consider
potential directions for further work arising from this topic. But here is a brief idea of the
motivation as it pertains to contemporary scholarship. One way to understand my
intentions in characterizing the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise is as an attempt to
answer the question of whether ‘emotion’ in Hume can be understood to refer to a
particular kind of distinctive mental event or, put another way, if Hume had something
like a category of emotion in mind when he introduced the term to his discussion.
One of the reasons for asking such a question is to determine whether Hume is suggesting
that among the kinds of things we need to posit in a theory of the mind, we not only need
to be able to talk about the particular passions and their role, but also about emotions
generally and their role. To find a category of emotion in Hume would suggest that on his
analysis we need to be able to talk about both passions and emotions in order to have a
sufficiently rich conceptual framework within which to discuss the workings of the mind.
3

This is a point of some significance when we look forward to some of the current work
being done within philosophy of emotions. Both Louis Charland3 and Thomas Dixon4
have suggested that current discourse has lost some important richness in trying to make
the single term ‘emotion’ do all the work in characterizing our affective mental
experience. Dixon has argued that discussions of affective mental states prior to the
emergence of the category ‘emotion’ involved numerous, variously defined terms (such
as sentiments, affections, passions). By contrast, inclusion of all such mental states under
the umbrella term ‘emotion’ encourages sweeping generalizations and a lack of subtlety
and diversity in the claims made about the nature of emotion. This is to be lamented,
according to Dixon. Charland has argued that ‘passion’ in particular is a useful additional
category that perhaps needs to be reintroduced to the discourse. I am ultimately
suggesting that Hume, by his introduction of the new term5 ‘emotion’ into the discourse
on the passions of his time, is implicitly pushing a similar line; that is, he is seeing a need
for an additional category of affective mental state in order to explain our mental life.
Insofar as we can indeed posit something like a category of emotion in Hume, we obtain
tools for further consideration of possible ways to break down the broad grouping of
affective mental states, and put some subtly and richness back into the discourse on the
passions.
Another reason to question whether Hume had a distinct category of emotion in mind as
he introduced the term in the Treatise, is that contemporary discussions of the category of
‘emotion’ question whether it is a category that makes sense at all. Current debates
question whether upon examination we find anything that can unite in a single category

3

Charland, L. (forthcoming). Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from History of Psychopathology. The

Oxford Companion to the Philosophy of Emotion. P. Goldie.
4

Dixon, T. (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category.

Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press.
5

Dixon (2003) in particular has argued that the term ‘emotion’ used in a sustained way in the more modern

sense is found first in Hume.
4

all that we are inclined to denote with this term.6 I would like to suggest that Hume’s
introduction of the term ‘emotion,’ along with the characterization of ‘emotion’ that can
be pieced together from his use of the term, paved the way for our contemporary category
of emotion. Understanding how Hume used the term could usefully inform debates about
the natural kind status of emotion and emotions, and in particular their intellectual history
and inheritance. This then, provides another contemporary motivation for the current
study.
But why, one might ask, focus on ‘emotion’ in particular? To someone entering from the
contemporary debate this may seem an obvious choice, given the prominence and
importance of the term in current discourse on mind, whether in the context of
philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, neurology, moral philosophy, etc. But to
those familiar with the discourse of Hume’s time the focus may seem a bit
anachronistically derived. That is to say, the project appears to favor ‘emotion’ over other
terms often used apparently synonymously with ‘passion.’ Hume, as well as his
contemporaries, supplemented the use of ‘passion’ with several other terms in discourse
that touched on affectivity, including ‘affections,’ ‘sentiments,’ ‘appetites,’ ‘feelings,’
and ‘desires.’ In Hume’s case in particular, these terms are in addition to the various
named particular passions (love, hate, pride, humility, desire, aversion, grief, joy, anger,
benevolence, etc), as well as his multiple references to ‘vivacity,’ ‘force,’ ‘impulse,’ and
‘liveliness,’ all terms denoting various kinds of felt states of mind. The question of

6

Scholars like Paul Griffiths have suggested that there really is no single category or natural kind of

‘emotion’ (Griffiths, P. E. (1997), What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press), arguing instead that we think of select individual emotions as
representing natural kinds of basic emotions. By contrast, Louis Charland argues for the possibility of
‘emotion’ as a whole as a natural kind [Charland, Louis (2002). “The Natural Kind Status of Emotion”.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53:511-537]. Following Griffiths, Charland suggests that a
natural kind be understood as a category in which properties are correlated, not necessarily by resemblance
with each other, but rather by homology, which is focused more on history and origin of the objects. Mental
states that would fall under the term ‘emotion’ would be identified by things such as their evolutionary
story, as we come to understand how beings that are ‘emoters’ successfully navigate in the world.
5

whether, or in what way, these terms should be understood as related to or distinct from
the dominant term ‘passion’ may appear to be just as important as the question as it
pertains to ‘emotion’. Why should this study focus on this particular apparent synonym?
The reason for this focus I believe can be found in the exploration of the way this
particular term was used to introduce new dimensions into the discourse on affective
mental states.7 While Descartes had presented a picture of the passions that moved them
beyond being merely passive, Hume constructed a philosophy of mind where the
passionate mind was not only moved primarily by the passions, he wanted to show that
reason alone, as he took it to have been conceived in the rationalist tradition, was
impotent to provide impulse. The somewhat mechanical account of our movements of
mind through association was paired with an account of the force and impulse of
affectivity, to create an account of belief and motivation. The passions, conceived as
particular affective states, with characteristic causes, objects and valence, could not alone
do the work Hume required to explain the shifting, changing nature of the feeling-driven
mind. Therefore his category of reflections of impressions had to include not only these
particular passions, but also the “other emotions resembling them.” Hence the focus of
this project on this particular term, and the additional kind of affective mental state it
seems to denote, as playing a key role in Hume’s philosophy of mind.

7

This is not to say that the other terms mentioned aren’t used in a way that adds dimensions to Hume’s

theory of mind that would not be present with only a concept of passion. Sentiment in particular appears to
play a particular role in his moral psychology, as well as that of some of his contemporaries. My intention
here, however, is to provide the justification for the focus on ‘emotion’ out of all potential candidates; and
this justification, it turns out, has less to do with his moral philosophy, and more to do with his overall
picture of the workings of the mind. This difference between ‘emotion’ and ‘sentiment’ can be seen in the
relative frequency with which each show up in each Book of the Treatise. While sentiment appears not
infrequently in Books I and II, it is used regularly in Book III. On the other hand, emotion appears often
enough in Book I, quite frequently in Book II, and then is hardly used at all in Book III. ‘Emotion’ is
clearly a term important to Hume in explaining the workings of the mind, while ‘sentiment’ figures
strongly into his explanations of moral psychology in particular.
6

With this general picture of the motivation for the project in mind (and some suggestion
of how the findings of this study might be developed and more broadly applied), I will
give a brief outline of what I will discuss in each of the two parts that make up this
dissertation. Part One, “The appearance of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise,” will provide a
detailed textual analysis of Hume’s use of the term ‘emotion’ in that work. I will begin by
considering Hume’s stated taxonomy of the contents of the mind, and in particular the
taxonomy he offers of his ‘impressions of reflection’ (1.2). I will then look at some
textual evidence for the claim that Hume applies the term ‘emotion’ more broadly than he
does the term ‘passion,’ at times making it appear synonymous to impression of
reflection generally (1.3). This discussion will lead into a consideration of emotions in
Hume as essentially felt in character, and touch on the relationship between these feelings
and their (possible) physiological underpinnings, a topic Hume has little to say about, but
is necessary to address if only to distinguish the identity of the emotions Hume is
referring to as more concerned with feeling than physical events (1.4). I will then look at
the nature of these feelings, which I will argue always have a particular hedonic tone, or
valence—put another way, I will look at text that shows emotions to be either pleasant or
painful (uneasy) in nature (1.5). The role of valenced emotion will then be explored as a
part of the production of particular passions (1.6) and then as the key principle in
motivation (1.7). One of the sections of the Treatise where ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’
appear most clearly distinct is in Hume’s account of the calm and violent passions at
2.3.4. I will therefore take some time to work out what is meant by ‘calm’ and ‘violent’ in
Hume, and how these relate to emotions and their strength/weakness (1.8). Another
treatment of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise that appears to distinguish it from ‘passion’ occurs
in Hume’s maxim introduced in the discussions of 2.2.8 that all perceptions are attended
with some emotion. The ‘attending’ nature of emotions will therefore be explored as a
key aspect of their character and role in Hume’s philosophy of mind (1.9). The
discussions of Part One will culminate in a treatment of the transient, fluid and mixable
nature of emotion (1.10), where I will argue for a strong conceptual distinction between
emotions and passions in Hume based on the role emotions play in the changeableness of
the feeling mind.

7

The analysis of Part One will guide the reader not only through the particular passages
where ‘emotion’ is used, but also through the details of the types of discussions in which
this term plays a reoccurring role. Based on the characterization of ‘emotion’ that arises
in Part One, I ultimately wish to argue for a distinction between Hume’s use of the terms
‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ along the following lines. When Hume speaks of the emotions he
is consistently referring to movements of the mind that have both affective content and
are capable of motivating (at times indirectly) by virtue of the ‘impulse’ they provide.
They are distinguished from the passions by their fluid, transient nature. While particular
passions have characteristic hedonic tone or valence, and occur as part of particularly
determined causal chains that Hume takes great pains to elaborate on through much of
Book II, emotions are valenced feelings that can flow between impressions and ideas,
their feeling changing to match the dominant impression of reflection they come to
contribute to.
This distinction between types of mental events I argue can be attributed to Hume’s
conceptual framework in his theory of the impressions of reflection. I do not want to
argue that this distinction is clearly to be found in his explicit taxonomy of mental events
(which is itself not always clear anyway—something I comment on in the discussion of
1.2 in this work). I even hesitate to make the case that this distinction is reflected in his
use of the terms in a clearly consistent way. Though I take there to be strong textual
evidence supporting the reality of a distinction between these as general concepts in
Hume, which is naturally strongly reflected in particular usage taken as a whole, Hume’s
looseness in his use of these (one would assume) technical terms means that a stronger
reading of the distinction in Hume cannot be supported.8 Therefore, along with the claim
about the basic conceptual distinction implicit in his theory, I will also suggest that

8

This loose use of language is of course not without precedence in Hume—see, for example, his own

comments on his use of the technical term ‘imagination’ at 1.3.9.19n1. The difference between these two
cases is that in the case of imagination Hume explicitly recognizes that he is inclined to use the term in
multiple ways, and gives the reader some guidelines in determining his meaning from context. In the case
of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ he offers no such clarification.
8

Hume’s use of terms in relation to each other can be understood in the following two
ways. Passions as understood as ‘original existences’ are a kind of emotion (i.e., passions
considered as whole and without representative content are emotions, but do not exhaust
the category of emotions). Passions as understood as involving what Hume calls their
‘attending circumstances,’ i.e., their causes and objects (which appear to have beliefs and
particular associations of ideas and impressions as partly constitutive of them) are not
identical to the emotions, but are necessarily ‘attended’ by them.
Part Two of the dissertation will begin with a small step away from the text in order to
consider some of the secondary literature that has considered the potential distinction
between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in Hume (2.1). While that particular distinction has
received little treatment (and that which has been done has been brief), the
characterization of the passions and what we would currently identify as Hume’s general
theory of emotion, have received ample treatment, especially in recent decades. Therefore
I will turn to give a brief survey of some of the scholarship on Hume’s theory of the
passions (2.2). I will focus this discussion primarily around the question of whether
Hume’s theory of the passions reveals him to be a cognitivist or a sensationalist with
regard to his theory of emotion9. There are aspects of his theory that appear to fall into
both camps, and the suggestion has been made by some that Hume clearly intended his
theory to be read in one way or the other, while still other commentators have suggested

9

The language I am using here may be slightly confusing. In contemporary discourse the discussions centre

around theories of emotion, not of passion. Therefore, though Hume focused on passions as the dominant
term for affective mental states, when we shift gears into a contemporary analysis of him as a theorist of
affectivity, the scholarship tends to refer to his ‘theory of emotion.’ This is not a particular source of
confusion in most discussions, as the two terms are generally used interchangeably, with one merely
seeming more antiquated than the other. However, in a discussion such as mine where a distinction
between the terms in their older use is being sought this may cause some confusion. I have nevertheless
chosen to refer to Hume’s ‘theory of emotion’ at times when I am considering his thought in the context of
contemporary analysis, as is in keeping with the discussions I am engaging in and referring to. I am
obviously not intending to bring the distinction I have argued is found within Hume to the use of these
terms in debates outside of discussion specifically on that interpretive problem in Hume studies.
9

that Hume was confused in trying to have it both ways. I will acknowledge that there
appears to be a tension in Hume’s thought in this regard. In an effort to explore it more
thoroughly, I will look at the case for Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion (2.2), as
well as the case for Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion (2.3). I will then offer a
brief analysis of how this apparent tension in Hume’s thought might be answered by the
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for in Part One. I intend to show that though
there is indeed some attempt by Hume to ‘have his cake and eat it too’ in the way he
draws on both the cognitive and sensitive aspects of the passions, he is not guilty of as
problematic a tension as may first appear, once the cognitive and sensitive aspects of his
theory are pried apart with the positing of a conceptual distinction between passions and
emotions, respectively.
I will finish this work by offering two brief considerations of how this distinction may be
usefully applied to interpretive issues in other central themes in Hume studies. I will first
present a case for how my proposed understanding of the distinction between emotion
and passion might inform interpretations of Hume’s characterization of belief and its role
in motivation (2.6). I will then consider an interpretive problem in the application of his
principle of sympathy, which I believe can be answered with the distinction between
emotion and passion (2.7). In the conclusion, I will present some suggestions of further
directions this work may take, both in the realm of history of philosophy and Hume
scholarship, as well as potential impact on contemporary debates surrounding the
philosophy of emotion.
With this outline in mind, it is time to move into the detailed analysis of the uses of
‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise in Part One.

10

Part One: The appearance of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s
Treatise

1.1 Introduction

I will begin my investigation with a thorough look at the occurrences of the term
‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise. My intention is to offer, first, ample examples of his usage
of the term for the reader’s own consideration, and second, a preliminary analysis of his
usage, which will be reconsidered and ultimately added to as my analysis progresses
through Part One of the project. At the end of Part One, I will provide a summary of what
I take to be the findings of this examination. This will include both highlighting the types
of discussions Hume predominantly uses the term in, and suggesting claims we might
make about Hume’s characterization of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise. Some of these claims I
will take to be clearly established, some, at this point, merely probable conclusions, and
some important questions that I take to require considerable additional analysis before
they can be answered.
But before moving on to this initial textual analysis, it may be useful to make a general
comment on Hume’s use of the rhetorical device of synonymy in his writing style, as
pointed out by Norton and Norton in their edition of A Treatise. In his writing Hume
frequently used a literary device “in which synonyms or synonymous phrases were
10

conjoined.” That is to say, he often uses a variety of terms or phrases all intended to
designate one idea or concept, particularly in the context of a single discussion. This may

10

Norton and Norton (2007), 570.
11

be counter-intuitive as a way of doing philosophy if one’s concern is careful use of
technical terms. The purpose of listing synonyms, for writers of Hume’s day, would be
either to “amplify meaning,” or to avoid repetition of the same word when a particular
concept is under discussion. Norton and Norton suggest as an example of the first
purpose Hume’s treatment of ‘force’ in his theory of ideas, which is frequently
supplemented with terms like ‘vivacity’, ‘liveliness’, ‘firmness’, etc. And as an example
in Hume of the second purpose, they suggest his frequent replacement of ‘imagination’
with ‘fancy’.

11

Given my aim of offering a characterization of ‘emotion’ in Hume, this point about his
writing style has obvious potential implications. Particularly insofar as I am seeking to
give ‘emotion’ a characterization distinct from other terms for affective mental states that
Hume uses, such as ‘affection,’ ‘sentiment,’ and, (most commonly), ‘passion.’ Hume not
infrequently lists more than one of these terms together, and even at times appears to
replace one with another mid-discussion. One might argue, therefore, that instances in
which Hume offers different terms for affective mental states (such as passions,
emotions, affections, etc) in conjunction with each other is weak evidence, or perhaps
non-evidence, of any real conceptual distinction. Similarly, one might point to his fluidity
between the terms in certain discussions as evidence that they really are synonymous for
Hume. But I would argue that ‘emotion’ is not simply introduced in the Treatise as part
of a device to amplify meaning, or avoid repetition. Rather, I would suggest that the
observation of his writing style from Norton and Norton puts more emphasis on the need
to pay close attention to the contexts in which the term ‘emotion’ is used, and in
particular, to those contexts in which it appears the dominant, or even sole designation for
the concept at issue. There may indeed be places where it is hard to say whether using

11

Ibid. Norton and Norton provide a lovely quote from Hugh Blair on the method of using a variety of

synonyms in writing: synonyms “are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer can
employ them to great advantage, by using them so as to heighten and to finish the picture which he gives
us. He supplies by one, what was wanting in the other, to the force, or to the luster of the image he means to
exhibit.”
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‘affection’ instead of ‘emotion,’ or ‘emotion’ instead of ‘passion’ would have made a
huge difference to Hume’s meaning. But there are multiple ways to explain such
instances. It may be that in the context in question the overlapping reference of the terms
under consideration makes any of them appropriate. In other cases, we may find that one
term indicates a broader category to which the second term belongs. It may also, indeed,
be an instance of a writing style in which synonyms are used to amplify meaning or avoid
repetition.
It is worth noting what Hume himself has to say about his tendency to use the same
technical terms in different ways dependent on the context in his footnote to 1.3.9.19,
which is on his use of ‘imagination.’ He begins explaining it in part by referencing the
more common ways of talking about his subjects, and claims that at times he finds
himself “oblig’d to fall into” this way of speaking. Though he comments that “nothing be
more contrary to true philosophy than this inaccuracy,” he nevertheless offers his readers
his varied use of the term ‘imagination,’ with the following explanation to guide them in
understanding each particular usage:
When I oppose [imagination] to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we
form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty,
excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to
neither, ‘tis indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or
at least the context will explain the meaning.12
A few things are worth nothing. First, the concept attached to ‘imagination’ is narrower
in some contexts, more general in others. The way to tell the difference between different
uses will be to note whether it is being ‘opposed’ or contrasted with some category (in
this case, reason) which will otherwise be considered included in the more general
category (in this case, imagination). Second, Hume acknowledges that there will be
instances in which it doesn’t really matter whether we take him to mean the more general
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or more narrow sense of the term. Third, and most importantly for the careful reader,
Hume tells us that context will point us to the meaning of the term.
This last is perhaps the most important point for the purposes of this investigation. Hume
himself appears to say here that the best way to understand his particular uses of terms
with varied signification will be in the particular context of the usages of such terms. In
what follows I will mostly steer away from explanations that rely on assumptions about
Hume’s literary use of synonyms. To lend support to my readings, I have carefully
grouped instances of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise according to conceptual context and
function, with an eye to drawing conclusions that do not rely in any case on one quote
taken in isolation, but always on a collection of supporting uses and discussions.
Ultimately one of the things I do wish to suggest in Part One of this work is that when we
look at all the uses of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise together, a picture emerges of a general
characterization of emotion in Hume, a characterization that I wish to develop in further
discussion to the end of showing it to be a useful designation for affective mental states
that has an importantly distinct meaning for Hume from the more dominant term,
‘passion.’

1.2

The taxonomy of the Humean mind

A useful starting place for this investigation is Hume’s explicit identification of emotions
as having a place in his taxonomy of the contents of the mind. Unlike certain other terms
for affective mental states that Hume uses, such as affection and sentiment, emotion is
consistently listed along with passion (and sometimes desire and aversion) as part of what
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constitutes the category of impressions of reflection.13 A reminder of Hume’s general
taxonomy of mind may be helpful at this point.
The perceptions of the mind are divided into ideas and impressions, which Hume tells us
map on to our mental experiences of thinking and feeling respectively. All ideas are
copies of impressions, and are described as “the faint images of things in thinking and
reasoning,” while our impressions are those perceptions which “enter with most force and
violence” into our consciousness (1.1.1.1). Both ideas and impressions may be simple
(“admit of no distinction or separation”) or complex (“may be distinguish’d into parts”),
with the complex being themselves composed of the simple (1.1.1.2). The category of
impressions is subdivided into impressions of sensation (or original impressions) and
impressions of reflection (or secondary impressions). Impressions of sensation “are such
as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body,
from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs”
(2.1.1.1). These are impressions that come by way of our senses. The investigation of
such bodily sensations Hume takes to be the work of anatomists and naturalists. As such
he excuses himself from saying anything about them or their causes.14 Secondary
impressions, or impressions of reflection, come to the mind as ‘reflections’ of our
original impressions, or of our ideas derived from them. Given their status as
impressions, it is worth remembering that this is a feeling kind of reflection, not thinking.
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Hume explicitly lists what he intends by ‘impressions of reflection.’
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It might be noted that despite Hume’s statement that discussions of the anatomical beginnings of our

impressions would “lead [him] to far from [his] present subject” (2.1.1.1) and he will therefore leave such
discussions out of his analysis of human nature, there are certainly moments where his psychological
explanations dip into language and explanatory principles more properly considered part of a physiological
approach (see for example 2.3.5.2, where Hume explains the effect of custom on the passions in terms of
the ease of spirits moving, presumably through the body and brain). In doing this he tends to be following
the general approach to the physiology of sensation as he likely was familiar with it in writers such as
Descartes and Malebranche.
15

As impressions are not ideas, we should not understand these ‘reflections’ to be copies of
anything.15
So what part of our experience does Hume think makes up this category of impressions
of reflection? Impressions, he tells us at the very beginning of Book I, are “all our
sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul”
(1.1.1.1). Sensations are then identified as our original impressions, providing felt
experiences of our organs and senses, including their pains and pleasures. Reflection on
these sensations and on the ideas we form as copies of these sensations, in turn gives rise
to new kinds of impressions, “impressions of reflection, viz. passions, desires, and
emotions” (1.1.2.1). Desire, and its opposite, aversion, are added to the list of impressions
of reflection at 1.1.2.1, and 1.2.3.3. In all cases, Hume lists both passions and emotions as
constitutive of his category of impressions of reflection (see 1.1.1.1, 1.1.6.1, and 2.1.1.1).
Though Hume puts faith in his readers’ ability to “perceive the difference between
feeling and thinking” (1.1.1.1) in understanding his ideas/impressions division, and
likewise appears to take the distinction between bodily feeling and those feelings that
arise from our ideas and impressions of bodily feeling to be clear, he offers more detailed
explanation of his suggested taxonomy internal to impressions of reflection. This
treatment, however, and the distinctions it presents are not always clear. At 2.1.1.3 Hume
makes what appears to be an initial division of impressions of reflection into the
categories of calm and violent. He says the calm are “the sense of beauty and deformity
in action, composition and external objects,” while the violent are, “the passions of love
and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.” But this division is “far from being exact.”
Reflective impressions arising from observations of beauty in poetry, for example, can be
experienced as violent ‘raptures,’ while certain mental states we would generally
recognize as passions (love, hate, grief, joy, etc) may be experienced calmly, “decay[ing]
into so soft an emotion as to be, in a manner, imperceptible.” The calm/violent
distinction, Hume goes on to say, is one commonly made, but in fact is a “vulgar and
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specious division” that he makes here merely to “proceed with greater order” in his
analysis. The help this division offers the readers, the ‘greater order’ it is meant to
provide, is apparently in pointing them to the main focus of Book II, the passions, which
Hume identifies as the (generally) more violent impressions of reflection. Hume then
offers his division of the passions themselves into the direct and indirect, a distinction I
will explore in later discussions of the passions in this project.
For now, I think it is worth considering some of the attempts that have been made to
reconstruct the basic taxonomy of impressions of reflection that Hume has offered here.
The exact flow of the taxonomy is not clear from an isolated reading of 2.1.1, as I think
becomes evident when we consider some of the attempts that have been made by
commentators to represent the organization. James Fieser, in his article, “Hume’s
Classification of the Passions and its Precursors,”16 offers analysis of several authors’
attempts at constructing a Humean taxonomy of the reflective impressions, as well as
offering a construction of his own. Fieser’s article highlights what I take to be the
primary difficulty in organizing an outline of Hume’s impressions of reflection: figuring
out how best to incorporate both Hume’s calm/violent distinction and his direct/indirect
distinction into a single taxonomy that flows from the general category of impressions of
reflection, down to the appropriately categorized individual passions. To recap, Hume’s
own discussion gives us the following information:
1) Impressions of reflection are “the passions, and other emotions resembling
them.” (2.1.1.1)
2) Impressions of reflection may be divided into two kinds: calm and violent.
3) The calm are “the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and
external objects;” the violent are “the passions of love and hatred, grief and
joy, pride and humility.” (2.1.1.3)
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4) The calm/violent distinction is not exact—generally calm impressions of
reflection may be experienced violently and vice-versa.
5) Hume’s aim is to use this distinction to identify the topic of his current book:
“those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.”
(2.1.1.3)
6) The passions can be divided into the direct (“desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope,
fear, despair and security”) and the indirect (“pride, humility, ambition,
vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity and their dependents”).
(2.1.1.4)
The main difficulty should be evident. The calm/violent distinction is acknowledged as
inexact, particular passions (never mind other kinds of impressions of reflection, if there
are any) may fall into either category.
Fieser also sees the need to accommodate a distinction, found outside of Treatise 2.1.1,
between instinctive and acquired passions. While the latter type of passion arises from
ideas and impressions of pain and pleasure in varied contexts, the former are part of
original human nature, hence their identification with a kind of instinct.17 Examples
Hume gives of our ‘original instincts’ include benevolence and resentment, love of life,
kindness to children, punishment to our enemies, happiness to our friends, and a general
appetite to good or general aversion to evil.18 Some commentators have identified those
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This is a distinction that will receive more attention in later discussions of this project.
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THN 2.3.3.8 and 2.3.9.8. Hume also mentions, at 2.3.9.8, certain bodily appetites as falling into this

category, such as hunger and lust. This is a bit confusing, as at 1.1.2.1 Hume identifies hunger as an
impression of sensation, and at 2.1.5.6 both hunger and lust are identified as sensations. He does, however,
identify lust as a passion again at 3.2.2.5, though he consistently calls it an appetite in this section as well. It
is not clear if this is an oversight on Hume’s part, or if there is a distinction being made between mere
sensations of bodily appetites, and more realized experiences of these sensations of appetites, that involve
reflection in a way that makes them more akin to passions. Perhaps, for instance, when I am working on a
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passions original to us as ‘primary impressions,’ and those acquired upon perceptions of
pain and pleasure as ‘secondary impressions,’19 and therefore have placed this distinction
somewhere in their reconstructions of Hume’s taxonomy of the impressions of reflection,
a move Fieser takes to be appropriate. With this in mind, I will turn to a quick look at
some of the suggested taxonomies.
Kemp Smith, like Fieser, uses the primary/secondary impression of reflection distinction
in his outline.20 He suggests that impressions of reflection can first be divided into
primary and secondary, with the primary not divided further, but the secondary
subdivided into indirect and direct. The direct, then are subdivided into calm and violent.
Kemp Smith’s outline, Fieser points out, comes up short, since Hume makes it clear that
indirect passions can be experienced as violent (as well as calm, one might assume;
2.1.1.3). Pal Ardal offers some improvement in his suggested organization21: impressions
of reflection divide into primary and secondary, with the primary subdivided into calm
and violent, the secondary into indirect and direct, and finally each of these in turn

philosophy paper and my stomach growls this feeling is merely an impression of sensation, not at all being
a reflection of any current ideas or impressions. If, on the other hand, I see my colleague eating a piece of
chocolate cake and begin to desire one myself, my hunger may be considered something more like a
passion, as it is a reflection of current impressions and ideas. Similar scenarios could certainly be
constructed for the example of lust. Appetites may in this way straddle the impressions of
sensation/impressions of reflection divide for Hume. But this is only a suggestion—more work would
certainly be needed to prove such a claim.
19
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made this distinction in these terms. Note that the language is slightly confusing. Hume uses ‘original’ and
‘secondary’ impressions at 2.1.1.1 to refer to impression of sensation and impressions of reflection
respectively. This is of course not the use intended when commentators sub-divide the category of
impressions of reflection into primary and secondary.
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divided into calm and violent as well. This purposed taxonomy has the advantage of
nicely reflecting Hume’s implied claim that any impression of reflection may be
experienced calmly or violently. Philip Mercer, among others, has accepted this outline in
his work.22 Fieser argues, however, that this outline fails to properly accommodate the
division of particular passions into the categories of generally calm and generally
violent, a division that, he points out, is supported by historical precedents.
Fieser’s own outline involves adopting a token/type distinction when approaching the
classes of calm and violent passions. Types of passions are generally calm or violent,
though individual tokens may be expressed either way. Thus, Fieser argues, “membership
[in the classes] will remain constant despite any variantly experienced tokens.”23 His
taxonomy, therefore, flows as follows: impressions of reflection are divided first into the
(generally) calm and (generally) violent. The generally calm include only certain kinds of
pleasure and pains that may qualify as impressions of reflection (such as the “sense of
beauty and deformity”—Fiesser identifies these generally with “aesthetic emotions and
value judgments”24). The violent are subdivided into the direct and indirect passions. The
primary/secondary distinction is then made only within the class of direct passions, as
none of the primary impressions of reflection that are mentioned are indirect passions,
nor, in fact, does it seem possible for that to be the case, given the more complex and
often socially informed structure of the indirect passions.25
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work. For an interesting discussion of the layered contexts of association tied to the indirect passions, and
their relation to the direct, see Jane McIntyre’s “Hume’s Passions: Direct and Indirect” [Hume Studies, 26
(2000), 77-86].
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Fieser’s article offers an interesting historical background to some of the categories
Hume uses, suggesting the need to read Hume’s work on the passions as informed by the
Stoic tradition and Hutcheson’s calm/violent class distinction in particular.26 The
taxonomy he develops has the strength of being historically informed and shaped. But I
am not convinced of it. Despite the common and historic class division of passions into
calm and violent (which Hume would no doubt have been very aware of), I think Fieser
is wrong to insist on incorporating this class distinction into Hume’s taxonomy of the
impressions of reflection. Hume emphasizes that he takes this to be a ‘vulgar’ distinction,
and this is something he never says about his division of perceptions into ideas and
impressions, nor of impressions into sensations and impressions of reflection, nor of
passions into direct and indirect. What he does say when he introduces the distinction
between calm and violent impressions of reflection at 2.1.1 is that this common usage
makes it a useful distinction in pointing his readers to the kind of impression of reflection
he is interested in addressing in Book II of the Treatise, namely, the passions (which he
takes to be most commonly understood as generally violent passions). He desires to draw
on the common distinction between calm and violent to “proceed with the greater order”
in his continuing discussion—having talked about ideas, he now wants to talk about our
more ‘violent’ impressions of reflection, the passions. This reading of Hume’s intention
in drawing the reader’s attention to the calm/violent distinction is supported, I think, by
his later discussions of this distinction, the primary purposes of which are to explain how
the common distinction can be used to explain peoples’ mistaken perceptions that they
are at times motivated by reason. Violently experienced passions we tend to recognize as
such, the calm we tend to confuse with reason.27 In both his discussions of motivation
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motivation will naturally follow as this work progresses. See THN 2.3.3.8-10, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6.10 for more
on the workings of calm and violent passions.
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and his introduction of his topic of the passions in 2.1.1, Hume treats the calm/violent
distinction not as a technical and precise distinction, but rather as a common way of
thinking and speaking that is useful in the discussions in question.
Of course there is something dissatisfying about this explanation, since it leaves us
without a clear taxonomy of the impressions of reflection of the kind Fieser and others
have tried to construct. But I think this dissatisfaction, and the general difficulties in
producing a taxonomy internal to Hume’s impressions of reflection, is a product of what
Hume actually presents the readers with, not of shortcomings in the scholarship. Consider
again what Hume tells us. Impressions of reflection are clearly distinguished from
impressions of sensation. They include “the passions, and other emotions resembling
them” (2.1.1.1). Then he offers a way to understand a narrowing of this category by
separating the commonly considered calm impressions of reflection from the commonly
considered violent. The latter the reader would recognize as the passions, which Hume
intends to make the focus of his investigation in Book II, in particular “their nature,
origin, causes, and effects” (2.1.1.3). In presenting his distinction between direct and
indirect passions, Hume is already moving his investigation into the passions in
particular. Nothing, it turns out, is said about how the generally calm impressions of
reflection fit into a taxonomy of impressions of reflection. And of more immediate
concern to our investigation, nothing is said about the impressions that might fall into the
evasive category of “other emotions” resembling the passions.
So what role has emotion played in Hume’s discussions of the taxonomy of the contents
of the mind? First, they are impressions, not ideas—that is, feelings, not copies of felt
experience. As impressions they are identified consistently with secondary impressions,
or impressions of reflection. This means that they arise as felt ‘reflections’ of our ideas
and impressions, at first of sensations, particularly of pain and pleasure, and then with
the natural production of more, often complex, ideas and impressions, they arise from
these as well. As for how emotions may or may not be separated from other kinds of
impressions of reflection, in particular from the passions and desires/aversions that are
included in the lists Hume gives of impressions of reflection, this isn’t clear. The
calm/violent distinction is presented primarily to point the reader to “[w]hat we
22

commonly understand by passion… a violent and sensible emotion of mind” (2.3.8.13).
This seems to suggest that passions are a particular kind of emotion, a conclusion
supported by the reference at 2.1.1.1 to impressions of reflection being, “the passions and
other emotions resembling them.” In fact, there are places where ‘emotion’ and
‘impression’ appear to be used interchangeably (see for example 2.1.5.6 and 2.1.9.5). But
there is not, at this point, sufficient evidence to draw such a conclusion about the
relationship between emotions and impressions generally, nor a conclusion about how
passions and emotions as constituents of the category of impressions of reflection are
related. We do know that passions themselves can be divided into direct and indirect, and
that impressions of reflection generally may be experienced as either calm or violent.
Hume also tells us at 1.3.16.3 that animals are “susceptible of the same emotions and
affections as persons,” and we learn in Book II that animals experience many of the same
particular passions that humans do. These are all together basic contents of the mind,
facilitating the thinking, feeling and reasoning that forms in us beliefs and moves us to
action. But if emotion is to be understood to play a role more distinct, in particular from
the passions, we need to look beyond the basic taxonomy of mind that Hume offers,
which, I take to have shown here, is very basic and lacks detail in its presentation of the
classes of the impressions of reflection in particular.

1.3

Emotion as a broader category of impressions of
reflection

One conclusion that might be drawn from the discussion above is that while passions may
be best considered as a particular kind of impression of reflection (i.e., the generally more
violently experienced impressions of reflection), ‘emotion’ is used in a way that often
seems to suggest it has a broader application than that. One might suggest that all calmly
or violently experienced impressions of reflection can be considered emotions, and
23

passions are a particular kind of emotion. This is a conclusion that would appear to have
support from other discussions in the Treatise. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to
present some of the textual evidence that I take to support the conclusion that Hume
presents emotion as a broader category of impressions of reflection than passion.
The term ‘emotion’ is clearly used by Hume in some contexts as a sort of ‘catch-all’
phrase, meant to be inclusive of a wide array of felt mental states or events. For example,
in his discussion of time, Hume argues that when we hear five consecutive notes on a
flute we have an impression of these five sounds, and corresponding ideas, but no sixth
impression of time passing (our idea of the passage of time, he explains, comes from the
manner in which the impressions appear, not from some distinct impression). “These
five sounds,” he explains, “making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no
emotion in the mind, nor produce an affection of any kind, which being observ’d by it
can give rise to a new idea” (1.2.3.10). The point Hume is seeking to make is that not
only are we limited to the initial five impressions of sensation, but that there is no further
impression of reflection generated by the experience of these five notes. ‘Emotion’ is
being used here as a sort of general term for impressions of reflection (in this case
supplemented with the term ‘affection’28). It is used with similarly broad scope in
Hume’s critique of our tendency to “bestow on external objects the same emotions” we
observe in ourselves, “and to find everywhere those ideas which are most present to [us]”
(1.4.3.11). Here again ‘emotions’, contrasted with ‘ideas’, appears to be a sort of catch-all
phrase for impressions. Finally, in his discussion of sympathy in animals in Book II,
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literary use of synonymy in Hume that Norton and Norton point out (as was discussed in 1.1). There is
reason to think that ‘emotion’ and ‘affection’ in Hume might be close to synonymous. At the very least, it
appears much harder in the case of ‘affection’ to present a case for any kind of real distinction from
‘passion,’ or ‘emotion’—it appears for Hume to be a rather general term for impressions of reflection.
Without arguing for any further interpretation, I will note for now that Hume’s use of ‘affection’ appears to
have been influenced by Hutcheson, and that the occurrences of ‘affection’ in the Treatise tend to be
similar to his usage of ‘emotion’ in a way that, say ‘passion’ is not. For more passages where both terms
are present, see his usage at 1.3.16.3, 2.1.4.3, 2.1.11.3, 2.2.2.6, 2.2.3.1, 2.3.4.5 and 3.3.1.7.
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Hume says that a passion received by sympathy in an animal “produces almost all the
same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species” (2.2.12.6).
‘Emotion’ is used to denote a wide variety of impressions, in this case all the passions
and pains and pleasures susceptible to sympathetic contagion.29
In addition to texts where ‘emotion’ appears to be used as a catch-all phrase, there are
passages in which emotion is explicitly used as a sort of broader category, replacing
multiple terms for different impressions of reflection with this single, apparently
encompassing category. For example, at 1.1.1.12 Hume says, “To prove the ideas of
passion and desire not to be innate, [philosophers] observe that we have a preceding
experience of these emotions in ourselves.” Here passions and desires are collectively
referred to as emotions. As was noted above, at 2.1.1.1 when the very category of
impressions of reflection is presented, Hume says it consists of “the passions and other
emotions resembling them,” suggesting that not only are our passions themselves a kind
of emotion, but there are other passion-like emotions that are also included in the
category of impressions of reflection. Later, in a discussion of sympathy at 2.2.5.21,
Hume says that mirror-like human minds “reflect each other’s emotions” and that “those
rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay
away by insensible degrees.” Here emotion is presented as a particularly broad category,
inclusive of all the feelings that can be ‘reflected’ in people through the sympathy
mechanism, a mechanism that operates through the enlivening of ideas of impressions to
the points of changing our ideas of others’ feelings into the feelings themselves (note that
this for Hume includes the particular feeling attached to believed ideas, hence his
inclusion of opinions). At 2.3.5.2 Hume speaks of “wonder, surprize, and of all the
emotions, which arise from novelty,” and later in the same passage speaks of emotion as
encompassing both our pleasurable and painful affections. Finally, at 2.3.8.13 Hume
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pointing out that Hume thinks beliefs can be sympathetically adopted, as well as passions, pains, pleasures,
etc. This makes the possibility that ‘emotion’ is here being used broadly enough to capture all possible
sympathetically communicated mental events even more interesting.
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reminds us that “[w]hat we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible
emotion of mind,” again suggesting passion to be a kind of emotion, making emotion the
broader category.
This last piece of text, as well as a few others we have looked at, uses ‘emotion’ as a
more general term in the context of discussion of the calmness or violence with which an
impression of reflection is experienced.30 As was argued above, the division between
calm and violent in Hume is not one of absolute categories, but rather a division that can
either be made between impressions of reflection that are generally experienced either
calmly or violently, or between particular experiences of impressions of reflection, which
can be either calm or violent to varying degrees. So when Hume wishes to speak of
passions as the generally violent impressions of reflection (themselves often identified
with emotions), he contrasts them with ‘soft’ emotions, and includes examples like the
subtle feelings that may arise when observing beautiful or deformed things (2.1.1.3). At
both 2.1.1.3 and 2.3.8.13 Hume is happy to draw on the vulgar distinction between
violent and calm emotions in order to identify the passions. All this suggests a use of
‘emotion’ as a generally broader category in Hume than ‘passion.’
An important question that still is unclear at this point is the degree to which ‘passion’
and ‘emotion’ should be understood as receiving distinct treatment in Hume. Certainly,
there are places where they appear to be used interchangeably, but the question is
whether this is because of their overlapping reference, or because Hume is treating the
terms as synonyms. There are also instances where both are listed together, and it is not
clear whether this is because they have different reference, or whether Hume is using
synonymy as a literary device. For example, passages like 1.3.5.5 and 2.3.3.4, where
passion and emotion are presented connected disjunctively, could be read either way—
potentially ‘emotion’ is adding something to the statement that ‘passion’ alone could not,
but whether such a reading is appropriate is not yet clear. This question cannot be
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answered here fully, as I have not yet provided a treatment of Hume’s concept of passion
(this will be addressed more directly in Part Two of this work). I will, however, note
some of the places where a distinction in scope of reference between ‘passion’ and
‘emotion’ seems suggested.
Consider the following passage, found in a discussion of the workings of the indirect
passions in Book II:
‘Tis evident, then, that when the mind feels the passion either of pride or humility
upon the appearance of a related object, there is, beside the relation or transition
of thought, an emotion or original impression produc’d by some other principle.
The question is, whether the emotion first produc’d be the passion itself, or some
other impression related to it. (2.1.9.5)
There are several interesting things to note about the use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in
this passage. First, the initial feeling we have when we experience one of the indirect
passions (generally a pain or pleasure that we will then associate with the pain or pleasure
of humility or pride31) Hume identifies as “an emotion or original impression.” This
language is a bit confusing. It sounds as though Hume is equating emotions with
impressions of sensation, not impressions of reflection as one might expect. And it is
certainly true that Hume includes pains and pleasures among our impressions of
sensation. It is also true that Hume identifies various passions as being painful or pleasant
in nature. Perhaps, then, we can understand the category of emotion to include our pains
and pleasures, which would in turn suggest that this category is indeed broader than that
of the passions. This is not the only place where Hume identifies pains and pleasures with
emotions. At 2.2.11.6, Hume is similarly describing the circumstances in which the
indirect passions arise, and identifies the necessary feeling of pain or pleasure as a
required emotion for occasioning the passion. Also at 2.1.10.11, Hume identifies pleasure
and pride grouped together, and then uneasiness and humility, as emotions. Again,
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emotion appears as a broader category, in which both passions and certain sensations of
pain/pleasure may be included.
The passage at 2.1.9.5 also presents another interesting possibility: could the term
emotion apply to all impressions of reflection? This would be to say that for Hume all
reflective feelings could be described as emotions, even though only particular feelings
may be rightly called ‘passions.’ This possibility finds support from instances where
Hume appears to use ‘emotion’ and ‘impression’ interchangeably.32 A final intriguing
piece of textual evidence to this end is found at 2.2.2.8, where Hume explains why
travelling with a friend through generally pleasing terrain will excite neither the passions
of love (for my companion) nor pride if the land has no connection to either person. In
such a case there is an undeniable, generally pleasant felt experience, however, “… my
emotions are rather to be consider’d as the overflowing of an elevate or humane
disposition, than as an establish’d passion.” This distinction, between emotions as
abundant feeling and emotions as ‘established passions,’ is particularly suggestive of
passions being a particular kind of emotion, and the category of emotion itself extending
to a broader range of felt experience.
What conclusions can we draw at this point about the scope of the category of emotion in
the Treatise? First, that there is good reason to think that ‘emotion’ can appropriately be
used to refer to any impression of reflection, inclusive of the violent and the calm.
Further, emotion is clearly used at times as a catch-all phrase for felt mental states
generally, including not only passions, but also sentiments, affections, desires, and even
the vivid feelings of believed ideas (as shared by sympathy). All this suggests that the
scope of reference of the term ‘emotion’ in Hume is broader than that of ‘passion’—a
claim which gains particular support from the observation that at times sensations of pain
and pleasure are referred to as emotions. This last observation raises the question of
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For examples of places where Hume appears to use emotion and impression interchangeably, see 2.1.5.6,

2.1.9.5 and 2.2.8.20. Also 2.1.5.4, where sensations are called “peculiar emotions,” suggesting again that
emotion straddles the divide of impressions into sensations and reflective impressions.
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whether and in what way Hume’s use of emotion might straddle his distinction between
impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. A good place to begin an answer
to this question would be an exploration of ‘emotion’ in Hume as feeling and felt mental
states.

1.4

Emotion as feeling

That emotions are felt mental events may seem very clear in Hume’s usage of the term.
Indeed, to a modern audience the idea that feeling is a central part of the concept of
emotion might seem too obvious to require much argument. However, this aspect of
Hume’s usage is more significant than a contemporary reader may assume. Hume’s
contemporaries, when they did use the term, generally used it in the sense of physical
disturbance and agitation.33 When it was applied to aspects of human experience it was
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Lord Kames is a striking exception to this general rule. He had an explicitly stated emotion/passion

distinction in which ‘emotion’ is not used in the older sense of physical disturbance, but in a sense more
akin to Hume’s usage. The work in which this distinction is found, Kame’s Elements of Criticism [Kames,
H. H., Lord (1796). Elements of criticism. First American from the seventh London edition. Boston.
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. University of Western Ontario. 16 Aug. 2009], was first
published in 1762, some 23 years after the publication of Book II of Hume’s Treatise. The mutual influence
of these thinkers ideas on each other is difficult to say—Kames and Hume were certainly familiar with each
other’s work, but Kame’s theory of the passions generally, and his characterization of the emotion/passion
distinction in particular, differ from Hume’s even while sharing some similar key approaches. I cannot
comment here at any length on the potential influence of the ideas, but I will give a brief characterization of
Kame’s emotion/passion distinction.
For Kame’s emotions are the feelings of pain and pleasure that he introduces as part of the
necessary causes of passions. As such, he generally characterizes the emotions as mental events antecedent
to the experience of passions. Emotion responses can occur spontaneously and without any kind of mental
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tied closely to bodily disturbance and agitation. Annette Baier has suggested, following
the Oxford English Dictionary, that ‘emotion’ didn’t appear used in the more modern
sense of ‘feeling’ until the early 1800’s, well after the writing of the Treatise.34 This
might lead a reader of Hume to assume his usage of ‘emotion’ is really intended as a
reference to movement of ‘spirits’ and other bodily events connected to feeling. In this
section I will present text to the end of arguing that though Hume was aware of, and
sometimes took advantage of, the physiological connotations of the term ‘emotion,’ he
saw the physiological as the realm of the anatomists and naturalists. His concern was less
with emotions as physical movement taking place in the body, and more with emotions as
the feelings of the mind that (perhaps) correspond to these movements.
Of the over 100 uses of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise, only 6 of them explicitly present
emotion as related to a physiological aspect of human experience. Hume, as was
mentioned above, did not take himself to be engaged in speculation on the workings of
the body—this he took to be the work for “anatomists and natural philosophers”
(1.1.2.1).35 Nevertheless, he did on occasion speak in more physiological terms when
describing various aspects of human mental experience. Those instances where ‘emotion’

reflections (‘natural’ responses) or as feelings of pain and pleasure following on reflection on our ideas and
impressions. In either case these feelings are fleeting if they are not accompanied by desire. Stronger
emotions are felt with desire attached, and though the feeling of emotions attended by desire and emotions
unattended by desire are the same, Kames characterizes the latter as ‘emotions’ and the former as the more
enduring ‘passions.’ ‘Desire’ itself is characterized as an internal impulse that moves us generally to act.
Therefore another way to understand his emotion/passion distinction is that passions are the feelings that
move us to act, while emotions are more fleeting feelings that fail to move us. Passions require an object
that they move us towards, emotions lack this. (See Elements of Criticism, chapter 2, part 1, section 1.)
34

35

Baier (1991), 310 n9.
Hume also is careful to distinguish between the use of ‘impression’ to indicate the manner of production

of the perceptions (for instance, physical impression of objects on the organs in some way) and the
experience of the perceptions themselves, the latter being the use he makes of it. See the footnote to 1.1.1.1.
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is used I will look at quickly here. Most of the uses of ‘emotion’ that link it to
physiological phenomena reference the ‘spirits’ in some way.36 For instance, at 1.3.10.10
Hume speaks of the effects of “poetical enthusiasm” on the spirits as giving them
“emotion.” Similarly, at 2.2.4.4 he talks of our tendency to seek lively entertainment to
“excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain’d by
some brisk and lively emotion,” since Hume takes the experience of feeling to be desired,
even in some cases where the feeling is not pleasant.37 In keeping with this theme, Hume
claims at 2.2.4.7 that “a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to
the spirits.” At 2.2.8.4 Hume makes the claim that “ no object is presented to the senses,
nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d with some emotion or
movement of spirits proportion’d to it.” Note how this statement (which will receive a
fuller treatment in a more complete context below) directly identifies emotion with
movements of the spirits. In his discussion of how violent passions strengthen our
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Hume is likely following Malebranche (an author Hume is known to have been familiar with) and the

general Cartesian line on the role of ‘spirits’ as the physical underpinning of our experience of emotion. He
also may have been influenced, however, by Malebranche’s move to draw a distinction between these
physical causes and the actual mental experience of emotions. He argues, “I cannot understand how certain
people imagine there is an absolutely necessary relation between the movements of the spirits and blood
and the emotions of the soul. A few tiny particles of bile are rather violently stirred up in the brain—
therefore the soul must be excited by some passion, and the passion must be anger rather than love. What
relation can be conceived between the idea of an enemy’s faults, or a passion of contempt or hatred, on the
one hand, and the corporeal movement of the blood’s parts striking against certain parts of the brain on the
other?” [Malebranche, N., T. M. Lennon, et al. (1997). The Search after Truth. Cambridge; New York,
Cambridge University Press, 338-339]. For Malebranche the connection is explained by his occassionalism,
which entails no real causal connection between the physical movements and the felt experience. Hume is
not an occassionalist, but he does seem to assume a distinction between the physical and the
phenomenological. He is not concerned with the details of the physiology, and the kind of causal
connection, but instead focuses on emotions and passions as felt events, which can be analyzed and
understood independent of their physical underpinnings.
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There is the potential for any emotion to be a desirable kind of experience, for Hume, since he holds that

“every thing, which inlivens the mind to a moderate degree” is agreeable (2.3.5.2)..
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dominant passions even when they are opposites, Hume describes how “an opposition in
the passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder,
than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force” (2.3.4.5). Finally, Hume
makes a slightly different kind of physiological claim at 2.1.5.8, where he references the
organs “naturally fitted to produce the emotion” of pride.
Clearly, in five of these uses Hume is using ‘emotion’ to mean the physical movement
and agitation of spirits in the body. But it is also true that in each of these passages
Hume’s overarching interest is in the feelings that movement and agitation occasion in
our conscious experience, and the effects these felt mental events ultimately have. For
instance, at 1.3.10.10 Hume is arguing that the feelings associated with the motions
stirred up by poetical enthusiasms are qualitatively different from the feelings of real
belief. The reference to physical agitation is incidental—what is important is the
comparison of the feelings aroused by poetry and the feelings aroused in beliefs. At
2.2.4.4 and 2.2.4.7 the case is the same, it is the felt experience of motion in the spirits
that is pleasant to us, not the fact that there is physical motion occurring. The claim at
2.2.8.4 that every perception is attended by some emotion can be seen as two-fold: first,
that there is always some physical motion that happens when we perceive something, and
second, that there is always some feeling accompanying what we perceive, even if it is
very slight. The case is the same at 2.3.4.5 and 2.1.5.8. Hume references bodily events,
even uses the term ‘emotion’ to describe the physical movement (as the term was
commonly used in his time), but ultimately his concern is not with anatomy or bodily
mechanics, but with movements of mind, and in particular, feeling.
In the end, what we see in these passages is evidence that Hume takes there to be
anatomical events corresponding to (at least some of) our mental events. Occasionally he
is inclined to reference these bodily movements as part of his explanation for the
workings of the mind. But his use of ‘emotion’ extends far beyond these isolated
instances of physical explanation. And even in cases where it is used to reference the
physical events, his ultimate concern is in emotions as felt experiences, not as mechanics
of body. I would argue that, contrary to some claims about use of ‘emotion’ in the 18th
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century, Hume’s use of the term, though still closely connected to connotations of
physical events, is primarily concerned with feeling, not physical movement.
Moving away from the physical underpinnings of emotion in Hume, I will look now at
some textual evidence for conclusions we might draw in characterizing the feeling aspect
of Hume’s emotions. A useful starting place is his distinction between feeling and
thinking. While the basic distinction Hume takes to be self-evident to all upon reflection
(1.1.1.1), he does provide us with some useful observations about these activities and
their interactions.
The first I will note is his contention that effort of thought disrupts the operation of
feeling, and feeling in turn disrupts the operation of thought. “As the emotions of the soul
prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection, so these latter actions of the mind are
equally prejudicial to the former” (1.4.1.11). Hume argues this within the context of a
discussion of belief. A believed idea for Hume is an idea that we experience with a
particular feeling attending it. Hume finds that engaging in subtle reasoning decreases our
experience of feeling, and therefore makes it less likely that careful calculation of thought
will result in beliefs. On the other hand strong feelings, which can result in belief
formation, often prevent careful thought and reflection. Why does Hume think these
activities interfere with each other? He goes on to explain in this passage that, “The mind,
as well as the body, seems to be endow’d with a certain precise degree of force and
activity, which it never employs in one action, but at the expense of all the rest.” Emotion
is feeling, one of the two basic activities of mind. Here we learn that to the degree that the
mind is taken up in the activity of feeling emotion, it will compromise the imagination’s
ability to engage in unfelt reasoning. The mind can only exert itself to a limited degree,
and extremes of either activity (thinking or feeling) mean that effort cannot be made in
the other. Note also that despite the analogy drawn to the body, emotions are placed in
the realm of activities of mind. Hume is using them to mean feeling, not physical events.
This kind of contrasting of feeling with the operation of reasoning occurs in many places
in Hume. ‘Reasoning’ itself is of course a tricky topic in Hume, partly because he is
inclined to talk about it in at least two ways: as the associations of ideas that constitute
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causal reasoning on the one hand, and as the perception of relations that hold between our
ideas on the other. It is the second kind of reason in particular that Hume frequently
contrasts with our felt experience. He argues that the association of ideas “produces no
emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind” (2.1.9.4) and that reason
“exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion” (2.3.3.8). It is exactly because of
the lack of emotion attending the workings of reason that we are inclined to confuse the
calm passions, instances of little or subtle emotion, with the workings of reason. Hume
says that the calm passions, “though they be real passions, produce little emotion in the
mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation”
(2.3.3.8). Here again we see emotion directly identified with feeling, a kind of sensation.
This sensation may be subtle, as is the case with the calm passions, but is still distinct
from the activity of reasoning, as there is still emotion present. It is important to note that
here Hume is understanding ‘reasoning’ in this case very simply as the activity of
recognizing relations between ideas that are themselves merely copies of impressions.
This difference from reason is another important characteristic of emotion; in a rather
infamous passage at 2.3.3.5 Hume argues that “[w]hen I am angry, I am actually possest
with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than
when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.”38 Emotions are pure impressions,
pure feelings, and not ‘copies’ of anything in our experience, unlike ideas. Feeling itself,
we may say, is nonrepresentational for Hume, and emotions are identified with this kind
of purely felt mental event.39
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At 1.1.6.1 Hume also appears to assume that all impressions of reflection are non-representative. The

passage at 2.3.3.5, and the reasons for its infamous status in contemporary Hume scholarship, will be
considered at much greater length in Part Two, and in particular give consideration to the arguments
Annette Baier has given for rejecting this passage as part of Hume’s considered view on the nature of the
passions.
39

See also 2.2.6.3, where Hume describes pride and humility as “pure emotions of the soul” because they

are not attended by a desire that would point us to other ideas, and in light of which move us in a particular
direction.
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We may now question what kind of feeling is characteristic of emotions. A related
question concerns their relation to the other kinds of feelings we have, namely those of
pure sensation. Is the impression I have of the color red a kind of emotion? Or is there
some distinction between kinds of feelings that Hume would like to draw? And what
about the sensations of pain and pleasure, which (as has been pointed out above) Hume
considers as impressions of sensation, but also identifies as emotions in various places?
To answer these, let us begin by looking at a telling passage from Hume’s discussion of
pride and humility:
The second quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise
consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they
excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is
a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure
and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. (2.1.5.4)
There are several important points that can be drawn from this passage. First, emotions
are identified as the feelings, or sensations that are peculiar to particular passions. In fact,
despite the amount of time Hume spends in Book II talking about the necessary causal
conditions of various passions, it is the feeling peculiar to each passion that he explicitly
identifies as “the very being and essence” of that particular passion.40 Emotions are then
sensations, but, at least in this context, they cannot be the sensations Hume intends by his
category of impressions of sensations, as the passions are of course impressions of
reflection. If the sensation, i.e., emotion of a passion is its very essence, then that same
sensation cannot be considered an impression of sensation. This makes further sense,
when we reconsider what Hume intends by impression of sensation: namely, those
sensations that “without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution
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The question of whether Hume ultimately characterizes his passions as defined by their feeling, or by the

circumstances and causes necessarily attending them is the focus of the debate between a sensationalist and
cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions, which will be the focus of Part Two.
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of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external
organs” (2.1.1.1).
But then what kind of sensations are emotions? Another point of importance that can be
taken from the passage at 2.1.5.4 is that the emotions or sensations excited when we
experience a passion are either painful or pleasant in nature. Pain and pleasure, as brute
physical sensations, are not considered by Hume to be impressions of reflection, but
rather impressions of sensation. So what of the painful and pleasant emotions that
constitute the very essence of particular passion, which are themselves clearly reflective
impressions, responses to ideas and impressions we have present to us (as opposed to
spontaneously arising in us)? As was noted above, all pains and pleasures seem for Hume
to be kinds of emotions. But the felt experience of pain and pleasure is neither
exclusively found in impressions of sensation, nor impressions of reflection. A pain that
comes from damage to our bodies, immediately felt in us without preceding ideas or
impressions leading to it, is pain experienced as an impression of sensation. A pain of
heartache from grief or lost love, on the other hand, is one that arises from preceding
ideas and impressions. It is our own realizations, associations of various ideas and
impressions, that brings about this kind of pain in us. Similar stories can be told to
illustrate the difference between pleasures of sensation and pleasures of reflection. Pain
and pleasure come in a variety of felt experiences, and in many of these cases may be
appropriately called emotions. Whether every instance of pain or pleasure may be
classified as an emotion (including my pain at stubbing my toe, or my pleasure at tasting
chocolate), is not yet clear. Though there are other instances of impressions of sensation
(the sight of redness, the taste of salt, etc), which, insofar as they are neither painful nor
pleasurable, we have no reason at this point to think Hume might have qualified as
emotions. In fact, the basic information given to us by our senses, when the object is not
associated with anything that would inspire in us a passion (primarily things painful or
pleasant to us), Hume at times identifies as producing no emotion in us, as in the case of
“an ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither [myself nor my
companion],” which causes “no emotion, or independent pain or pleasure” (2.2.2.5).
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With a better understanding of Hume’s emotions as kinds of sensations (and distinct from
other kinds of sensations), I will make one final point about the characteristic feeling of
emotion. In his descriptions of the workings of sympathy Hume frequently uses the term
‘emotion.’ At 2.1.11.3 Hume argues that the ideas we receive of the passions of others
are converted by them into impressions by acquiring, “such a degree of force and vivacity
as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original
affection.” Here we see the distinction between a vividly held idea of a passion and the
passion itself is the degree of force and vivacity attending it. When this vivacity reaches a
certain point, it is enough to turn our lively idea into the passion itself, as that vivacity
will result in “an equal emotion” to a passion experienced as a result of our own
reflections on our ideas and impressions. We know already that the very essence of a
passion is the particular emotion affiliated with it. Now we know that the sensation of
that emotion is one of force and vivacity, such that increases in force and vivacity can
turn mere ideas of the sensation of the passions, i.e., the emotion, into the passion itself.
This is not the only place where emotion is described as a feeling of force, vivacity or
liveliness (see 2.2.4.4, for instance). The feeling of an emotion brings with it a certain
force; how this force affects our experience of that emotion, say in terms of motivation of
the will, is not yet clear.
In summary, in this section I hope to have shown the following about Hume’s use of
‘emotion’ in the Treatise. That ‘emotion’ is used to denote feeling, generally as
contrasted with the non-felt nature of reasoning (a distinction sometimes lost on those
who mistakenly identify the calmly experienced passions with reason). This felt nature of
emotion is over and above any reference to the physical motion of the spirits or other
parts of the body that might occur concurrently. It is a kind of feeling that potentially
interferes with certain kinds of reasoning (that which only involves associations of ideas),
and in fact the potential for interference runs both ways. Emotions are sensations, but not
identical to Hume’s category of impressions of sensation. They are rather the sensations
of reflective impressions, and particular emotions constitute the very essence of particular
passions. Emotions include a variety of distinct pain and pleasure experiences, most
importantly those that arise from our reflections on ideas and impressions presented to us.
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Finally, emotions are feelings of force and vivacity- an experience of a particular passion
is distinguished from the mere idea of that passion by the degree of force with which it is
felt.
One of the most important things that has been noted in this section is that emotion in
Hume includes a large variety of pleasures and pains. The next section deals with this
observation specifically, and makes a case for the following claim: emotions in Hume are
necessarily either painful or pleasant. In contemporary discussion, this is to say that
emotion in Hume is necessarily valenced.

1.5

Valence: Emotion as valenced

Before looking at the textual support for the claim that emotions for Hume always have a
positive (pleasurable) or negative (painful) valence, I will give a brief account of this
term in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion.41 The classification of
emotions by valence, i.e., by whether they are positive or negative, is common to many
theories of emotion, both contemporary and historical. More controversial is the question
of how to best understand what makes a particular emotion positive or negative. For
instance, we may evaluate an emotion as positive insofar as it is ‘about’ something good
(intentional valence). On the other hand we may evaluate the valence of an emotion
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My presentation of the concept will follow closely the discussion of valence found in the entry on

emotion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Charland, L. and R. Gordon (2005). Emotion. Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. D. Borchert, MacMillan. 2: 197-203].
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based on what the felt experience of that emotion is like (experiential valence). It should
be no surprise at this point that Hume is inclined to classify according to the experiential
valence of emotions. That is, he is concerned with whether an emotion feels painful or
pleasant. The distinctly painful or pleasant nature of an emotion is an essential
component of it for Hume. In particular, the valence of our impressions of reflection play
a key role in how they associate with other impressions, produce new impressions (often
particular passions), and at times act as opposing forces. I have broken the discussion of
valence in Hume’s theory of emotion here into three parts. The first will deal generally
with text supporting the claim that for Hume emotions are valenced, and argue further
that in his view the pains and pleasures that constitute the valence of each emotion come
in a variety of kinds, not merely degrees. In the second, 1.6, I will look at the role of this
kind of valenced feeling in the production of our passions Finally, in 1.7, I will begin
considering the way we are ultimately motivated by our impressions of reflection, and the
vital role played by valenced emotions in experiences of willing. But to begin, I will start
with a basic look at emotions as experientially valenced mental events.
At 2.2.5.3 Hume argues that one of the reasons we tend to feel esteem (a species of love)
for the rich and powerful is the pleasure we receive from the agreeable objects they own
or control. He explains,
We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without
an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much
in our common indolent way of thinking, ‘tis easy, either in reading or in
conversation, to discover them… [E]very thing, which is agreeable to the senses,
is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an
image of that satisfaction, which it gives by its real application to the bodily
organs.
There are several interesting things we learn about the emotions here. Emotions are
presented as the feelings of pleasure and uneasiness that we receive in response to the
reflection on things that are beautiful and ugly, agreeable and disagreeable. Emotions are
thus presented as valenced, sensitive reactions that are generally positive or negative in
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nature. It is interesting to note that Hume specifies here that these are sensations of
reflection; we perceive things that are beautiful, ugly, agreeable, or disagreeable, and
upon reflecting on them (i.e., responding to our conscious experience of their ideas and
impressions) experience emotions that are either pleasant or uneasy in nature. These
emotions, however, Hume notes are not necessarily obvious to us (they are, perhaps,
calm in nature), and it is not so much from a conscious awareness of always experiencing
emotions of pleasure or uneasiness that we can conclude that beautiful/ugly or
agreeable/disagreeable things always have this felt effect on us. Rather, it is when we
note human behavior, such as the way in which things which please our senses are used
in attempts to produce vivacity in thought (Hume gives the example of the use of imagery
pleasing to the senses in poetry or conversation), that we realize there are two kinds of
pleasant sensations at play. This is what Hume is explaining in the latter part of the quote
above: when we reflect on the ideas and impressions of pleasant experience that come to
the imagination upon the experiences of pleasant sensation, we experience a second kind
of pleasant sensation, one of reflection. This is the valenced emotion that Hume argues
arises whenever we experience something agreeable or disagreeable, beautiful or ugly.
This passage also tells us something very important about emotions of pain and pleasure:
painful and pleasant emotions are not identical to the sensations of pain and pleasure,
which arise “from the constitution of the body” without “any antecedent perception” in
the soul (i.e., impressions of sensation; 2.1.1.1). In the passage above Hume clearly
distinguishes the sensations of body and the senses, including potential bodily pains and
pleasures, from the sensations of reflection that are our valenced emotions. These
reflective impressions are pains and pleasures of a different kind from impression of
sensation, yet are also not properly considered passions (as even reflective sensations of
pain and pleasure as such are never listed as passions by Hume). This clearly marks out
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space in Hume’s category of secondary impressions for reflective impressions that are not
passions.42
A point of classification I take to be less clear at this point is the question of whether
Hume thinks that the pains and pleasures of our original impressions of sensation qualify
as emotions. That is, would Hume consider my felt pain at stubbing my toe an emotion,
separate from the disagreeable reflective sensation such an event would occasion? It is
tempting to make the clear division between pains/pleasures of original impressions and
pains/pleasures of impression of reflection also the divide between non-emotion
sensations of pain/pleasure, and emotions of pain/pleasure. This is especially attractive,
as it appears to give a more defined role for emotions within the category of impressions
of reflection: they become the sensations of reflection, a key part to any impression of
reflection, but a broader category than the grouping of specific passions. But I do not
think it is clear whether a claim of this kind can be justified. For now, I will note it as a
potential, and intriguing, read on Hume’s use of ‘emotion.’
One might also question whether it has yet been shown that Hume thinks all emotions are
either positively (pleasurably) or negatively (painfully) valenced. I would argue that this
is likely the case. There are often times where Hume argues as though painful and
pleasant emotions together exhaust the category of emotions. For instance, at 1.3.10.4, in
his discussion of the effects of beliefs and passions on each other, Hume argues that not
only do beliefs excite passions, but passions also often encourage belief, and this is true
“not only [of] such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain.”
Here Hume treats the emotions arising from the perception of certain facts as either
pleasant or painful, and appears to take these designations to exhaust the potential kinds
of emotions arising from objects. Likewise, the passage at 2.2.2.5 suggests all emotions
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Or perhaps, one might say they are not fully ‘established’ passions, taking a cue from Hume at 2.2.2.8.

Either way, we now have a clear candidate for the “other emotions resembling” the passions that make up
part of the category of impressions of reflection (2.1.1.1).
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can be divided into either painful or pleasurable.43 Hume’s discussion of the effects of
probability on the direct passions also appears to assume that emotions fall into these
opposite categories.44
That particular emotions for Hume appear to be categorized either as positively or
negatively valenced may suggest a sort of scale with pleasure on one end and pain on the
other, and lead the reader to conclude that the difference between the pains and pleasures
of particular emotions is one of degree. In fact, this appears to not be the case for
Humean emotions, which differ not only in degree of pain or pleasure, but also in kind.
This point should not be too quickly passed over. Considering the elaborate structure that
Hume offers as the causes and ‘circumstances’ that attend the various passions, it may be
tempting to think of emotions, as the feeling aspect of a passion, as playing the role of
determining first, whether the passion is painful or pleasant, and second, the degree of
force or violence with which a particular experience of a passion is felt. On such a
reading, emotions do not really act to distinguish between various passions; emotions
merely establish valence and degree of feeling. Further distinction between passions
would then be made according to their typical objects and causes. This seems at odds
with Hume’s own pronouncement that the emotion of a passion, i.e., its sensation or
feeling, is the “very being and essence” of the passion (2.1.5.4).
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This is the passage about the stone that “caus[es] no emotion, or independent pain or pleasure.” There are

two potential ways to read this passage. Hume may be using the ‘or’ to indicate identity—emotion would in
that case be intended to mean an independent pain or pleasure (independent, presumably, from the basic
sensations associated with the stone). Alternatively, the disjunctive may be in place to acknowledge the
distinction between pains and pleasures that are impressions of sensation, and pains and pleasures that are
impressions of reflection (emotions, according to the argument made above). In this case the ‘independent’
would mean independent of the pains and pleasures of emotions, sensations of reflection the perception of
the stone might inspire. In either reading, the category of ‘emotion’ appears to be exhausted by the
painful/pleasant dichotomy.
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See 2.3.9.10-11.
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It is therefore of great significance that Hume speaks of a variety of kinds of pains and
pleasures, which may bear more or less resemblance to each other. Whether these
differences are actually sufficient to distinguish between different kinds of Humean
passions, without reference to their causes, objects and ‘attending circumstances’
generally, is not altogether clear. Despite Hume’s contention at 2.1.5.4 that the feeling
component of a passion constitutes the very essence of the passion, there are places
where he makes other claims that seem to suggest some of the attending circumstances
are essential for distinguishing between passions. The debate over whether passions for
Hume are ultimately sensitive in nature, or are best understood in terms of their complex
logical structures, I will discuss in Part Two of this work, and characterize as a debate
between those who would give a sensationalist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions,
and those who would give a cognitivist reading of his theory of the passions. For now, it
will be sufficient to provide some evidence for the claim that, whether they are the
feature differentiating between different passions or not, the valenced emotions come in
varieties of pain and pleasure, not merely degrees.
As has been pointed out in a previous section, there are many instances of use of
‘emotion’ in the Treatise in which that single term is being used to reference a variety of
passions or impressions that have been mentioned in the discussion in question. Of
particular interest here are those instances in which multiple kinds of pleasant or painful
impressions of reflection are grouped together as similar emotions. Take for example
1.2.1.1, where Hume refers to surprise and admiration and “those agreeable emotions,” or
2.2.9.18, where women inclined to feel pity and attraction towards condemned criminals
“[feel] no such tender emotions” when they are exposed to the horrors of the punishment
of the criminal on the rack, in which case uneasy emotional sensations overpower the
variety of positive emotions that may have otherwise been experienced.
This type of use may not be, by itself, enough to convince us of a variety of kinds of
pleasant and painful emotions. Rather these could be taken as indications of multiplicity
of instances of pleasure or pain, which may still nevertheless be argued to differ by
degree, not kind of sensation. Consider, then, Hume’s discussion of love between the
sexes at 2.2.11.2, where the appetite to generation (characterized here not as a mere
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bodily impulse, but as a kind of passion) is characterized as pleasant in nature.45 Hume
notes that in virtue of this, it has “a strong connexion with, all the agreeable emotions,”
which he goes on to tell us include, among others, joy, mirth, vanity and kindness. This
passage suggests two things: first, that there is a multiplicity of agreeable emotions; and
two, that they are associated based on their resemblance to each other as pleasurable.
It could still be insisted, however, that these agreeable emotions resemble each other
exactly because it is the same pleasure, experienced perhaps to different degrees and in
different contexts, that is felt with all of these emotions. So as a final piece of proof that
Hume takes there to be different kinds of pleasures and pains, consider Hume’s insistence
on the qualitative difference between self-love (pride) and love of a friend or lover at
2.2.1.2:
[W]hen we talk of self-love, ‘tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it
produces any thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a
friend or mistress. ‘Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortify’d by our
own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries
of others.
Here Hume specifically says that it is the sensation of self-love that differs from the
sensation of love of others, the latter being characterized as “that tender emotion.”
Though these kinds of sensations are both pleasant, and though we may be inclined to
characterize both as kinds of love, differing only by object, Hume insists that we not
understand pride as a form of love because the sensations are ultimately different. The
same is true of the difference between humility and hatred. While these passions share a
general valence (painful or pleasant), they ultimately differ in kind. We could assume that
pride/humility experienced with the same degree of pleasure/pain as love/hate would not
make the similarly valenced passions identical in feeling. Love of myself is pleasant, and
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degree” (2.2.11.2). See 2.3.5.4 for a possible Humean explanation of why this otherwise pleasing emotion
becomes unpleasant when experienced in an extreme.
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love of my friend is pleasant, but these pleasures are different sensations. And the
sensation of a passion, for Hume, is its particular emotion. Therefore, this appears to
make it certain not only that emotions are necessarily valenced feeling, but also come in a
variety of kinds of positive and negative feeling.

1.6

Valence: The Production of the Passions

It has been established above that Hume took the valenced, felt emotion of a passion to
be the essential characteristic of that passion. But this is not the limit of the role of pains
and pleasures in the formation of our passions. Specifically, there are two extremely
prominent roles that valenced feeling plays in the production of the passions. The first is
in the perception of pain or pleasure itself that Hume takes to be the foundation of almost
all of our passions and impressions of reflection generally. The second, specific to the
production of the indirect passions, is Hume’s self-proclaimed innovation of the ‘double
relation of ideas and impressions,’ which turns out to be a result of the way that
impressions of reflection may be associated by similarity in valence of feeling. This
section deals with the part played by valence in the production of the passions. I will pay
special attention to the question of the role emotion specifically plays, understanding
emotion as the valenced, felt aspect of an impression of reflection (as was argued for
above).
Hume tells us that the impressions of reflections generally are “in a great measure”
founded on our ideas of pain and pleasure (1.1.2.1; 2.3.9.1). We experience primary
impressions of sensation, which may include “heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or
pain of some kind or other” (1.1.2.1). Obviously our primary impressions include a
greater range of sensations than this (for instance, color, sounds of different pitch, etc),
but Hume is interested in sensations that lead us to some idea of pain or pleasure, whether
currently experienced, or potentially. And while he acknowledges that secondary
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impressions may sometimes be a reflection of our impressions of sensation themselves
(2.1.1.2), he emphasizes the role of our ideas of pain and pleasure as the foundation of
impressions of reflection. He argues that “in order to produce an affection of any kind, it
is only requisite to present some good or evil” i.e., pain or pleasure, and that the removal
of that pain or pleasure results in an immediate removal of “most of our reflective or
secondary impressions” (2.3.9.1). This is, essentially, Hume’s account of the origins of
the valence of particular emotions and passions. And the story of the origins of valence is
also the story of the origins of impressions of reflection period—as well as containing
potential limits to the experience of the passions. His insistence that upon removal of pain
or pleasure there is a removal of the impression of reflection plays a key role in his theory
of motivation presented at 2.3.3.
Hume offers several kinds of ‘propensities’ original to human nature to explain roughly
three kinds of origins of impressions of reflection. The first, and core ‘original instinct,’
is the mind’s tendency to “unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil” (2.3.9.2).
This instinct leads ‘directly’ to our experience of the direct passions. The direct passions
are immediate responses to kinds of prospects and/or perceptions of pain or pleasure,
whether found in our impressions of sensation, ideas of those impressions, or the ideas
and impressions that are naturally generated from these. For instance, ideas and
impressions of immediately present pleasure/pain give us joy/sorrow, while anticipated
pleasure/pain gives us hope/fear. Meanwhile, potentially attainable pleasures/pains cause
in us desire/aversion, while reliable/unattainable pleasures/pains cause feelings of
security/despair (2.1.1.4; 2.3.9.5-7). At the core of all these passions is a general desire
for pleasure and aversion to pain, and that this is the original instinct that Hume sees as
fundamental to our experience of impressions of reflection is evidenced in his insistence
on the foundational role of pains and pleasures in the production of impressions of
reflection.
A second type of original instinct that causes in us a direct, valenced, felt, reflective
response to our impressions and ideas, are certain ‘natural impulses’ which, “properly
speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them like the other affections”
(2.3.9.8). In this category of origin belong all the impressions of reflection that Hume
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takes to be common to human nature, but not always explainable in terms of perceptions
of (potential or present) pains and pleasures.46 Among these he lists desire for punishment
for enemies (resentment), happiness to friends (benevolence), kindness to children, lust,
hunger and a few other bodily appetites47 (2.3.3.8 and 2.3.9.8). Note the role played here
by valence. While these are not reflective impressions derived from pain and pleasure,
Hume still insists that they ‘produce,’ i.e. are experienced as pleasurable or painful. That
is to say, the felt component (the emotion) of these impressions of reflection is still
valenced, though their origins are not directly in the perceptions of pain and pleasure.
The third type of origin of impressions of reflection is that of Hume’s indirect passions,
those which are based on the same principle of general aversion to pain and desire for
pleasure as the direct passions, but arise distinctly “by the conjunction of other qualities”
(2.1.1.4). These are cases where the imagination provides us with various associations
and beliefs that are related to the objects we perceive as sources of pain or pleasure. The
perception of a delicious chocolate cake may in and of itself cause in me the direct
passion of desire, as it is a source of pleasure. But facts surrounding the cake may also
result in a great variety of indirect passions. If it is a cake I made, the conjunction of these
‘other qualities’ to my beliefs about the cake may cause in me pride and ambition. If the
cake belongs to someone else, it may cause both love and envy. If by comparison it
makes my own attempts at cake-making look very poor, it may cause humility and
malice. In all cases, facts about how pain or pleasure is presented to us make a difference
for what we come to feel. The ‘other qualities’ conjoined to our ideas and impressions
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odds with the views of authors like Hobbes, who sought to explain all impulses in terms of responses to
pain and pleasure [Norton (2007), 531]. This difference is ultimately of importance for the moral theories
of the respective thinkers. Hume is following a more ‘sentimentalist’ tradition, where human nature
includes some key moral impulses and tendencies to certain social behaviours.
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47

that produce the indirect passions play a defining role in the ultimate valence of the
passion, whether the initial impression be one of pain or pleasure.
Hume tells us explicitly that the indirect passions are “always agreeable or uneasy,”
which is to say, they are always valenced (2.3.9.4). He also tells us that the indirect
passions contribute to the desires and aversions of our direct passions, which themselves
in turn inform the formation of indirect passions.48 Note also that the mental events of
these passions are not mutually exclusive (2.3.9.3)—I may at once feel both the direct
passion of joy in pleasure received from eating the chocolate cake, and the indirect
passion of humility as I realize that I am a poor cake-maker by comparison. These
passions may both exist despite the opposing valence. They may even combine despite
this opposition, the force of the subordinate passion ultimately adding force to that of the
dominant passion. But more will be said about this characteristic of Hume’s impressions
of reflection in a later section of Part One of this work (1.10).
What is the role of emotion in all of this? Well, whether our impressions of reflection
arise from our original instinct to avoid pain and embrace pleasure, some original impulse
towards benevolence, revenge, etc (which does not arise from pain/pleasure, but does
point us towards them), or, finally, the conjunction of other beliefs about our situation
with perceptions of pain and pleasure, all the resulting impressions of reflection Hume
takes to have a sensation that is either painful or pleasant. This felt aspect of the
impression of reflection, I have argued above, Hume calls the ‘emotion’ of the
impression. And it is their “very being and essence” to be a particular kind of pleasant or
painful sensation. In fact, “upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality
no pride nor humility,” suggesting more generally, that the removal of the painful and
pleasant sensations means the removal of passions all together (2.1.5.4).
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in her paper, “Hume’s Passions: Direct and Indirect” [Hume Studies (2000) 26: 77-86].
48

There is a further role played by the valence of the emotion in the formation of the
indirect passions in particular. Hume presents the indirect passions as arising due to a
‘double relation of impressions and ideas.’ Take Hume’s analysis of pride as an example.
The passion of pride “by an original and natural instinct” always has the same object: the
self (2.1.5.3). The causes of pride, on the other hand, are varied, but similar in that all are
always in some way related to the self. Therefore, Hume concludes that these two related
ideas (of the self and of some cause that is connected to the self) are necessary to produce
pride. But they are not sufficient. Pride is an impression of reflection, and as such is
characterized by the particular pleasant sensation that we experience as the passion. This
pleasant sensation of pride, Hume points out, resembles, and is therefore associated with,
the sensations of pleasure that the causes of pride typically give us.49 This is a relation of
impressions, and is the second necessary component of producing the indirect passion of
pride. The cause of pride must provide us an idea that has some relation to our idea of the
self. The cause must further produce in us, independent of the pleasure of the passion of
pride, a distinct pleasure, and without this pleasure the passion will not arise. The
circumstances for producing an indirect passion generally, in Hume’s own words, are as
follows:
Here then is the situation of the mind as I have describ’d it. It has certain organs
naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produc’d, naturally turns
the view to a certain object. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion,
there is requir’d some other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions
and ideas may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first
impulse. (2.2.11.650)
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Interestingly, this paragraph appears to suggest that resemblance between impressions is primarily a
function of their positive or negative valence. Painful impressions resemble other painful impressions,
pleasant impressions the pleasant.
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Thus we see that the emotion required to set the indirect passion-producing principles
into action is the feeling of pain or pleasure produced in us by reflection on the things we
are perceiving that act as causes. This emotion, Hume emphasizes, is distinct from the
passion itself, again suggesting room in the category of impressions of reflection for
emotions that are not passions, but are nonetheless valenced, felt, reflective impressions.
Such emotions we now understand to be an essential part of the production of the indirect
passions. In fact, they are what provide the ‘first impulse’ in producing the passions51;
even though our nature is ‘naturally fitted’ to produce the passion when we have certain
perceptions, without the feeling of pain and pleasure that constitutes a basic response of
emotion to these perceptions, we will not experience the passion.
The suggestion of a distinction in Hume between mere reflective feelings of pain and
pleasure and full-blown passions such as pride and love is worth pausing to note. At the
end of 2.2.2.7 Hume emphasizes that objects which produce pleasure or uneasiness in us,
but do not provide the necessary relation of ideas to produce the appropriate indirect
passion, “can never give rise to any constant and establish’d passion.” The suggested
distinction is between valenced feeling that is somehow inconstant or ‘unestablished’ in
nature and fully realized passions. Hume takes the next paragraph to expand on this a bit.
This is where he describes travelling through a pleasant countryside with a friend. The
beautiful scenery may “put me into good humour both with myself and fellow-traveller,”
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emotion may on the surface appear to be in tension with the claim above that the emotion of a passion is the
feeling that constitutes the very essence of the passion. In the former case it appears that emotion is a
distinct element from the passion, causally prior. In the second, the emotion is constitutive of the felt
essence of the passion. But these are not mutually exclusive roles for emotion to play if we think of it as the
broader category of valenced feeling that I am suggesting here. In its productive role it is a simple feeling
of some pain or pleasure. That simple pain/pleasure works in the production of the particular pain/pleasure
of the passion in question. There is a separate emotion produced in the production of the indirect passion,
this one identified as the essence of the passion.
50

but insofar as the country is neither related to myself or my companion it cannot cause
the indirect passions of pride or love in us. Therefore the pleasant emotional responses,
Hume tells us, “are rather to be consider’d as the overflowings of an elevated or humane
disposition, than as an establish’d passion” (2.2.2.8). The emotions of pleasure or
uneasiness that we receive from some of our perceptions may remain as more general
either positively or negatively valenced feelings, if various other circumstances are not
present (such as, in the case of the indirect passions, the double relation of ideas).52 We
are therefore capable of experiencing general, valenced dispositions or feelings, without
them constituting proper, fully formed passions. Presumably, given Hume’s emphasis on
the felt nature of the passions, this difference is one of felt quality, not merely of
attending belief structures. But more on this later.
Here is a brief summary of what has been established in this section. Pain and pleasure
play a key role in producing most of our passions, and the characteristic experience and
(necessary) valance of the passions themselves is produced from these perceptions of
pain or pleasure combined with the way our natures are ‘naturally fitted’ to produce
certain passions. The painful or pleasant nature of indirect passions is itself essential to
their production, as they cannot be produced without our associating their typically
painful or pleasant experience with present, resembling emotions of pain or pleasure.
These associated painful or pleasant emotions are distinct from the passions they are
associated with and ultimately assist in bringing to be. They are not full-blown passions,
but distinct impressions of reflection, without which the indirect passions could not be
experienced. Valenced emotion, then, plays a central role in the experience of all
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that we are by nature determined, both in physiology and psychological law, to find that the input of certain
perceptions in conjunction with perceptions of pain or pleasure have an output of the experience of
particular passions. Or, we may put emphasis on the fact that the relevant attending circumstances to the
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content to the production of the passions. This will be discussed further as the debate between the
sensationalist and cognitivist accounts of Hume’s theory of the passion is explored.
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passions, as well as in the production of many particular passions. Further, its role in the
production of the indirect passions in particular reveals a telling distinction between fully
realized passions, and these more general, valenced impressions of reflection.

1.7

Valence: Emotion and Motivation

I will consider one final point of discussion before moving away from the topic of
valence and the emotions. Generally speaking, valenced feeling is at the centre of
Hume’s theory of motivation and will. Clearly the Humean account of motivation will
have the passions and feeling at its core. In this section I wish to consider the particular
use Hume makes of valenced emotion in his explanation of the influences on our wills.
Hume characterizes the will as the “[most] remarkable” immediate effect of pain and
pleasure (2.3.1.2; see also 2.3.9.2). Though the will itself is not to be considered a
passion, nor does he treat it as a particular faculty of the mind, Hume explains at the
beginning of Book II, Part III that a discussion of the will is necessary in order to fully
explain the passions.53 Hume’s will is “the internal impression we feel and are conscious
of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of
our mind” (2.3.1.2). But though this feeling of willing is not itself a passion, Hume does
include the very closely related experiences of aversion and desire (or propensity) among
the direct passions (2.1.1.4, 2.3.1.1). These passions arise according the perceptions of
pleasure or pain we find before us as follows:
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52

‘Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object,
we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid
or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction… ’Tis from the
prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any
object. (2.3.3.3)
The section from which this passage is taken, “On the influencing motives of the will,”
makes it clear that Hume is inclined to understand motivation and will in terms of the two
direct passions of aversion and propensity. The feeling of ‘willing’ results when we find
ourselves motivated following experiences of our own aversions and propensities,
themselves responses to the prospects for pain and pleasure we find before us. Aversion,
a response against pain, we may assume has a negative valence, while propensity or
desire, a response to the prospect of pleasure, would seem to have a positive valence.54
Painful and pleasant feeling, therefore, are foundational for our coming to experience will
and motivation.
It turns out that this claim about the role of perceptions of realized or potential pains and
pleasures in the production of the will is parallel to a claim Hume makes about the
production of the passions generally:

54

This is not entirely satisfying. Unlike the other direct passions (grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and

security) it is not immediately clear that all my experiences of aversion should be painful, while all
experiences of propensity should be pleasant. For instance, persistent, but unattainable desires
(propensities) would presumably take on a negative valence in our experience of them (think of Socrates’
characterization of the desire associated with eros in his Symposium). Hume could, perhaps explain this by
saying that while our propensity itself has a pleasant sort of feeling, as it is the feeling of being welldisposed to something and anticipating pleasure from it, the experience of wanting something likely
unattainable will involved many other passions (perhaps jealousy or envy, grief, humility, etc) that have a
strongly negative valence. The overall felt experience when we desire something (or wish to avoid
something) will therefore be a reflection not only of the valence of the isolated direct passion of aversion or
desire, but a culmination of all the passions and feelings associated with the pleasant or painful prospect.
The mixing, transitivity and fluidity of the emotions in Hume is discussed in more detail in 1.8.
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‘Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on
pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, ‘tis only
requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain and pleasure
there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire
and aversion, and most of our reflective or secondary impressions. (2.3.9.1)55
Hume goes on to explain that, in the case of the direct passions, it is the mind’s ‘original
instinct’ to unite with pleasure and avoid pain that results in valenced passions that are
direct responses to perceptions of potential pains and pleasures. These, it turns out, are
also directly motivating. There is a sense in which all the direct passions may be thought
of as various kinds of aversions and propensities, because the objects of the direct
passions may always be considered as objects of desire or aversion. For instance, grief is
a response to a certain pain, while fear is a response to a pain that may or may not occur
(2.3.9.5-6). In both cases we experience a painful reflective impression from the presence
of a prospect of pain. Will results when actions of body or mind may allow us to
successfully follow our felt impulse to avoid or acquire these pains and pleasures
(2.3.9.7).
Hume also explains in 2.3.9 how it is that the indirect passions, which he argues
elsewhere “are pure emotions of the soul, unattended by any desire, and not immediately
exciting us to action” (2.2.6.3), can nevertheless contribute to our motivating impulses.
They have this ‘indirect’ influence because of the way their agreeable or uneasy
sensations increase our desire or aversion towards the objects of our indirect passions.
Hume argues,
[S]upposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure, and that
arising from an object related to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the
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particular causes, regardless of the prospects of pain or pleasure the situations offer. Presumably, these
passions are also potentially motivating.
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propensity or aversion, with the consequent emotions, but by concurring with
certain dormant principles of the human mind, excites the new impressions of
pride or humility, love or hatred. That propensity, which unites us to the object, or
separates us from it, still continues to operate, but in conjunction with the indirect
passions, which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. (2.3.9.3)
The indirect passions arise upon perceptions of things that are pleasing or painful to us,
and associated with ourselves or others in appropriate ways to cause our predisposed
natures to produce the said passions. Naturally, the objects, being pleasing or painful to
us on their own, will cause the direct passions of desire and aversion as well (and perhaps
the related reactions of joy/grief, hope/fear, etc). These directly motivating passions56 are
still present when we experience the indirect passions. For instance, when I feel pride in
the beautiful chocolate cake I have made, I will likely feel at the same time the direct
passion of desire for the cake57 and perhaps joy in the cake. Thus I will have at least two
distinct, pleasing impressions of reflection: the indirect passion of pride, and the direct
passion of desire or joy. We learn in 2.3.9.4 that, in fact, the painful or pleasant
sensations that attend the indirect passions “give in their turn additional force to the direct
passions, and increase our desire and aversion to the object.” They ultimately contribute
to the motivation to perform certain actions. The indirect passions act as indirect

56

Note that the direct passions are called such because that they are direct responses to pleasure and pain,

not because they are directly motivating (as may appear to be suggested here). As it happens they are both
direct responses to pleasure and pain, and directly motivating, but the category designation comes from the
former characteristic.
57

Note that Hume argues at 2.2.6.3 that pride and humility are “pure emotions in the soul, unattended with

any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action,” as contrasted with love and hatred are always
followed with particular desires. My claim about the chocolate cake in this case should not therefore be
taken to be the claim that my pride in the cake is immediately followed by a desire that will excite me to
action. Rather, I take it that in such an example it is plausible to posit a desire for the cake entirely distinct
from my experience of pride, arising merely because of the pleasant qualities of the cake that will cause my
desire. Hume’s point is about the way that force and impulse can be shared between passions. Indirect
passions may thus come to supplement the force of the direct in contributing to motivation.
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motivators of action in virtue of the force and feeling they ultimately contribute to our
concurrently experienced direct passions. Thus, the valenced emotion component of both
the direct and indirect passions can be seen to be the key to the motivating power of all
passions.
Valenced feeling acts as the key to motivation for Hume because of a characteristic it has
that he is inclined to express in the language of force and impulse. This language and
type of metaphor in Hume is worth noting. Both in his discussions of the production of
particular passions and in descriptions of the effects they have, particularly in that
‘remarkable’ effect of motivation and will, Hume uses this kind of metaphorical
language. Throughout the Treatise, in fact, Hume is at times inclined to discuss the
workings of the mind in a (somewhat) mechanical way. As found in his discussions of the
passions, he makes particular use of the metaphors as it pertains to valence. Consider his
discussion at 2.2.2 of various ‘experiments’ meant to prove that both a relation between
particular ideas and a relation between particular impressions is necessary in order to
produce the indirect passions. In his second experiment we are asked to consider a stone
which belongs to either oneself or a companion, but presents us with neither pleasure nor
pain, and then determine whether love, hate, pride or humility will arise in either of us.
Hume answers the question as follows:
‘Tis plain, that to consider the matter a priori, no emotion of any kind can
reasonably be expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and
calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of
pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves
or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind
perfectly free from any affection. (2.2.2.6)
The object does not provide the independent emotion of pleasure or pain that we
identified above as essential in the production of the indirect passions. Hume appears to
be claiming here that in fact, a valence-neutral object, providing only the appropriate
relation of ideas, provides only equal ‘impulse’ towards each passions, which is to say no
new impulse, as relations of ideas operate without any feeling being produced. Though
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our natures may be naturally fitted to produce the passions when the appropriate beliefs
about the relations between myself or my companion and the stone are present, the
impulse necessary to produce the felt passion is lacking, and the potential for the two
passions is equal and will cancel each other out, as it were. The impulse of feeling is a
necessary companion to the relations of ideas in producing the indirect passions. Without
impulse, we will not be moved to experience a passion.
Furthermore, equal impulses cancel each other out. Like equal forces going in opposite
directions, two opposite emotions, equally associated with the same object will find any
potential effect destroyed “leav[ing] the mind perfectly free from any affection or
emotion” (2.2.2.6).58 This kind of approach to emotions in Hume often extends beyond
the production of passions to the ultimate motivational outcomes of the passions we
experience. Impressions of reflection generally are often treated as forces of motivation,
moving feeling through ideas and deliberation, with infused vivacity potentially
providing motivation for certain actions, and challenging or defeating potential motives
for others. Fuller discussions of this apparent fluidity of the force and impulse of
emotions and passions will be discussed in 1.10. For now it is worth noting that this
metaphor of impulse informs how it is various passions are both produced and ultimately
move us to act. And the source of the impulse appears to be the valenced feeling of
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the particulars of circumstances in which contrary passions may either combine, alternate, or cancel each
other out entirely. Generally, his explanations have to do with how exactly contrary they are. Insofar as two
passions with opposite valence are exactly contrary they will cancel each other out, otherwise they may
combine their force and impulse, or we may experience a seesawing between them. Exact contrariety is
determined, interestingly, not by the feeling of the passion (how would one determine what an exact
opposite in ‘feeling’ was?), but by both the strength of the feeling and the accompanying relations of ideas.
If the relations of ideas occasioning the passions are identical, and the opposite feelings they have equal in
force, this contrariety will cause the passions to cancel each other out.
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emotions, whether experienced as ‘established’ passions, or more general feelings and
dispositions, not tied by relations of ideas to a particular passionate experience.59
How then might we summarize what we have determined thus far about the role of
valenced emotions in motivation for Hume? First, it is the valenced emotional response to
pain and pleasure that, in most cases, results in our experience of willing.60 Valenced
emotion, in any case, is necessarily present to motivate the will. Indeed, the influence on
the will of both the direct and indirect passions can be explained with reference to their
valenced feeling.61 Finally, we have begun to explain why it is for Hume that emotions
play such a key role in motivation: they offer ‘force’ and ‘impulse’62, which unfelt
relations of ideas do not. Therefore, whether it is in the formation of the passions
themselves, or the influencing of the will, sufficient force and impulse comes from the
feeling of valenced emotion.
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Recall the wording at 2.2.11.6 where emotion is identified as providing the “first impulse” for the

indirect passions.
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Again, the exceptions are the original instincts (see 2.3.3.8, 2.3.9.2, and 2.3.9.8), which are not responses

to pains and pleasures, but passions we are naturally predisposed to respond with when faced with certain
circumstances. Though they do not arise from perceptions of pain and pleasure, they are valenced, felt
(albeit at times calm) responses, and it would seem to be in virtue of the impulse provided by their status as
valenced emotion that they come to be motivating.
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Note that there are two ways that valenced feeling leads to acting: one, directly, through our natural

propensity for good and aversion to evil, and two, through providing impulse and force of feeling through
association with other passions.
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We must be careful in how we speak here, as talk about force or impulse as a kind of efficacious cause or

necessary connection is rather unHumean, given his arguments concerning causality in Book I. It is clear,
however, that Hume takes a certain amount of force and impulse, particularly as it is provided through
passions, to be consistently antecedent to action. Therefore, the ‘force’ and ‘impulse’ must be understood in
the Humean sense of strength and liveliness of feeling, some degree of which he takes to attend the
perceptions constantly conjoined with action. The degree of force is therefore correlated for Hume with
likelihood of particular action being taken.
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One thing we have not addressed it how to understand the variations in strength and
influence of our various emotional responses over our actions. To say that valenced
emotion provides impulse is only beginning to explain motivation. The next section picks
up on this question by looking at what Hume as said about the differences between calm
and violent passions, and the implication of calmness or violence for the influence of the
emotions, particularly over motivation.

1.8

Calm and violent emotions

Understanding motivation in Hume in terms of the impulse that comes from valenced
feeling would appear to put force of feeling at centre stage. That is to say, if valenced
feeling is what provides impulse, one would assume that stronger feeling provides
stronger impulse. As has been mentioned, Hume at times employs a distinction between
calm and violent passions [though he acknowledges it to be an inexact, vulgar and
specious distinction (2.1.1.3)]. He explains that the passions he is interested in discussing
in Book II are our generally more violently felt impressions of reflection. But these
typically violent passions may be felt with very little emotion, while other, generally
calm and subtle, valenced impressions of reflection, which Hume appears to not consider
(proper) passions, may be experienced violently at times (he offers the example of the
extreme raptures of poetry and music). As was established above, in either case we have
an experience of emotion; it is the violence or the subtlety of the emotion that varies, not
the question of whether emotion is experienced at all. When introducing impulse and
power over the will into discussions of our various impressions of reflection, it appears to
be a natural step to assume that the ‘violence’ of an emotion is an indicator of the
strength or influence of that emotion. Alternatively, we may think that insofar as emotion
is the felt component of a passion, it is somehow the amount of emotion attending the
passion that determines the passion’s power to direct the will. But as it turns out, the
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connection between the violence of an emotion and the power of an emotion to motivate
and determine the will do not have the direct correspondence that one might expect.
Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at what Hume intends by the violence or
calmness of an emotion, and what its connection might be to the ‘impulse’ and ‘force’
that he identifies as both informing the formation of other passions—and even the
adoption of some beliefs—and the influence of our impressions of reflection over the
will.
How does Hume characterize the distinction between calmness and violence of
impressions of reflection? The idea of violent perceptions is introduced at the very
beginning of the Treatise, in Hume’s introduction of the ideas/impressions distinction,
which differ in “force and liveliness” (1.1.1.1). This is the difference between feeling and
thinking that Hume takes to be so familiar to all. But even in the context of this first
presentation, Hume is quick to acknowledge that this distinction between felt and unfelt
mental states must be considered carefully, as there are ideas that may be accompanied
by great force, and impressions that may have little feeling, which has the potential to
confuse this otherwise generally clear distinction. The following passage, therefore, may
be considered Hume’s first introduction of the distinction between calm and violent
impressions:
[I]t is not impossible but in particular instances [ideas and impressions] may very
nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very
violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the
other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that
we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. (1.1.1.1)
To be clear, there are four types of mental experiences being distinguished here. First,
our unfelt perceptions of ideas; these are copies of our impressions that we clearly
experience as unfelt. Second, our forcefully felt experience of impressions, which include
vividly felt sensations, passions and emotions. These first two categories are easily
distinguished on the basis of the obvious feeling or lack of feeling they present. The third
manner of perception presents more of a challenge in categorizing, as these are our ideas
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that “approach impressions,” generally experienced in vivid dreams, madness, and when
we are experiencing ‘violent emotions’. Likewise, the fourth type are impressions with
very faint or subtle feeling, which due to their resemblance in this regard to the lack of
feeling in ideas, may be mistaken for such (this confusion, of course, is the cause of the
tendency to attribute certain influences on the will to reason63). Therefore, while all
perceptions may be divided into ideas and impressions, this distinction cannot
consistently be made based only on the presence or absence of violent feeling. On the one
hand, impressions may have subtle, calm feeling; on the other hand, ideas may occur in
the context of violent feeling, which can cause them to “approach to our impressions” in
our felt perception of them.64
In Book I of the Treatise there are a few more places where Hume gives us hints about
how to understand his use of the notion of violence in reference to mental events. In
discussing the ‘paradox’ he has presented concerning the idea of necessary connection at
1.3.14.24, Hume describes this thesis as the “most violent” of the ideas he will argue for
in the Treatise. Earlier in his discussion of causality, he had indeed noted that the
association of constantly conjoined causes and effects creates in us such a habit of
expecting the one to follow the other that “we cannot without a sensible violence survey
them in any other [relation]” (1.3.11.4; see also 1.3.11.11). Violence then it seems would
be required to make our beliefs other than they would be by custom and habit. The
suggestion seems to be that what is natural and easy to our minds is generally
experienced with little feeling—at least with no feeling of opposition. Of course some
‘natural and easy’ beliefs and relations of ideas have some kind of feeling attached.
Believed ideas themselves are differentiated from other ideas by the way they feel, and
these Hume tells us must be “founded on something natural and easy” (1.4.1.11). What is
natural and easy in thinking, therefore, appears to be direction of thought that agrees with
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See 2.3.3.
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Note that Hume allows for cases where ideas do in fact become the very impressions they are ideas of—

this is the function of the sympathy mechanism.
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the associations our mind tends, by nature and custom, to make between various ideas
and impressions, as well as the beliefs that result (see for instance, 1.4.5.12, 1.4.7.7,
2.1.4.4 and 2.1.9.1). And the experience of resistance to what is in this way ‘natural and
easy’ Hume describes as a form of mental ‘violence.’
Hume’s application of the calm/violent distinction is given a more explicit, but slightly
different characterization as he introduces it more formally in his opening discussion in
Book II. Here the distinction is applied directly to different kinds of impressions of
reflection, not to mental events generally. All impressions of reflection can be considered
as either calm or violent in kind (though, as I have argued above, this is not a strict
category distinction in Hume). Hume lists as a generally calm impression of reflection
“the sense of beauty and deformity in action composition, and external objects,” while
the generally violent listed are the basic passions (both direct and indirect). Paralleling his
introduction of the thinking/feeling distinction in 1.1.1.1, Hume follows the introduction
of the calm/violent distinction with this comment:
This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently
rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call’d passions,
may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in some manner, imperceptible.
But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from
beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish’d from
each other. (2.1.1.3)
As was argued above, the calm/violent distinction does not turn out to be a strict
distinction of categories (making it disanalogous to the ideas/impressions distinction), but
rather a distinction between ways in which particular impressions of reflection may be
experienced. As it happens, there are certain types of impressions that we perceive to be
generally experienced calmly, others which we tend to think of as violent. That all
impressions of reflection have the potential to be experienced either way seems implied
in much of Hume’s discussion of the two manners of experience that follows in Book II,
not unlike his contention about vivid ideas and subtle impressions in Book I.
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It is also worth considering how the term ‘emotion’ is being employed in the quotation
above. While ‘passion’ is being applied to a subsection of the impressions of reflection,
those which are generally experienced violently, ‘emotion’ appears to apply to both
kinds. Our calm impressions are identified with a kind of emotion (a soft, almost
imperceptible emotion), and later in the paragraph Hume identifies the subject of Book II
as “those violent emotions or passions.” All impressions of reflection may be divided into
calm and violent, and all either calm or violent impressions of reflection would appear to
be kinds of emotions. This is further evidence that the category of impressions of
reflection is a category of emotion, in which passion is a subcategory.
I have argued above that Hume introduces the calm/violent distinction not as a strict
division of class in his taxonomy, but rather as a kind of rhetorical tool to “proceed with
greater order” in carrying out two key aims of his work in Book II. The first aim is to
point the reader to the narrowed topic of his book on impressions of reflection; rather
than discuss these generally, Hume desires to treat the passions in particular. The reader
is lead to understand what Hume means by this category of the passions by considering
the typically more violent emotions that we experience. The second purpose of the
calm/violent distinction is to offer a way to understand the confusion of certain
impressions of reflection with reason. The similarity in feeling between reasoning and
calmly experienced impressions of reflection leads us to the false belief that we can be
motivated by reason alone. Understanding that there are different kinds of passions, some
that have a strong feeling that is difficult to ignore, others with subtle feeling easily
missed or confused with unfelt reasoning is useful to Hume’s arguments, even if the
division is “vulgar and specious” (2.1.1.3).
The description of the calm passions in Hume’s discussion of the influencing motives of
the will presents a slightly different way of thinking about the emotion of these subtly felt
passions. Hume says,
Now it is certain that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which though
they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by
their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. (2.3.3.8)
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Here the calmness of the passions in question (passions which we often confuse with
reason) is linked directly to the amount of emotion they produce in the mind. This is an
interesting distinction- while in other cases Hume speaks about the violence produced by
passions as emotions, here he suggests that passions produce emotion. This way of
speaking is not unique to this passage, and indeed, in the next section of my discussion
we will take a closer look at the language of ‘attending’ that Hume often uses when
discussing emotion. Hume’s tendency to move in and out of, (a) talking about passions as
kinds of emotion, and (b) talking of passions as somehow producing emotion or being
attended by emotion, will turn out to be a key aspect of the dual treatment of our affective
mental states that I will ultimately argue characterizes Hume’s theory of the passions
(Part Two of this work).
We now move to consider Hume’s characterization of violence of emotion in Book II.
Generally speaking Hume appears to assume that his description of certain passions or
emotions as ‘violent’ is sufficient to point us to the feelings that he intends. But at 2.3.4.1
Hume sheds light on how he intends his use of ‘violence’ when he identifies it with “the
disorder [the passions] occasion in the temper.” He makes the same identification again at
2.3.8.13. Violence is disruption of order in the mind, while calmness is agreement with
the order of the mind. This seems in keeping with his uses of ‘violence’ in Book I
mentioned above. For instance, to try to adopt his thesis about the lack of necessary
connection between constantly conjoined events that we take to be causally related is to
attempt to adopt a belief that runs deeply contrary to the order that our minds establish
via custom, and is therefore a kind of violence. This is a kind of felt violence (1.3.11.4), a
felt disorder, but this is not to say that feeling is violence, since believed ideas are
distinguished from non-believed ideas by the felt manner in which we experience them,
and this feeling generally occurs through the well-ordered “natural and easy” associations
we tend to make through custom. Therefore the (presumably) subtle feeling of a believed
idea occurs when there is not a violence of mind, but an established and natural flow of
associations of custom. Violence is interference with this, and such interference we have
a sensible experience of.
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Understanding violence of mind in this way also sheds light on what makes the calm
passions calm. Hume identifies as the first kind of calm passion our “sense of beauty and
deformity” (2.1.1.3), and goes on later to add to his list of “calm desires and tendencies”
…certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and
resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to
good and aversion to evil, consider’d merely as such. (2.3.3.8)
Thus, the calm passions are initially identified with passionate responses we naturally
have in certain circumstances, passions that Hume identifies as instinctive. It makes sense
to think that original instincts such as these would not disorder the mind, but are rather
very much in keeping with the customary order of our mental experience, hence the
tendency towards an absence of violence when they occur. Hume goes on in the next
paragraph to explain that certain of these original instincts, such as the desire for
punishment of one who has hurt me, may be experienced with violence as well, but not
because they themselves are disorderly to the mind. Rather, “[w]hen I am immediately
threatened with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great
height, and produce a sensible emotion” (2.3.3.9). It is the numerous associated passions
and emotions that cause the violence and disorder of the experience of these typically
violent, but ‘original’ passions. One could assume that the generally calm passions
derived from original instinct could likewise be experienced with other, stronger and
more disorderly emotions, and therefore also violently.
The cases in which passions are experienced with little or no disorder of the mind (i.e.,
violence) are curious when we consider Hume’s insistence that, while they are
impressions, they are “so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from ideas”
(1.1.1.1), and can “become in a manner imperceptible” (2.1.1.3). One might question, if
these mental events are unfelt, in what sense are they impressions, a category apparently
delineated by the force of feeling of its constituents? Perhaps the key is noting that “faint
and low” is an indication of degree of feeling, not of non-existence, while “in a manner
imperceptible” suggests maybe a context (say, in the presence of other strong feelings) in
which what is otherwise perceptible, but subtle, is rendered imperceptible. In fact, the
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calm passions Hume suggests are a much more common part of our experience than we
might think. He argues,
We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without
an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much
in our common indolent way of thinking, ‘tis easy, either in reading or in
conversation, to discover them. (2.2.5.3)
Our evaluations of things, whether aesthetic, moral, or just as they relate to our own
pleasures or pains, are products of impressions of reflection, and generally are
experienced as calm passions. We realize that we are experiencing these calm passions,
not merely the workings of reason’s associations, more by “their effects than by the
immediate feeling or sensation” (2.3.3.8). One example of the telling ‘effects’ that Hume
offers is the observation that when ‘men of wit’ and poets use reference to what is
beautiful and agreeable in their discourse they have greater success in gaining the
audience’s approbation. Reflecting on what is pleasing is agreeable to the imagination,
because of the nearly imperceptible emotion which accompanies the reflection, and
therefore reference to these things enhances the effect of the words spoken, or poem read
(2.2.5.3). And although Hume is not explicit at 2.3.3.8 about what the effects of the calm
passions he is referring to are, given that this statement comes immediately following his
famous argument for the impotency of reason alone to motivate us, and the need for
preference, it seems clear that the fact that we are moved to act according to certain
thoughts at all serves as proof for Hume that these are passions having an effect.
We have established how we can discover the effects of calm passions on the will;
predictably, the effects of the violent are more obvious, though their potential for effect is
limited in (perhaps) surprising ways. Hume argues that we cannot necessarily equate
violence of passion with strength to motivate the will and the direction of thought. He
explains this thesis as follows:
‘Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the
disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has
once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of
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the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated
custom and it own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions
and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every
momentary gust of passion. We must, therefore, distinguish between a calm and a
weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. (2.3.4.1)
There is much to unpack in this passage. I will address three main points. First, that the
influence of passions over the will is not proportionate to their violence, despite intuitions
that given Hume’s system of motivation this should be the case. Violent passions are not
necessarily strong; calm passions are not necessarily weak. Second, that the calm
passions, i.e., the passions that have become a part of the ordered workings of our mind,
through custom and habit, generally do not produce sensible agitation. And third, the idea
that ‘gusts’ of passion are ‘attended’ by emotion and opposition, the latter likely referring
to the disordering effect of violence. I will look at each of these in turn.
First, then, let us look at the relationship between violence and strength. As has been
mentioned above, Hume often uses mechanical metaphors in explaining the workings of
the mind, and in particular frequently uses the language of ‘impulse’ when describing
motivation and the associated emotions. Impulses can be combined, redirected, and
opposed depending on what other impulses they meet, and what the ‘attending
circumstances’ of belief and associated ideas are. In 2.3.3.6, when explaining how it is I
may come to prefer “my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater,” and act
accordingly, Hume explains the unexpected force of a passion which we know will bring
us less pleasure than another passion in these mechanical terms:
A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what
arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more
extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a
hundred by the advantage of its situation. (2.3.3.4)
Hume takes our beliefs, current perceptions, customary associations, the force and
vivacity of our impressions and ideas, and so on, to be circumstances of mind with
influence on the advantage of our various passions in influencing the will. In this case,
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one would assume that it is the violence of the passion for our lesser good that ultimately
tips the scale in favour of that impulse. But the metaphor suggests that how this comes to
be the case is not as simple as, say, our spontaneously having a violent passion for a good
we believe to be lesser. In the metaphor the passion for the lesser good is compared to a
one pound weight, suggesting that taken by itself, in isolation, the passion is not of much
‘weight’, i.e., not likely to move us against other passions. It is the circumstances of
situation that result in the counterintuitive mechanical feat of the one pound weight
raising the hundred pound weight. Attending emotions, beliefs, associated ideas and
impressions, must be involved in giving the ‘one pound’ passion the advantage over the
one hundred pound passion. It is likely things like the force and vivacity of current [and
perhaps ‘near’ (see 2.3.4.1 and below)] impressions that ultimately provide the violence
sufficient for the passion for the lesser good to overcome the passion for ‘my own
acknowledged greater good.’
We can likewise imagine mental circumstances such that the calmer, more ‘rational’
passions, whether acquired in response to beliefs about what is most likely to produce our
own good or through the natural instincts that cause us to be kind to children and prefer
what is generally good, could come by situation to provide greater impulse and influence
over our actions than the violent passions. Hume provides a couple of different ways of
understanding the influence of such passions. In 2.3.4 he explains that one way the calm
passions, i.e., passions attended by less emotion in the form of disordering violence,
come to have the dominant impulse is that they may come to be experienced violently:
[A]ll depends on the situation of the object, and... a variation in this particular will
be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other. Both these
kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil. But herein lies the difference
betwixt them: The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which,
when remote, produces only a calm one... [we shall here] consider some of those
circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or
violent. (2.3.4.1)
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The “situation of the object” that makes the difference in this case Hume explains to be
our beliefs about the degree to which the desired good that the passion points us towards
is near or remote. ‘Nearness’ and ‘remoteness’ we can imagine come in different forms.
An object that is physically near to us will have the advantage of the force and vivacity of
immediate impressions of sensation, increasing the ‘violence’ of our experience of it,
while a physically remote object may have to rely on the weaker ideas of memory and the
imagination. On the other hand, an absent object may be ‘near’ in the sense that it would
be easy to achieve, making our idea of achieving it more vivid, while a similarly absent
object that would take more work or time to achieve would be considered more remote.
In any case, things like our beliefs about how immediate our pleasure may be, and the
force of current impressions surrounding the beliefs and the passions may all contribute
to the possibility of a passion being a violent or a calm passion.
Nearness of the object is of course only one way that a passion (whether typically calm or
violent) may come to be experienced as calm or violent. Hume goes on in this section to
explain further how the context of accompanying passions and emotions make a
considerable difference to the strength of our passionate impulses to determine our will
and support a dominant passion. He explains in 2.3.4 that the accompanying emotion of
one passion is easily transfused into another (this important point about the fluidity of the
force and impulse of passions will be examined further in 1.10 of this work). Therefore, a
passion which on its own would be too calm to move us, may have the advantage of the
force and vivacity of accompanying emotions added to it, making it strong enough to act
as the dominant passionate impulse. One way to think about this might be to say that the
passion has become violent.
But that a typically calm passion may acquire the force and vivacity of emotion to be
experienced as a violent passion is not entirely satisfactory as Hume’s explanation for
how it is we come to be moved by our calm passions. Clearly the calm passions are not,
in every instance in which they are motivating, accompanied by violent emotions—if this
were the case there would not be the tendency to attribute the motivating power of the
calm passions to reason. Hume provides the explanation of how it is the calm passions, in

69

a calm manner, come to motivate us in his discussion of the effects of custom on our
passions (2.3.5).
He begins by explaining the effects of custom on the mind in this way:
Custom has two original effects upon the mind, in bestowing a facility in the
performance of any action or the conception of any object; and afterwards a
tendency or inclination, towards it; and from these we may account for all its
other effects, however extraordinary. (2.3.5.1)
It might be useful here to establish what Hume intends when he talks about custom.
‘Custom’ in Hume refers to anything “which proceeds from a past repetition, without any
new reasoning or conclusion” (1.3.8.10). The idea here appears to be that the effect of
repetition of mental events creates in the mind a tendency towards the same flow of ideas
and impressions that it has repeatedly experienced in the past. This makes custom, in
function, related to the natural principles of association our minds operate under (1.3.7.6).
For example, in the Abstract Hume explains that custom is what causes us to move from
our impression of a billiard-ball moving towards another to the idea of the second ball in
motion. This kind of causal relationship is one we have observed enough times that our
minds move easily and naturally from one idea to its associate. ‘Custom,’ therefore,
refers both to the repetition of mental events in our lives, as well as the effects these
repetitions have on our tendencies towards association.
How it is exactly that a tendency towards certain associations develops (or particular
flows of ideas and impressions become ‘natural and easy’ for the mind) is not entirely
clear. Hume clearly takes our first hand experience of such trends to be strong evidence
that our minds operate in this way. He also occasionally appears to be assuming a sort of
physiological picture of the brain, as is found in writers like Descartes and Malebranche,
where physical ‘traces’ in the brain deepen with time and repetition of particular
impressions and passions, creating tendencies towards certain flows of spirits, and
therefore, trains of thought. At 2.3.5.2, Hume explains that new ideas and actions are met
with “a certain unpliableness in the faculties, and a difficulty of the spirit’s moving in
their new direction.” Such difficulty “excites the spirits” and, “like everything, which
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enlivens the mind to a moderate degree” is pleasurable. But this ‘unpliableness’ also fits
the Humean definition of violence in the mind. It is a disordering of the natural and easy
passages of thought and association. Therefore, the passions which excite and work
against our customary tendencies are the violent passions. Our passions which are in
keeping with our natural and easy associations (whether original instincts or acquired
through custom), are experienced as calm passions.
This puts into perspective the second point taken from 2.3.4.1: Hume’s claim that the
calm passions come to “produce no longer any sensible agitation.” The calm passions are
not a source of sensible agitation and disorder—but are they entirely without feeling? At
various places Hume seems clear that calmness of passions does not amount to a lack of
feeling, but rather a kind of ‘tranquility’ of feeling. Where violent passions produce
disorder and felt agitation, custom produces facility, and facility Hume describes as a
“very powerful principle of the human mind, and an infallible source of pleasure”
(2.3.5.3). This particular kind of pleasure “does not so much consist in any ferment of the
spirits, as in their orderly motion” (2.3.5.3), and in fact the pleasure of order may at times
be strong enough to counteract the uneasiness and pain that may otherwise accompany
the ideas and impressions we are experiencing. Of course, this subtle pleasure is a calm
pleasure born of the manner of the experience of the passion (similar to how a violent
passion takes some of its feeling from the disordering violence of its manner of
experience). We may assume, as Hume has stated in other places, that aside from the
calm pleasure of facility, calm passions and emotions are still impressions of reflection,
and have, albeit subtle and nearly imperceptible, valenced feeling.
The third point of discussion from 2.3.4.1 concerns Hume’s reference to “momentary
gust[s] of passion.” These, he tells us, are attended by opposition and emotion. In light of
the discussion above, we can understand these gusts of passion to be bursts of
impressions of reflection not part of our settled ordering of the brain, and therefore
disruptive to it, if brief. The context of the reference to gusts in Hume’s discussion is the
contrast of the motivating effects of calm passions over fleeting, though violent, passions.
The emphasis here seems to be on the staying power of the passion. Bursts of violence
may not have a lasting effect on a will that has the constant influence of calm passions of
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custom. Such gusts of opposition and emotion, however, it is implied can have directing
influence over the will—it is only through the effects of custom that the calm passions
come to be able to dominate, and even at times convert the force and violence of our
fleeting passions to their own ends, in directing the will.
A summary of Hume’s take on the motivational effects of the calm and violent passions
can be found in his own words in the final paragraph of 2.3.8:
We commonly understand by passion a violent and sensible emotion of mind,
when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original
formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean
affections of the very same kind with the former; but such as operate more
calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquility leads us into a
mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our
intellectual faculties.
Here Hume offers a reconciliation of his arguments with the common way of speaking
about reason and the passions. Reason is defined in terms of the calm passions, and our
tendency to confuse these with workings of the intellect (demonstrative and probable
reasoning) is explained. He continues,
Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable,
and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every
individual. Generally speaking, the violent passions have a more powerful
influence on the will; tho` `tis often found, that the calm ones, when corroborated
by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to control them in their more
furious movements.
The history and natural temperament of the individual affects the circumstances that may
cause a passion to be calm or violent, as well as the strength that a calm or violent
passion may have to motivate us. Interestingly, here Hume concedes that generally
speaking, violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will. However, he then
turns to put power over the passions in the reader’s hands, but saying that reflection and
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resolution can help us control the violent impulses of such passions. Presumably, the idea
is that we have some control over the repetition and custom that will lead to the
development of stronger calm passions, capable of moving us in the face of violent
opposition. Hume then concludes,
What makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm passion may easily
be chang`d into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the
circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from an
attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination. (2.3.8.13)
This, of course, is where this section ends in explanation, and the next two pick up. The
calmness and violence of passions, and the effect such a manner of experience has on the
will, is influenced greatly by the tendency of the dominant passions (whether calm or
violent) to ‘borrow’ and even convert force and impulse from attending passions and
emotions. But before moving on to the discussion of these, here is a final summary on the
relationship between emotion and violence/calmness.
Calm passions are (or have) subtle feeling, though it shouldn’t be overlooked that they
are still impressions of reflection, and therefore are kinds of emotions themselves. But we
could also say that when we experience passions calmly, those subtle emotions are not
attended by much additional emotion (such as the violence arising from passions which
cause mental disorder). This is in contrast with violently experienced passions, which can
be violent for two reasons: one, because the passion itself is disruptive to our natural
patterns of thinking, disordering the mind and providing vividly felt impulse; or two,
because the passion is attended with violent emotion, which lends its feeling and impulse
to the dominant (perhaps even otherwise calm) passion that is driving our will. The
effects of violence and emotion on the will are therefore only fully understood when we
understand Hume’s use of ‘attending’ and his contention that the emotions are fluid and
transient in their attending. The next two sections will treat these topics.
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1.9

Emotion as ‘attending’ impressions and ideas

This section examines instances where Hume talks about emotions as ‘attending’ various
perceptions, both ideas and impressions. Effectively, it is the beginning of a discussion
about how it is Hume talks about the operation of these valenced feelings in conjunction
with our other mental experiences, a topic that will carry on over into the next section.
The language of ‘attending’ in Hume’s explanations of the impressions of reflection has
already appeared in the discussions above, frequently with the ‘attendee’ being some
degree of emotion or force of feeling. Such emotions do not only attend passions for
Hume—ideas too are at times described as being ‘attended’ by emotions (or even by fullfledged passions). The purpose of this section is to add some depth to our understanding
of what Hume means when he talks about ideas and passions as being ‘attended’ by
emotion. This discussion is of particular importance in that an understanding of feeling as
attending other mental events is the starting place for the final topic we will consider in
examining Hume’s use of ‘emotion’: the very important Humean doctrines surrounding
the transitivity, mixing and general fluidity of feeling and emotion in his picture of the
human mind.
The language of ‘attending’ shows up early in the Treatise. In the first section of Book I,
Hume introduces his impressions and ideas distinction and argues that, “every simple
impression is attended with a correspondent idea” (1.1.1.8). Here ‘attended’ appears to
mean ‘is accompanied by.’ This type of use, generally referring to the way various ideas
and impressions accompany each other, continues throughout Book I of the Treatise.
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Hume also introduces there the idea that belief ‘attends’ memory and sensation,65
meaning in Humean terms that ideas of memory and sensation are always attended, i.e.,
accompanied, by a degree of liveliness, force and vivacity that is lacking in our nonbelieved ideas. This is a significant development—we learn from it that it is not only
ideas and impressions that can ‘attend’ other ideas and impressions, but also that Hume
will sometimes talk about the manner of perception as a kind of ‘attending’ feeling. In
“Of the influence of belief” Hume extends this idea further by showing how the passions
are favourable to belief by lending to our ideas the feeling and liveliness that naturally
attends them, so that the ideas (now attended by feeling) “[resemble] the inferences we
draw from experience,” i.e., the inferences we believe due to vivacity of immediate
impressions of the objects in question, not borrowed vivacity (1.3.10.466). In a related
vein, Hume talks at 1.3.11.2 about probability as being evidence “still attended with
uncertainty”, another feeling or manner of perception (which we learn in 2.3.9 is an
uneasy feeling). In short, along with discussions of various impressions and ideas
attending each other, Hume is inclined to talk about feelings of various kinds (force,
vivacity, pleasure, uneasiness, etc) attending impressions and ideas, often contributing to
the ‘manner’ in which they are experienced.
What one finds when tracing Hume’s use of ‘attention’ in the Treatise is that while it is
not a technical term for Hume, it is a common metaphor used in his descriptions of the
way various mental events are experienced in conjunction with each other, and at times
combined. Sometimes the ‘attendee’ is a distinct idea or impression, while at other times
it is a kind of feeling or vivacity that affects the manner of experience of the ideas and/or
impressions in question. For instance, to say an idea of a present object is attended by an
idea of an absent object that custom tells us is usually conjoined with the first (the case of
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For instances where Hume talks about belief attending impressions and ideas, see for example 1.3.5.7,

1.3.8.8-10, 1.3.8.15, and 1.3.13.20. Hume alternatively at times talks about vivacity and liveliness as
attending belief (see for example 1.3.10.7 and 1.3.13.13).
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See also 1.3.14.24, where Hume fears the typical “astonishment attending everything extraordinary” will

cause his readers to find their contempt at his thesis concerning causality to be more lively.
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causal beliefs), is to say that what typically accompanies some idea or impression is
another idea or impression. On the other hand, to say that an idea is attended by belief
(force and vivacity), or that believed ideas are attended themselves by force and vivacity,
is to suggest the ‘attendee’ is a kind of felt aspect of the mental event; the ‘attendee’ is
some aspect of the manner of the experience.
This sort of dual way of talking about what it is that attends ideas and impressions is
reflected in the discussions of Book II of the Treatise as well. On the one hand, particular
passions may be found to attend each other. For example, at 2.2.6.3, Hume says that the
indirect passions are not attended by the direct passion of desire. The implication seems
to be that the direct passions, on the other hand, are always attended by some form of
desire or aversion, which makes them direct causes of action. On the other hand, there are
also instances where a kind of feeling is spoken of as attending a passion, but not
identical to the passion. Often these feelings are presented as being transferable between
passions (and ideas). For instance, when talking about the indirect passions at 2.3.9.4,
Hume says that pleasure attends the passion of pride, and may itself be deflected back to
the direct passions, increasing our desire (for instance) for the things which give us pride.
Here the attending pleasure is considered separable from the passion itself, and is able to
spread over and attend other passions we may be experiencing. This feature of attending
feeling that may move between ideas and impressions turns out to be very important for
Hume. I would like to suggest that ‘emotion’ for Hume is often used to reference this
kind of ‘attending feeling.’
One example of emotion being used in this way may be found in Hume’s discussion of
the difference between calm and violent passions. Hume’s discussion at 2.3.4, “Of the
causes of the violent passions,” explains calm and violent experiences of particular
passions in terms of the feeling that does or does not attend them. When discussing the
possibility of calm passions moving the will as a result of custom, Hume talks of the
violent passions yielding to the force of custom “without that opposition and emotion,
which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion” (2.3.4.1). Violent gusts of
passion are here characterized as being attended by emotion. That same emotion may also
act as an opposing impulse to that provided by our calm passions. The suggestion seems
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to be that it is this feeling, the ‘attending emotion,’ that makes the experience of the
violent passions violent. On the flip side, the calm passions “produce little emotion in the
mind,” causing them to resemble the operation of reason, which is entirely without
attending emotion (2.3.3.8).67 As has been argued above, this does not mean that calm
passions are emotionless—rather, the emotion of a calm passion is more subtle.68 One
might think of it in these terms: all passions are themselves emotions, but the instances of
passion we describe as violent are attended by more obvious feeling (emotion) than those
we describe as calm.
There is reason to think the feeling or emotion attending a passion in this sense is, though
intimately tied to the experience of the passion, not identical to the passion. One reason
for understanding these emotions in this way will become clearer in the discussion of the
fluidity and transitivity of emotion in the next section. Here we will look at another
reason for understanding the emotions in this way: through a key discussion of ‘attending
emotion’ found at 2.2.8.
In this section Hume is seeking explain the ‘secondary passion’ of malice without
appealing to new principles of mind. That is to say, he wants to show how this passion
which “imitates the effects of hatred” (a passion we come by through ‘original instinct,’
which is to say that we are naturally predisposed to respond to certain kinds of objects
and causes with that passion) arises indirectly, as a result of other original mental
mechanisms. Among the natural tendencies of particular interest to Hume in his
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that reason operates without generating emotion, see also 2.1.9.4 and 2.2.2.6.
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One way of explaining the efficacy of the calm passions is, of course, with reference to general rules (see

the previous section of this work, as well as Hume’s discussion at 2.3.4). But Hume also hints at the
possibility that some emotions come to be experienced calmly (so calmly, in fact, that we tend not to
recognize them as emotions) because the experience of these feelings is so typical for us. At 2.2.8.4 Hume
claims that “custom may make us insensible” of the subtle emotion that attends almost every perception.
Thus, calm passions may seem to be emotionless simply because the feeling of the emotion that typically
attends them is so familiar or customary that we no longer are particularly sensible to it.
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explanation is our natural tendency “to judge more of objects by comparison than from
their intrinsic worth and value” (2.2.8.2). To explain this original tendency of judgment
by comparison, Hume likens it to the bodily experience of warming one hand, cooling the
other and then putting both in the same warm water. The results, of course, would be the
feeling of cold in the previously heated hand, and the feeling of warmth in the previously
cooled hand. Our judgment of how hot or cool the water is is dependent on the
comparison with the state of the hand previously. Hume argues that judgments of the
changes in the pleasure/pain we experience are similar—we judge the degree of
pain/pleasure we are in by comparing immediately previous or typically familiar
experiences of pain/pleasure with current impressions. Thus,
A small degree of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation,
as if less than it really is, and even sometimes the opposite quality. A gentle pain,
that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather becomes a pleasure; as on
the other hand a violent pain, succeeding a gentle one, is doubly grievous and
uneasy. (2.2.8.2)
Hume takes it as obvious that this tendency in judgment applies not only to sensations
and pain/pleasure, but in fact to all our passions (2.2.8.3).69 His point seems to be that all
impressions we tend to judge by comparison; that is, what we experience in a felt manner
we judge relative to our typical or preceding feelings. What Hume takes to be less clear is
how it is we come to judge of our ideas (and by extension the objects of our ideas) in the
same way. If judging by comparison is a matter of comparing difference of feeling, how
is it that we frequently make judgments about our unfelt ideas in the same way? To be
clear, the phenomenon that Hume is seeking to explain is our tendency to judge the
objects of our ideas to have certain properties relative to other objects we are inclined to
compare them to. For instance, a hill will be judged to be tall in an otherwise flat
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“according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an
estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure” (2.2.8.8).
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landscape, though it will be judged small if it is at the foot of a mountain range. Hence,
with any given object we may “form such different judgments…and at one time admire
its bulk, and at another despise its littleness” (2.2.8.3). Hume points out that we do this
despite that fact that the ideas themselves, as copies of our impressions and the results of
the functioning of our sense organs, need not vary for us to make varied judgments
concerning them.70
The tendency to judge according to comparison is an original principle of the human
mind for Hume and it is explained in terms of feeling. The explanation of how it is that
unfelt ideas are likewise frequently judged according to this principle is the following
interesting claim that Hume introduces in this passage, but references several more times
in Book II:
I believe it may safely be establish’d for a general maxim that no object is
presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d
with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it; and however custom
may make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to confound it with the
object or idea, ‘twill be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and
distinguish them. (2.2.8.4)
Unfelt ideas are subject to our tendency toward judgment by comparison because
(almost71) all objects of thought are attended with some degree of emotion, which means
they are all accompanied with some degree of feeling. This feeling may be exceedingly
subtle and even generally undetected, but these are nonetheless distinct sensations from
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nerves convey the images to the brain in the very same manner, whether a great or small object has
proceded…”.
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Hume presents this claim in the slightly weaker form in other places. He does think there are

exceptions—ideas that are not accompanied by any emotion, but these he takes to be rare and non-typical.
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the ideas themselves that we can discover by careful consideration of our experience, and
the help of some of Hume’s trusty ‘experiments.’
Note that this is a passage where emotion appears to be equated with ‘movement of
spirits.’ Thus, the modern reader may be tempted to simply assume this easy explanation
of Hume’s claim: we generally understand today that all mental events have a
physiological basis, and in particular that all perceptions have their beginnings in the
activity of nerves and the firing of neurons. Could it be that this claim merely amounts to
that? That is to say, could we read this paragraph as suggesting that Hume intuits a
physiological component of all perceptions (including those of the imagination), and
means no more than this?
Clearly Hume takes the emotion that attends every object we conceive of to have a
connection to some physiological event(s). But it cannot be accurate to say this is merely
what Hume means by this new claim. As was discussed earlier in this work,72 there is
good reason to think that Hume took there to be an important relationship between
physiological events and our experiences of emotion. But he left thinking about and
working out the physiology to the anatomists and naturalists. His interest was not in the
physical side of these events, but the felt, mental side. Thus his claim about an emotion
attending every object perceived is not a claim about spirits moving, it is a claim about
feeling (though, as has been established, this is the kind of subtle feeling that Hume
admits we commonly fail to note, despite its reality). This is also the only way to make
sense of this new maxim as an explanation of the tendency to judge ideas of objects by
comparison. Judgment by comparison is explained in terms of contrasting feelings, and
judging according to resemblance and departure from preceding or typical felt
experience. Thus, it is feeling that must accompany the ideas of objects we judge by
comparison to each other, not mere physiology.
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The passage above is the first formal introduction of this seemingly important “general
maxim” to Hume’s philosophy of mind. Hume illustrates this principle with reference to
the felt effect of large objects, or vast numbers of objects on the observer:
[‘T]is evident, that any very bulky object, such as the ocean, an extended plain, a
vast chain of mountains, a wide forest; or any very numerous collection of
objects, such as an army a fleet, a crowd, excite in the mind a sensible emotion;
and that the admiration, which arises on the appearance of such objects, is one of
the most lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying. Now as this
admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects,
we may conclude… that ‘tis a compound effect, proceeding from the conjunction
of the several effects, which arise from each part of the cause. (2.2.8.4)
The compound effect of the felt emotion attending each distinct object or unit of
extension in such cases is a feeling of admiration. And as this admiration is proportionate
to the increase or decrease in size or number of the object or objects being admired,
Hume takes himself to have shown that “[e]very part… of extension, and every unite of
number has a separate emotion attending it, when conceiv’d by the mind.”73 Note that
these attending emotions can’t be conceived merely as bodily sensations—compounded
they become (in this case) the passion of admiration. They are not, therefore, simple body
sensations, rather in Hume’s terminology they are a kind of impression of reflection, a
felt response to the considered object. In this case, compounded, these feelings become
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slightly greater number of chances to the lesser, even when the numbers are so great that we could not
possibly feel the effects of all of them on our belief directly. Hume explains our preference with reference
to general rules, and draws an analogy to the passions in the form of compounded desires. The similar
claim is therefore somewhat between the lines: just as compounded desires result in a stronger overall
desire, compounded impressions of some causal connection result in a strong feeling of conviction.
Number of objects is relevant to the feeling we get from consideration of the objects, as attending emotion
compounds.
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the passion of admiration.74 And since he has shown them to be present in the case of
number and extension, Hume adds that it therefore must be also allowed to be the case
for those objects of thought , “which are always attended with an evident emotion” such
as “vice and virtue, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery” and so on
(2.2.8.4). Hence, we may state his new maxim in this way: Every object of thought,
whether ideas of objects outside of us or any object of the imagination, is attended with
some degree of emotion, rightly considered distinct from the things conceived
themselves.
Hume goes on in this section to link his conclusions about the tendency of the emotion
attending every cognition to make us judge by comparison with his theory concerning
general rules. “Every object is attended with some emotion proportion’d to it,” and
because of judgments made by comparison, “a great emotion succeeding a small one
becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary proportion” (2.2.8.6). In other words,
though the object itself hasn’t changed, nor even has our idea of it, the amount of
attending emotion changes when we judge by comparison that some object is actually
bigger/smaller, hotter/cooler, more beautiful/uglier, etc… This attending emotion
(though, presumably, we do not always realize that is what we are responding to) we take
to be directly proportionate to the actual object (here we have the application of a general
rule). Therefore,
… when the emotion increases, we naturally imagine that the object has likewise
encreas’d. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of
emotion to a certain magnitude of object; nor do we consider, that comparison
may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object.” (2.2.8.6)
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passion in us, which varies according to the different quantity of the object; I say, ‘tis evident, that the
passion, properly speaking, is not a simple emotion, but a compounded one, of a great number of weaker
passions, deriv’d from a view of each part of the object.” See also 1.3.12.16 for a description of the maxim
of compounded effects.
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Hume’s discussion of the emotion attending every idea is meant to provide
proof/reasoning for a claim he takes us all to find easily observable and familiar: the
tendency to compare things and pass judgments based on how things are measured
against each other, not against some constant standard. It is this tendency to compare that
is being used in order to explain malice and envy. But the mechanism of comparison is
itself explained as an independent (and therefore, one would assume, independently
important) principle of the human mind. And its operation in the case of ideas is
explained with the claim that an emotion attends every object. This “new discovery of an
impression, that attends every idea” (2.2.8.7) is mentioned again at 2.2.8.14 and 2.2.10.9
(where he uses the phrase, “almost every kind of idea is attended with some emotion”),
and must be taken seriously as a posited feature of the mental landscape that Hume was
committed to.
I would like to suggest that Hume’s insistence on an attending impression to the
cognition of every object carves out a role for the emotions in Hume that is unique to
emotion, not shared with the specific passions. Though passions may attend ideas (just as
ideas may attend other ideas, or passions etc), there is a special category of attending
impressions here: the felt impressions that attend every object. The term Hume most
often uses for this kind impression is ‘emotion.’ Therefore, I would like to suggest that
emotions, as something distinct from passions (particularly the ‘fully established
passions’ discussed above), are the kind of impressions that attend every perception.
This claim is more about conceptual distinctions in Hume than technical language. The
difference I have suggested here between emotions and passions in Hume is obviously
not one that he articulated, and there may be good reason to think that he himself had not
consciously committed to making such a clearly labeled technical distinction between
emotions and passions. In fact, despite the consistency with which Hume calls the
attending feelings either ‘emotions’ or the more general ‘impressions’ throughout most of
2.2.8, at the very end of his discussion he abruptly becomes looser in his language, for the
first time using ‘passion’ when discussing the attending impression:
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...no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, or by the passions they
separately produce, unless they be united together by some relation, which may
cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or
impressions, attending the ideas; and may preserve the one impression in the
passage of the imagination to the object of the other. (2.2.8.20)
A few things can be said about this passage. First, Hume’s sudden choice to label the
attending impressions to certain ideas ‘passions’ directly follows the use of various
examples of objects eliciting aesthetic responses (poetry and painting at 2.2.8.18 and
2.2.8.19 respectively). Such ideas may very well be attended by fully formed passions,
not the less specific feelings of emotion. That is to say, it could be that the claim that all
objects of thought are attended by some emotion need not exclude the possibility that this
emotion is really the felt component of a fully formed passion. It is likely Hume would
allow that there is a distinguishable attending emotion that is a component of that
passion. In some sense, all passions are ‘compounded’ for Hume. This is made clear
when he offers the following description of the identity of a passion:
…[W]e must consider, that ‘tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain
or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent
and tendency of it from beginning to the end. One impression may be related to
another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along
suppos’d in the preceding cases; but also when their impulses or directions are
similar and correspondent. (2.2.9.2)
This ‘maxim’ is repeated formally at 2.2.9.11:
But ‘tis a maxim, which I have just now establish’d, and which is absolutely
necessary…That ‘tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure,
which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency
of it from the beginning to the end.
If a passion is properly characterized by a collection of mental events and tendencies,
then certainly the attending emotion will be a component part of the passion. Thus,
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reference to the attending ‘passion’ may not only be loose use of terminology by Hume.
It may also suggest that the attending emotion is frequently a component of a broader
experience of passion that is also rightly spoken of as attending the cognition in question.
Hume’s language at 1.3.12.24, where his discussion seems to anticipate the maxim he
presents at 2.2.8 concerning the effects of attending impressions, is similarly loose. There
he uses both the terms ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ to designate a particular kind of attending
impression that once compounded results in a full passion. In this discussion, however, he
draws a helpful distinction between the ‘compounded passion’ that is a result of the large
quantity of object(s), and the ‘simple emotion’ that attends each discrete unit in question.
Thus, though he does refer in this passage to the attending emotions as ‘passions’, he
illustrates that the kind of conceptual distinction I am suggesting between fully
characteristic passions and simple felt emotions still obtains.
In summary, in this section I have sought to show the following. For Hume almost all
perceptions of objects (impressions, ideas, passions, etc) are attended by emotion. This
attending emotion is not to be understood as identical to the perceptions, but rather a
distinct accompanying feeling (possibly with physiological underpinnings). It is likely
that these feelings largely constitute the manner of experience of each particular
perceptions, as well as play a large role in how we come to judge, understand, and have
passionate reactions to the things we perceive. They can be appealed to to explain the
violence or calmness of experiences of particular passions, as well as the judgments we
make by comparison of various ideas and impressions.
The next section will look at the emotions as they play a role in the transitivity, fluidity
and mixing of ideas and impressions in Hume’s picture of the passionate mind. This topic
is essentially related to what has just been established concerning attending emotion. I
will argue that attending emotions are the feelings that move between and transform
passions. There are several ways that Hume explains the interactions, oppositions and
mixing of impressions, but I will argue that his writing suggests a useful conceptual
distinction between the static “established passions,” which are in a sense more cognitive
in nature, with a set character and structure, and the more transient emotions, valenced
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feelings that attend all perceptions and can bleed into one another, become one another,
and under very particular circumstances, oppose one another.
But before moving on to the discussion of the transitivity, fluidity and mixing of the
emotions, I want to note two areas of Hume’s broader philosophy of mind that seem of
particular interest in light of the thesis about attending emotions established above, and
what will be said about the interactions of these attending impressions of reflection in
what follows. Both Hume’s doctrine of belief, and his doctrine of the sympathy
mechanism make reference and give important place to attending emotions. Consider first
this statement concerning the nature of believed ideas:
[B]elief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity
is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the
violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon
either of them. It is too weak to take hold of the mind, or be attended with
emotion. (2.3.6.1075)
As was discussed at the beginning of this section, a believed idea for Hume is an idea
attended with a certain vivacity, which is itself sometimes characterized as a felt manner
of experiencing an idea. In the quotation above there is an obvious link drawn between
that attending vivacity that is necessary for belief and attending emotion. One way to read
this passage even seems to suggest that the feeling accompanying the believed idea that
makes it a belief is the same as the feeling of the attending emotion that will make this
believed idea a basis for passions. That is, the attending emotion may play the role of
differentiating believed ideas from mere ideas. This (perhaps) surprising claim will
receive further treatment in the next section, where I will try to work out more about the
relationship between attending vivacity and attending emotion.
It is also worth considering Hume’s sympathy mechanism in the context of these two
sections. Consider the following:
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In general we may remark that the minds of men are like mirrors to one another,
not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of
passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay
away by insensible degrees. (2.2.5.21)
The mechanism itself is not explained here, but Hume’s claim in this passage is certainly
supported by his account of the principle of sympathy, whereby ideas we have of the
passions of others gain enough force and vivacity to become the very impressions we
perceive experienced in our own minds. Though the introduction of the sympathy
mechanism at 2.1.11 focuses on the principle as a communicator of passions, this passage
talks about the reflecting of “emotions”, which are then broken down into “passions,
sentiments and opinions.” I have, of course, argued that ‘emotion’ is a broader category
than passion, so the inclusion of both passions and sentiments is not surprising. The
inclusion of opinions in the list of ‘emotions’ reflected between people is more
surprising. Opinion arguably may be thought as a kind of belief, which is itself clearly
not an emotion. But if one assumes that attending emotion is what makes an idea a belief
(as was suggested above), it is easy to make sense of Hume’s inclusion of opinion among
the emotions reflected between human minds. So two new things must be considered as
we look at the next section: first, whether Hume’s claims about the workings of sympathy
suggest an identity relationship between attending vivacity and attending emotion; and
second, how precisely it is that sympathy operates to transfer beliefs between people, or
even attending emotion more generally.

1.10

Emotions as transient, fluid and mixing

Book I of the Treatise makes clear the central role played by Hume’s associationism in
his picture of mind. This is no less the case for his theory of the passions than it is for his
epistemology, as has been evidenced by the story he tells about the production of various
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passions (particularly the indirect passions) through the relations between certain kinds of
ideas and impressions. But it is not merely the production of the passions that is governed
by his associationism, but also their influences, effects and interactions. In Book II of the
Treatise Hume presents a picture of the mind where the basic mechanics of his
associationism is taken to the next level. His project is to explain much of human
experience and psychology in terms of the foundational principles governing the mind he
has presented in Book I, along with the odd new principle or maxim, as he calls them,
thrown into the mix. These new governing mental rules tend to either be derivative from
the basic principles found in Book I, or be facts about the nature of the mind that Hume
notes from experience, attributes to our original nature, and takes to be evident in virtue
of common experience.
The project of explaining all mental experience in terms of his basic principles and
maxims, Hume himself admits, is ambitious. In the latter part of his discussion of the
influences on the will, close to the end of Book II, and after trying to account for the
influence of violent passions, calm passions, general rules, custom, the imagination and
contiguity in space and time, he comments:
Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call’d, diversifies
human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from
themselves in different times. Philosophy can only account for a few of the
greatest and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and
more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her
comprehension. (2.3.8.13)
At the beginning of Book II Hume had stated that, “having said all I thought necessary
concerning our ideas” he has the ambitious goal of “now explain[ing] those violent
emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects” (2.1.1.3). Though it is
certainly less dramatic, the contrast between the opening statement of ambitions for his
work on the passions and the admittance of limitation by the end of the book parallels the
contrast between Hume’s ambitious, even boastful opening to his epistemology in Book I
and the famously uncertain bout of melancholy in 1.4.7. But the difficulty noted in Book
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II is importantly different in that Hume seems confident that he has successfully provided
the basic tools in the form of maxims and principles governing the mind to at least make
a start at explaining any particular ‘event’ in the internal wars we experience between our
calm and violent passions, along with all the other variations of associated emotion and
vividly felt ideas. His challenge, it turns out, is the complexity with which our ever
changing mental states fluctuate, interact and ultimately determine our actions and
characters, according to his principles and maxims.
The transient, fluctuating nature of felt experience turns out to be the key factor in this
‘wheeling’76 of the mind. While associations of ideas can cause the imagination to run
through images, it is only once these ideas are infused with feeling that they come to
produce beliefs, passions and motivations, and really come to shape thought, action and
experience. Hume’s attempt to outline how this works through his theory of the passions
is a considerable expansion from his ambitions in Book I, and Hume himself seems to be
acknowledging in the quote above that any such attempt will come up short due to the
complexity of mental experience. I would like to try to paint a general picture of how it is
our minds move between impression and their associated ideas (and vice versa), and how
these ultimately come to motivate us and contribute to belief on Hume’s account.77 I will
argue that it turns out that an understanding of attending emotion, as discussed in the last
section, can very helpfully inform the picture of how it is our mental states operate with a
kind of fluidity of emotion, mixing various passions and emotions, as well as
transitioning between particular ‘established’ passions.
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A metaphor used by Hume at 2.2.2.9 when discussing the change we can anticipate on our state of mind

upon the introduction of new relations of ideas and impressions (and the removal of others) from our
situation: “I immediately perceive the affections to wheel about…”
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Another function this movement of the mind certainly plays is the establishing of character. This is a

very interesting topic, that Hume says very little directly about, though I will not have opportunity in this
work to pursue it much further than the occasional mention of the effects of and on character in the various
interactions of ideas and impressions that make up the mind’s activity.
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Hume makes the following statement about the fluctuating nature of the passionate mind:
‘Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that
passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconsistent
to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. (2.1.4.3)
The essential characteristic of changeableness of the mind is what this section is about.
Hume offers this characterization in his initial discussion of the principles behind the
variety of causes that excite pride and humility, a discussion which of course leads
eventually to his positing a necessary double relation of impressions and ideas. This
mechanism for generating the indirect passions relies upon the mind’s tendency to have
us “cast our view on every side” (2.3.3.3) and naturally discover associations. In 2.1.4
Hume offers a characterization of this kind of passion driven association. This is a useful
starting place for our discussion of the transitivity, fluidity and mixing of the various
impressions of reflection.
He starts off his explanatory process by offering the basic principles under which all the
change and variation of the mind will occur. He begins by reminding the reader of two of
his basic principles of mind: the association of ideas and the association of impressions.
He introduces the first by saying,
‘Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any
considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy.
(2.1.4.2)
As the later passage quoted above states, changeableness is an essential characteristic of
mind. But that changeableness isn’t without rule or principle. Hume goes on to say,
But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule
and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one
object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it. When one idea is
present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows
it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction. (2.1.4.2)
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Thus he introduces a general principle that should be the means of explaining every
instance of thought or perception not generated directly by sense experience—or at least
will be when paired with a similar principle regarding the association of impressions:
‘Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well
as among ideas; tho’ with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by
resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance.
(2.1.4.3)
Impressions may resemble each other to various degrees, particularly (it will turn out)
with regard to valence. These then are the two main principles governing the apparent
chaos of our ever changing mental landscape. And Hume goes on to tell us that the two
kinds of association have an important effect on each other:
[‘T]is observable of these two kinds if association, that they very much assist and
forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both
concur in the same object... those principles, which forward the transition of
ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in
one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. (2.1.4.4)
This passage takes some unpacking. The first question is, in what sense do the
associations of ideas and the associations of impressions “assist and forward each other?”
Hume offers the example of a man who has received some injury from another, and
therefore finds himself “apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear and
other uneasy passions” (2.1.4.4). This is presumably because of the resemblance between
his feelings of injury and other uneasy passions—thus we have association through
similar valence. His current experience of, say anger, caused by the injury, has a negative
valence. Should he come across other objects that could act as the cause of a similarly
negatively valenced emotion (say fear), the association of resemblance will mean he will
easily go from feeling anger to feeling fear. But one may still press on Hume: why does
the association make me more likely to feel the uneasy feeling of fear? For the moment,
let us just keep this question in mind.
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The passage next tells us that the tendency to experience these new passions, associated
with the original by uneasy feeling, is apparently increased if the potential cause of the
uneasy passion is found in or near the person who was the initial cause of injury. While
the earlier association was one of impressions, this is an association of ideas. Our idea of
the individual who caused us injury will lead us to think of the things near to him and
vice versa—and clearly an idea of the individual as the subject of the new passion would
be strongly associated with our idea of himself as the subject of the original passion. This
association of ideas, Hume is claiming, will make the tendency to feel the associated
uneasy impressions stronger. So, I will be more likely to react with fear in response to his
threats after I am already feeling angry due to the injury he caused me. As now there is
not merely an association of similar uneasy passions, but also one of ideas of the causes,
Hume notes a “double impulse” bestowed on the mind. It is more likely that I will come
to feel fear if I am already feeling angry (due to resemblance of uneasy passions), but it is
even more likely that I will feel the fear if its subject is the same as or related to the
subject of the anger (due to resemblance of ideas). This is the double impulse, brought
about by association. But here I repeat the question from above: why should association,
the mechanism of resemblance (and in the case of ideas, contiguity and causality),
increase the likelihood of feeling and being moved in a certain way?
The point of the question is this: we understand from Hume why one thing may make us
think of another (whether ideas or impressions). But resemblance alone does not provide
impulse (otherwise the associations of mere un-believed, ideas in the imagination would
carry impulse and lead us to have certain impressions). Rather, it must be the case that the
resemblance and association provides a means for pre-existing impulse and feeling to
move between various ideas and impressions, i.e., various perceptions. This is what takes
the Humean mind from a mere observer of associations to a feeling, believing, motivated
agent.
The real importance, then, of the associations of impressions and ideas that Hume is
outlining in 2.1.4 is that they provide the general guideline for how impulse and feeling
are transferred in the mind, which is (broadly speaking) the topic of this section of my
discussion of emotion. Much of Book II, it turns out, is concerned with illustrating
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exactly how this works, and in particular how it results in the formation of passions, as
well as their interacting, intermingling, ability to motivate the will, and even their
violence or calmness.
Let us consider some basic examples of how impulse and feeling move through the mind
in the Humean picture. As has been stated above, passions that resemble our current
impressions in valence are more likely to be experienced than those of the opposite
valence.78 Thus, I am more likely to feel fear after someone has done me injury than I am
to immediately feel joy. This sort of mental movement from one passion, or emotion, to
another one with similar valence (and then another and so on) is not unique to humans
either; Hume comments of animals that “their minds are frequently convey’d thro’ a
series of connected emotions” just as ours are (2.1.12.8).
Of course it is not the valence of the emotion alone that can cause such a ‘connected
series’ of feelings. Hume tells us at 2.1.5.9 that in the case of pride and humility, “[t]he
double relation betwixt the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an
easy transition from the one emotion to the other.” This may seem initially surprising, as
unlike our first example, here the succeeding passion is opposite in valence to the
proceeding. But Hume’s point is that we find in experience that we can go very quickly
from feeling pride to humility—his example is of a beautiful house that one owns being
damaged and becoming an eyesore. In such a case, Hume is arguing, our feelings of
humility upon realizing that the house that once gave us pride is now a source of pain to
ourselves and others are actually propelled partly by the feeling that had accompanied the
pride. Our humility will be felt more keenly and more readily because the very feeling
that attended the pride is now fed into our new passion. Hume explains,
Tho’ pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects, and in their
sensations, they have notwithstanding the same object; so that ‘tis requisite only
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See for example 2.2.3.6, where Hume uses the example of being angry when injured though no injury

was intended to illustrate that, “there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger, and the relation
of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas.”
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to change the relation of impressions, without making any change upon that of
ideas. (2.1.5.9)
Pride and humility both bear the same relationship to our idea of the self, as it is the
object of both passions. In the case of the damaged, once-beautiful house mentioned
above, the ideas involved remain the same (my idea of my house, I associate with my
idea of my self), it is only the impressions that have changed (though the house once gave
a pleasant impression, it now gives a painful impression; while the first was associated
with the pleasant feeling of pride, the latter is associated with the uneasy feeling of
humility). Thus, in this case the flow of connected feelings will be guided not by
associations of resembling impressions, but instead associations of ideas.
But as was mentioned above, there is something particularly curious about this case of
the flowing of feeling: when we move from pride to humility, and the feeling and impulse
of the passion of pride become the feeling and impulse of the passion of humility, there is
a shift in the valence of the feeling in question. The felt impulse of the pride was pleasant,
and yet this same impulse becomes pain when it ‘flows’ into the passion of humility.
Thus, though pride is always pleasant, and humility is always painful, the feeling and
impulse in them, which through associations moves us through a cycle of connected
passions, need not retain the valence characteristic of the passion it attends. Hume in fact
offers this as a new maxim in a later section as follows:
It is a remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion, which attends a
passion, is easily converted into it, though in their natures they be originally
different from, and even contrary to each other. (2.3.4.2)
The context of this passage is Hume’s discussion of the causes of violent passions. He is
seeking to explain how excitement of incidental passions may lead our dominant passions
to gain more strength and ‘violence,’79 even in cases where the feeling and impulse being
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I am going to assume in this discussion the understanding of ‘violence’ and ‘calmness’ that I argued for

in section 1.8, where calmness was not characterized as a lack of emotion, but rather violence is disruptive
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provided by incidental passions is opposite to the character of the feeling of the dominant
passion.80 What he says, effectively, is that though the appropriate relations of ideas and
impressions are always necessary for the creation of the passions,81 when two passions
already exist independently emotion is easily transferred between them, resulting in the
dominant passion often ‘consuming’ the other.82 The vivacity and feeling that is

and disordering emotion, while calmness is emotion that is in keeping with natural tendencies of mind and
is only subtly felt.
80

Note that missing from Hume’s theory of the passions is any real account of how it is we come to acquire

these ‘dominant passions.’ This is perhaps not surprising, as it is likely no explanation was ever intended.
Hume, like many of his contemporaries, assumed that different people have different ‘governing passions,’
and these character traits are likely to be idiosyncratic and not the right sort of thing to be reduced and
incorporated into Hume’s general rules. It may be interesting, however, to speculate on a Humean
explanation of the presence of dominant passions. In the context of this discussion, Hume uses the example
of someone who is in love, and finds all incidental responses of passion surrounding their beloved
(including little annoyances) merely feed their dominant passion of love for the individual. In such a case
the ‘dominant passion’ is likely dominant in the sense that it is the most strongly felt for the individual at
that moment. Thus additions of feeling and impulse from the incidental passions we experience are easily
engulfed by the predominant feeling. There are also cases, however, where Hume talks about dominant
passions in terms of tendencies of character (see for example 2.3.4.1). Thus there may be no immediate and
strongly felt experience of such a passion in order for current incidental passions and emotions to feed it. In
such a case an underlying ‘calm’ passion may come to be experienced violently. What Hume has not
explained is how we come to have these dominant tendencies towards passions as part of our characters. He
probably comes closest to offering an explanation in his discussions of the effects of custom (primarily at
2.3.5).
81

This statement may require qualification, if we consider the production of passions through the sympathy

mechanism. The question of how it is passions are adopted sympathetically is a difficult one, though, which
I will address in some detail in Part Two of this work.
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For another instance where an attending emotion adopts the opposite valence to its original, see 2.2.8.4:

“…tho’ that emotion be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with others, and by its agitating the
spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production of admiration, which is always agreeable.”
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transferred from one passion to another may therefore find its valence convert to match
the feeling of the new passion.
This “remarkable property of human nature” is a very important new maxim of mind for
Hume; it is a maxim concerning the tendencies of attending emotion. It is the principle
“that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant” (2.3.6.1)83.
Consider the importance of this additional principle to the basic Humean picture of mind.
Hume posits that all perceptions can be categorized as either ideas or impressions. Our
mind finds itself inclined to cycle through ideas and impressions, not merely as new
information is presented to us via the senses, but also, and perhaps predominantly,
according to rules of association. But to have one idea or impression recall another isn’t
necessarily for it to be strengthened or increased in efficacy (in terms of, say,
motivational power, or belief). To have this kind of strengthening there needs to be a
mechanism for the transfer of vivacity, force, feeling, etc., between perceptions. Hume
implicitly makes this point in the following:
In a word, no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, or by the passions
they separately produce, unless they be united together by some relation, which
may cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or
impressions attending the ideas; and may preserve the one impression in the
passage of the imagination to the object of the other. (2.2.8.20, my italics)
This passage is meant to emphasize the need for a relation of ideas in order for there to be
transitions between ideas.84 But the secondary point is that the transitioning of ideas is
what leads to the transferring of attending emotion, and the preservation of fluid,
transient feeling between varied perceptions. But for Hume such fluidity of feeling
cannot be the function of passions generally speaking. Pride, for instance, experienced as
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This principle is also stated at 2.3.5.2 in the following form: “...every emotion which procedes or attends

a passion, is easily converted into it.”
84

Hume makes this point at 2.2.8.14 as well.
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a ‘fully established passion,’ and has a particular, valenced feeling, as well as typical
‘attending circumstances,’ i.e., types of objects, subjects, causes, etc.85 Passions so
conceived are not the right sort of thing to move between associated perceptions, in part
exactly because Hume wants to be able to account for instances where the force and
impulse of feeling attending one perception is added to another even when the valence
and particular character changes from what it was to match what it now attends. The
Humean maxim that “any attending emotion is easily converted into the predominant”
introduces a principle into his theory of mind that allows feeling and force to flow
between ideas, but at the same time be fluid in its felt character such that it is malleable to
the cognitive content and logic of the thoughts it comes to attend.
This maxim and the reading I have offered of it, strengthen the case for a need for (at
least conceptually) a real distinction between ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in Hume. At the
very least, we can align these concepts with the distinction between Hume’s ‘fully
established’ passions and his ‘attending emotions’. A distinct passion may arise in us, but
the emotion, the felt component, will, in ‘attending’ our dominant passion(s) easily
become part of that felt experience, even when it means a complete turn about in the
valence of the emotion. While passions are, in a sense, consistent in their identity and
certainly in their characteristic valence (even if our experience of the passion is fleeting,
or becomes mixed with others), emotions can flow between impressions and ideas, and
should they attend a new passion, easily adopt the valence and characteristic feeling of
the new passion they attend. Emotions may therefore be both transient between passions,
and fluid in the kind of feeling they bring to our experience.
This conclusion, in a sense, completes the analysis of the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume that I
have been seeking in Part One of this work. But I will not leave this topic just yet—some
demonstration of how Hume shows these attending emotions to work in the movements
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Recall that for Hume, “’tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which

determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end”
(2.2.9.2).
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of feeling in the Humean mind will be useful. I will also suggest a couple of places where
attending emotion can be seen to have an influence in a slightly different way: namely, in
the cases of belief and sympathy.
Generally speaking, then, Hume appears to talk about the interaction of emotions with
each other and the various impressions and ideas in the cycling of the mind in three ways.
First, as playing a role in transitions between different, but similar passions, which are
brought to mind through association. In these cases attending emotions flow between
distinct but related passions, adding force and impulse to the passion they come to attend.
These are instances in which “the relation of impressions [may] operate upon a very
small relation of ideas” (2.2.3.6), i.e, cases where the similarity between resembling
passions will make it easy for us to move from one to another, even when there are not
the relations of ideas present to support the new passion. Thus, though I may know very
well that the injury I receive is accidental, and therefore do not hold the appropriate
beliefs concerning offense to cause anger, the similarity of the impressions may cause me
to nonetheless come to feel anger through association. In these cases, the attending
emotion is transferred between similarly valenced passions. Association causes one
passion to be brought to mind because of its similarity to another, and the transfer of
attending emotion provides the impulse and feeling for us to actually move to feel this
new passion.
The second way that Hume talks about emotions and passions cycling in the mind
highlights the new maxim that attending emotion will take on the valence and feel of the
dominant passion. These are cases in which, though there is not an association of
impressions, there is either, (a) an association of ideas that makes the flow of passions
easy (such as the case of the transition between pride and humility at 2.1.5.9, as explained
above), or (b) there are two independently arising passions, one of which is dominant and
consumes the other, adopting its attending emotion. In both cases (a) and (b) the
attending emotion is changed to adopt the characteristic feeling of the new (dominant)
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passion.86 Therefore such cases add to the transient nature of emotions a certain fluidity
in the felt nature of the experience. As was emphasized above, such examples draw
attention to the distinction between attending emotion and established passions in Hume.
The former can retain its identity as a continuous felt impulse, even while aspects of that
felt experience change, fluidly adopting the felt character of the dominant passion.
Passions are consistent in their characteristic valence, while emotions have a fluidity of
feeling and the impulse of attending emotion can flow between the various impressions
and ideas that arise in the wheeling of the mind. Thus, though Hume talks about
particular passions arising as a result of some ‘affecting object’ being present, it is the
emotion that attends the passion that may go on to “[pass] by an easy transition to the
imagination; and diffus[e] itself over our idea of the affecting object” (1.3.10.4) and
presumably be carried to other ideas that we associate with our idea of the said object.
Hume gives examples of this at 2.3.4.3, focusing on the cases of the person in love (who
finds all their little annoyances come to contribute to the overall feeling of love with the
beloved), the politician (who agitates anxiety so that the feeling may extend to the
passion he is intending to raise), and the soldier advancing into battle (who’s thoughts of
friends, fears of the enemy, etc, all combine to buoy up his courage). All of these are
examples of “the conversion of the inferior emotion into the predominant” (2.3.4.3).
In the first two kinds of interaction, the attending emotion flows between perceptions,
suggesting that in the moment what we experience is a single kind of feeling. The
character of this feeling is determined by the passion that our minds have most recently
turned to by association or that is dominant (either as a result of character/custom, or the
momentary strength of the passion in question87). But of course this isn’t always our
experience—sometimes (perhaps mostly) we feel a multiplicity of types of feeling, and in
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See 2.3.4.4 for another explanation of the adopting of “new force and violence” by dominant passions.
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It may be pointed out here that this is one of Hume’s explanations for the change of calm passions into

violent passions: “[A] calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper,
or of the circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant
passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination” (2.3.8.13; my italics).
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fact it is not unusual to find the mind a battleground for opposition between conflicting
feelings. Hume was, of course, aware of this aspect of mental experience, and
accommodates it in what I have identified as his third way of talking about the cycling of
the mind: what I will call the ‘mixing’ of passions and emotions.
Hume himself, of course, talks about the mixing and even the ‘confounding’ of different
passions in his section, “Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and
malice” (2.2.9). Here, Hume acknowledges that certain passions (in this case pity and
malice), despite having a characteristic valence (pity is uneasy, malice is a kind of
pleasure), are generally mixed with feelings of the opposite valence (pity is accompanied
by love and/or tenderness, malice by hate and/or anger). This mixing of oppositely
valenced feelings “it must be confess’d,” Hume says,
…seems at first sight to be contradictory to my system. For as pity is an
uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity shou’d
naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and malice love. (2.2.9.1)
Hume must find a way to accommodate these apparently mixed passionate experiences in
his system. To explain this Hume needs to characterize passions not as a momentary
feelings (which he nevertheless wants to insist determines their felt character88), but
rather as “the whole bent or tendency of [the passion] from the beginning to the end”
(2.2.9.2). The direct passions, it turns out, are as much characterized by the typical
desires and impulses that arise from them, as they are by the feeling they present us with.
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The topic of Hume’s characterization of the passions I have not yet tackled directly, and this is a

conscious choice. Part Two of this work will open with a discussion of the debate between cognitive and
sensationalist theories of emotion as they pertains to Hume’s work. As may be becoming clear in the work I
have done here on ‘emotion’, I believe that Hume had aspects of both theories at work in his picture of the
mind. In particular, I believe that passions are more ‘cognitive’ for Hume than emotions, which are more
like the pure feeling of the sensationalist account. As for Hume’s characterization of the passions
specifically, there appears to be some tension in what he wants to say about them, depending on whether he
is focusing on them as feelings or as part of a broader cognitive picture. But more will be said about this in
Part Two.
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Thus, when two direct passions have a resembling “direction or tendency to action,” their
association will result in them typically presenting together. Hume is therefore able to
argue that despite the lack of resemblance of impressions, resemblance in tendency will
cause association, which will result in the familiar chain of passions that tends to lead
pity to feelings of love, and malice to feelings of hate, and so on.
But this is not a case of a clean transition from one kind of feeling to another, the
phenomenon that was discussed above. Rather, in the cases of pity and malice, we will
experience both painful and pleasant feelings at the same time. This is an example of the
mixing of emotions, as opposed to the transitioning between passions. Hume still insists
in such cases on a unity of the felt experience; he says that pity and love, malice and hate,
“so totally mix together as to be indistinguishable” (2.2.9.4). This unity of felt
experience, despite diversity of types of passions, is an interesting aspect of the mixing of
impressions of reflection that is emphasized in other places as well. One of the most
famous examples is in Hume’s comparison of the mind to a stringed instrument (a
metaphor which carries over to his description of the workings of sympathy in Book
III89):
Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find, that with regard to the
passions, ‘tis not of the nature of a wind instrument, which in running over all the
notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases; but rather resembles a
string-instrument, where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound,
which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extreme quick and
agile; but the passions are slow and restive: For which reason, when any object is
presented, that affords a variety of views to the one, and emotions to the other;
tho’ the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each stroke will not
produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be
mixed and confounded with the other. (2.3.9.12)
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See 3.3.1.7.
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This passage is part of Hume’s explanation of the passions of hope and fear (both
mixtures of grief and joy). So here we find that mixtures of feeling actually constitute the
characteristic feeling of some of Hume’s compound passions. Such mixtures may be
experienced as a blending of feelings, like the blending of different notes on a resonating
string instrument.
But the mixture of passions and emotions does not only occur in the manner of blending
sound. Carrying on his discussion in this section, and after reminding us of the possibility
of the dominant passion consuming the attending emotion (in what I have identified with
the transitivity and fluidity of emotion), Hume then offers three ways that in the
alternative scenario of ‘mixing’ the passions may interact:
‘Tis observable, that where the objects of contrary passions are presented at once,
beside the increase of the predominant passion (which has been already explain’d,
and commonly arises at their first shock or recounter90) it sometimes happens, that
both the passions exist successively, and by short intervals; sometimes, that they
destroy each other, and neither of them takes place; and sometimes that both of
them remain united in mind. (2.3.9.13)
The final case, in which the passions “remain united in mind,” is presumably the case of
the blending sound and creation of compound emotions as discussed above, so I will say
no more about it here.91 The first two cases, however, are new to our discussion. In the
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This phenomenon has also, of course, been already explained in this section—though Hume does add an

extra tidbit here about the tendency of dominant passions to adopt the attending emotion of other passions
in his specification that this is most commonly what happens in the initial ‘shock’ of the two passions
existing at once. Presumably, what he means is that when the dominant passion first arises it will often
‘consume’ the attending emotion of the currently felt passions, but that once established, other feelings may
continue to pop up, and may come to be mixed with our experience of the dominant passion, as opposed to
consumed by it.
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Hume goes on to characterize it in this discussion as passion which “instead of destroying and tempering

each other, will subsist together, and produce a third impression or affection by their union… The
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first instance, our experience is of successive feelings, a kind of emotional flip-flopping.
This may happen in instances where we are unsure of what to believe.92 As we consider it
more likely that we will obtain what we desire we feel the pleasure of hope; as we
consider it more likely that we won’t attain what we desire, or will attain what we are
averse to, we feel the uneasiness of fear. This kind of vacillating between emotions may
also occur as we have experiences that cause distinctly different passions at the same time
or in short succession. Hume gives the example of a man who at once loses a lawsuit and
finds out about the birth of a child, and finds his mind moving between the events and
associated emotions (2.3.9.14).93 Mixing of passions in these cases one might think of as
a kind of mechanical mixture; the parts are clearly distinguishable, though our overall
experience involves both.

incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line, if that expression may be
allowed; and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions…” (2.3.9.16).
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This entire discussion, in fact, arises in the context of Hume’s exploration of the effects of beliefs about

probability on our direct passions.
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Hume also gives an example of the experience of multiple, apparently incompatible emotions in Book III

(one of the only three passages where Hume uses the term ‘emotion’ in that book) that is slightly different
from the examples given here, and is worth noting: “The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind:
And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from the real consequences of
objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these emotions are so different in their feeling, that they may
often be contrary, without destroying each other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy
are esteemed beautiful on account of their strength, though we could wish that they were entirely destroyed.
The imagination adheres to the general view of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, from
those which arise from our particular and momentary situation” (3.3.1.23). The case given here is not
entirely clear as to whether it falls into the category of the subordinate passion being consumed by the
dominant, or a kind of vacillating between the contrary passions. What is clear, and interesting to note, is
that there is clearly a dominant passion set here (the wish that the enemies strength is destroyed), which
Hume has identified with the “general view of things”, to be contrasted with feelings that are “particular
and momentary.” This distinction seems related to the difference between passions and emotions that I am
seeking to establish.
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The remaining case is the case of opposition of contrary passions or emotions. Opposition
is an important phenomenon in the Humean explanation of the mind (think of its role in
particular in his discussions of motivation), but surprisingly particular in the
circumstances under which it may occur.94 In some sense, this is the opposite of the
‘mixing’ of emotions—this is the case in which they do not co-exist, either as vacillating
emotions or blending, but rather are too much in conflict of feeling or impulse to co-exist,
and some resolve must be attained. In some circumstances they will actually cancel each
other out, “and leave the mind in perfect tranquility” (2.3.9.15). But there are also cases
in which the conflict between opposing passions appears to constitute a kind of violence
in the mind, itself producing a new (third) emotion. Consider the following:
‘[T]is observable that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion
in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two
affections of equal force. This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion, and encreases its violence, beyond the pitch it wou’d have
arrived at had it met with no opposition. (2.3.4.5)
In this passage we learn a couple of things. First, that opposition that does not end in a
‘cancelling out’, will end with the establishing of a dominant passion, which presumably
will adopt the attending emotion of the previously contrary passion. But the second thing
we learn is that the dominant passion will also adopt the new, third emotion that has been
stirred as a result of the violence that is the disruption of mind cause by opposition. Thus
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At 2.2.8.20 Hume says a bit about this: “We find from experience, that the want of relation in the objects

or ideas hinders the natural contrariety of the passions, and that the break in transition of thought removes
the affections from each other and prevents their opposition.” Opposite feeling isn’t always enough to
result in opposition—the ideas and objects that are involved in the production of the passions need to be
related in the right way to cause the impulses of the two opposite passions to oppose one another. This
requirement for opposition is likely what Hume means when he talks about the potential to “shock[] in a
direct line” at 2.3.9.16. There are instances where opposing emotion will mingle, not push against each
other. Failure of opposite emotions to actually oppose each other is also explained in the case discussed at
3.3.1.23.
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opposition has the potential to strengthen whatever passion wins out, making it even
more efficacious than it would have been had it not been opposed. Hume uses this
phenomenon to explain our experience of increased joy in forbidden pleasures.
Note that in the case above, the new emotion produced by opposition cannot be identified
with any particular passion. It is more like an attending feeling readily attached to some
idea or impression that will determine its character. This again emphasizes the distinction
between attending emotion and established passions that I am seeking to make. It also
highlights an important aspect of what this attending emotion is: something that Hume in
other places calls ‘vivacity’. Vivacity, along with terms like ‘force’, and ‘liveliness,’
plays an important role in Hume’s theory of mind; he relies on it in his explanations of
belief and memory, for instance. It shows up in relation to emotion in Book I:
A painter, who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind, wou’d
endeavour to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion, in order to enliven
his ideas and give them force and vivacity superior to what is found in those,
which are mere fictions of his imagination. (1.3.5.5)
The painter’s desire to acquire vivacity through observation of emotion is surely an
attempt to make use of the sympathy mechanism for artistic purposes. The principle of
sympathy means that the passions, pains and pleasures of others, “must strike upon us in
a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is
easily converted into an impression” (2.2.7.2). Given the diversity of felt experience that
has been established in this analysis of the emotions (and the suggested distinction
between these and passions), we can anticipate that the application of Hume’s sympathy
mechanism will not be as straight forward as he perhaps makes it appear in his initial
presentation of the mechanism at 2.1.11. I will discuss the puzzles in the application of
this principle at length in Part Two. For now, I wish to point out that one of the things
that appears to be communicated at times are the feelings of vivacity. That is to say, it
would appear that attending emotion can be acquired through the sympathy mechanism,
and its vivacity added to whatever our dominant passion of the moment is. This kind of
phenomenon can help explain instances where we come to feel ‘sympathetically’ a
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passion that we do not actually observe in the person we are sympathizing with. Thus, as
in an example Hume gives, we overlook the “greatness of mind” of someone facing with
difficult circumstances, and feel the pain and grief over their circumstance even when
they don’t (2.2.7.5).95
This must also be at play when we find that the sympathy mechanism may result in the
adoption of beliefs (a claim Hume makes in several places). Believed ideas for Hume are,
of course, instances of ideas attended by a particular feeling, or experienced more vividly
than our non-believed ideas. But this reminder of the sensitive nature of belief in Hume
must give us pause in light of what has been said concerning attending emotion. If
attending emotion is a transient vivacity and fluid manner of feeling that may attend
various ideas and impressions, what is its relation to the vivacity that results in a believed
idea? Indeed, Hume is quick to point to the effects of emotion and passion on belief.
Consider the following two passages:
[A]nything propos’d to us, which causes surprise and admiration, gives such a
satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions, and
will never be perswaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation. (1.2.1.1)
As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting of the passions, so the
passions in their turn are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as
convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, do upon that account
become more readily the objects of faith and opinion. (1.3.10.4)
Emotion, both positively and negatively valenced, lends a kind of vivacity to our
thoughts that can create, and even cement, believed ideas. Whether attending emotion is
exactly what results in belief in these cases is not clear, but the prospect is interesting to
consider, as beliefs then become a part of the cycling of ideas and impressions that has
been the topic of discussion in this section. Hume insists that our believed ideas merely
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It should be noted that Hume explains this phenomenon in terms of the effects of general rules, but I take

it that the two approaches are compatible.
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‘approach’ impressions, and maintains a distinction between these vividly experienced
ideas and our actual impressions. But it is less clear that the attending feeling that creates
belief can be as easily separated from feeling more generally, and in particular the kind of
attending emotion that I have discussed here. For now, though, I merely wish to flag this
for the reader’s consideration: how is it that attending emotion affects and interacts with
our beliefs?
As Hume himself points out by the end of Book II, there are innumerable ways that the
associations of ideas and impressions come to influence the mind, particularly insofar as
they spread impulse, vivacity and feeling through attending emotion. Hume makes an
effort to explain many kinds of psychological experience in these terms, and I have given
a few examples. But for our purposes here, it is not necessary to try to track all that Hume
managed to argue for—and not only because Hume’s project is incomplete to begin with.
The main point that I am seeking to make here is that there is a central conceptual role
given to what I have identified as attending emotion in Hume. Associations of ideas and
impressions alone do not explain our mental landscapes. The introduction of the impulse
and feeling of attending emotion is necessary to shape belief, motivation and individual
character. Further, I have argued that attending emotion can be usefully distinguished
from the categories of specific Humean passions. In the next and final section of Part
One, I will recap what has been argued for concerning ‘emotion’ in Hume, culminating in
the claims of this last section. I will then begin to ask some broader questions about the
role of emotion and passion in Hume’s philosophy of mind—setting up for the
discussions of Part Two of this dissertation.

1.11

Summary: What we know of ‘emotion’ thus far

Every usage of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise has been referenced—and in many cases
commented upon—at some point in Part One of this work. Since no usage has been
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overlooked, we arguably have a very good sense now of the types of discussions in which
‘emotion’ plays a prominent role for Hume. We also can draw some conclusions about
the nature of emotion in Hume based on the reoccurring roles and themes that have been
uncovered. I have argued that there is good reason to posit an important conceptual role
for ‘emotion’ in Hume, in particular when thought of as ‘attending emotion.’ I have also
argued that it is distinct from the conceptual space filled by his more dominant term,
‘passion.’ But before moving on to the application of this thesis to broader interpretive
work on Hume (the aim of Part Two of this dissertation), I will, one, pause to clarify the
kind of distinction I am arguing for (particularly in light of the kinds of objections that
might be raised to it), and two, offer a summary of what has been established about
Humean emotion thus far. In this latter analysis I will strive not only to present a recap,
but also make clear which of those claims made in the proceeding sections that I take to
be clearly established, which seem probable (though perhaps difficult to insist upon,
given that Hume did not make the conceptual distinction clearly himself), and finally
highlight a few important questions that I take to be suggested by my reading, and in
need of further treatment.
First then, a word about my intention in developing a conceptual place for ‘emotion’ in
understanding Hume’s philosophy of mind that is distinct from that of ‘passion’. There is
indeed textual evidence, in the form of usage in particular passages, that at times Hume
used these terms to denote distinct concepts in discussions where he uses both. But as
there are also textual uses of these terms in which Hume appears to not offer any
particular distinction (often where he could be taken to be using the terms
synonymously96), this claim needs to be supported by more than a collection of isolated
quotes that suggest a distinction. Alternatively, one might grant that Hume clearly
employs the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ to suggest different things in different
discussions, but argue that there is no consistent conceptual distinction in his use, and that
such a distinction is therefore unimportant to understanding his philosophy of mind. Both
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Revisit the discussion of synonymy in Hume in 1.1 of this work for my take on why we should not be

overly concerned about such instances.
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of these types of objections I have tried to address in my method of analysis. My focus
was not merely on individual instances of the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume (though many of
these did receive in-depth treatment), but also on collecting and interpreting these
passages according to similar themes and claims made therein. In this way it is my hope
that individual uses have been shown to be part of consistent trends in how Hume
addresses certain themes. Though Hume has not articulated a clear distinction, and at
times seems a bit non-technical in his use of the terms (this is, of course, not a tendency
in Hume’s writing reserved for his use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ alone), I think a case
can be made for a conceptual distinction between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ that not only
has textual support, but lends itself to a clearer and more nuanced understanding of
Hume’s explanations of the workings of the mind in Book II, particularly as they pertain
to our passionate nature and motivation.
The nature of my thesis in Part One, therefore, is not an insistence on having uncovered
heretofore unacknowledged explicit technical distinctions in Hume’s terminology of
mind. In contrast to the kind of conceptual distinction I am arguing is implicit in Hume,
there are examples of clear, explicit distinctions between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ to be
found in treatments of the topic by other authors following the publication of the
Treatise.97 Not only is the conceptual distinction I am suggesting exists in Hume not in
content the same as these later treatments, but it is also not explicit in the same way. I
take it that the analysis I have given above shows that Hume was indeed employing
‘emotion’ differently from ‘passion’ at times, but he did not make the clear, technical
category distinction in the way that later theorists would. In fact, Hume’s treatment of the
passionate nature of the mind throughout the Treatise, and in Book II in particular,
involves a certain looseness in language use, and a tendency to draw on common
understanding to point the reader to the experiences and feelings Hume desired to discuss
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For instance, both Lord Kames and Alexander Crichton developed clear emotion/passion distinctions,

though both are different from Hume’s implicit conceptual distinction.
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and explain.98 Take as an example Hume’s distinction between calm and violent
passions: initially presented as though part of his taxonomy of mind, but just as quickly
withdrawn as a clear distinction of kinds, as opposed to a common way of speaking that
might direct the reader to the varieties of experience Hume is seeking to explain. This
tendency toward loose use of the key terms in his discussion is further highlighted by his
initial identification of the passions with the violent emotions—an identification he is
certainly not committed to as he acknowledges the existence of calm passions, and (as
has been argued for above) ultimately makes the calm/violent distinction on the basis of
manner of experience of passion, not according to particular passions.
Despite these tendencies towards loose use of the apparently technical language in Book
II, I do think that underlying his theory (and the general trends found in his word choice),
Hume has a conceptual scheme that involves a plurality of types of affective mental
events, or, as Hume would call them, ‘impressions of reflection.’ Recall his consistency
in describing the contents of this category of impressions as “the passions, and other
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When considering Hume’s tendency towards the loose use of terminology, we may do well to remember

the following advice offered by Ãrdal:
A modern reader, brought up to believe that a philosopher must emulate the scientist by developing a
strictly defined technical terminology, is likely to consider Hume’s use of language loose and unscientific.
It must be remembered that although he sought to introduce the ‘experimental method into Moral Science’,
he was essentially a man of letters, writing for the educated reader of his day, and not a specialist
addressing himself to other specialists. The style is varied according to the context; the same doctrine is
expressed in many different ways. It is essential to try to follow the drift of the argument, rather than to
take a forceful statement of doctrine out of context, on the assumption that it contains the essences of
Hume’s thought at the time of writing. [Ãrdal, P. (1966). Passion and value in Hume's Treatise. Edinburgh,
Edinburgh University Press, 2].

The counsel to “try to follow the drift of the argument” instead of focusing on single passages is what I
have sought to do in developing this conceptual distinction according to a broad reading of the use of
‘emotion’ in the Treatise.
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emotions resembling them” (2.1.1.1).99 Particular passions receive detailed treatment and
characterization in Book II, providing a picture of the rules and logic governing these
individual members of the category of impressions of reflection. But the characterization
of the category of passions generally suggested by the treatment of individual passions is
too narrow to do everything that Hume requires of feeling, particularly of feeling that is
‘reflective’ in nature (i.e., not impressions of sensation). Therefore Hume’s conceptual
scheme must include, along with space for particular passions which can be investigated
and understood as distinctly characteristic feelings and their consistently observed causes
and ‘attending circumstances,’100 space for feeling that can change in character and move
fluidly between ideas and impressions, both shaping their experience, and being shaped
by their content. The culmination of what I have argued for in Part One of this project is
the claim that Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ tends to direct us to this latter part of his
underlying conceptual scheme.
Here, then, is a reminder of what I take to have been established in the preceding nine
sections, in the form of a summary of the claims that can be made about the nature of
‘emotion’ in Hume:
Section 1.2 addressed the place of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s taxonomy of the contents of the
mind. It is clear that emotions are a kind of impression. Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ also
generally makes it clear that he considers them to be a kind of secondary impression, or
impression of reflection, in particular.101 Passions, the most explicitly treated member of
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See also 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.2.1.
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See 2.1.2.1. Or, consider Hume’s statement at 2.1.1.3 that Book II seeks to offer an explanation of the

“nature, origin, causes, and effects” of the particular passions.
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Interestingly, the question of whether emotions are entirely contained in the category of impressions of

reflection is not at this point clear to me, though I think it is likely the case. The cause for uncertainty is, of
course, certain sensations of pain and pleasure that are ‘original’ in the sense that Hume requires in order
for a feeling to classify as an impression of sensation. Such sensations are not the same as, say, my
sensation of red in seeing an apple, in that they have a more direct effect on my actions and passions, which
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the category of impressions of reflection, are initially identified as the typically ‘violent
emotions of the mind,’ though they need not always be experienced as such. I have
argued that the calm/violent distinction is not a proper part of the taxonomy of the
impressions of reflection for Hume, but rather should be thought of as different manners
in which passions may be experienced. Section 1.3 added to this analysis the claim that
for Hume ‘emotion’ appears to be a term with broader application than ‘passion.’ It
would seem that any impression of reflection may be referred to as an ‘emotion’, whether
it is experienced calmly or violently, and whether or not it can be identified with a
particular passion. The key characteristic of an emotion is that it is a felt state of mind.
The status of emotions as felt mental events in Hume was discussed in 1.4, where it was
argued that though there may be concurrent physiological ‘movement’ in the mind and in
the spirits of an individual, Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ is meant to point us to feeling, not
aspects of our physical experience. These feelings may interfere with reasoning through
associations of ideas, and such reasoning likewise tends to interfere with how we feel
emotions.102 I suggested that emotions be considered the sensations of our reflective
impressions, and highlighted that for Hume the felt, emotional component of a passion
constitutes the very essence of that passion. It was also established that emotions come in
the form of pains and pleasures arising from reflection on our present ideas and
impressions, and that emotions are a source of vivacity and force, which can distinguish
the mere idea of a passion from the experience of the passion itself.

in turn seems to suggest they operate more like emotions do for Hume. But I take this point to be not
terribly important. Emotion as a kind of impression of reflection is certainly Hume’s focus when using the
term.
102

Why this is the case is not explicitly explained in Hume, though given the claims made about the way

attending emotion moves between ideas and impression according to associations (as was discussed in
1.10), we can perhaps imagine why this would be the case—and why such interference tends to run both
ways.
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Of the claims made to this point in the analysis, there is little I take to be controversial, or
not clearly to be found in the text. Perhaps the newest thesis would be the direct
identification of the emotion of a passion with the characteristic felt essence that Hume
makes central to understanding individual passions. Though this is stated explicitly at
2.1.5.4, the significance of this statement is only felt once we assume that there is real
distinction between emotion and passion (as opposed to reading this as merely a claim
about the centrality of the felt nature of a passion to its identity). To this point in the
analysis, uncontroversial as it is, the potential distinction between emotion and passion is
vague at best.
Part of the reason for this, of course, is that I have not as of yet pursued a characterization
of ‘passion’ for Hume. What is perhaps becoming clear is that the more in-depth the
analysis of ‘emotion’ gets, the more questions arise as to how ‘passion’ is to be
understood on the same issues. I have suggested some textual evidence at this point in the
analysis that emotion is a broader category than passion, and inclusive of the passions.
But without a clearer idea of how passions in particular are characterized, it is difficult to
see exactly why they are to be considered a subcategory of emotions (if that is in fact the
best way to understand their relationship to the broader category of emotion). The
question of a characterization of ‘passion’ in Hume I will take up in Part Two of the
dissertation, as well as a consideration of the scholarship on the issue—a body of
scholarship, I should mention, that is considerable.
However, there is a characterization of ‘passion’ in Hume that arises implicitly in my
discussions in sections 1.5-1.10. I want to draw the reader’s attention to it now, as it has
its beginnings in the claim just now made that emotions can be considered the felt
component and essence of the particular passions. This does not yet go very far in
distinguishing emotion from passion (after all, the claim appears to be that they are
essentially the same!), but I believe that as the analysis of ‘emotion’ I offer in the second
half of Part One progresses, it becomes clear that it is possible to pry the two concepts
apart, particularly as the contrast between attending emotion and fully realized passions
becomes apparent.

113

Carrying on in the recap, then, the discussions of the valenced nature of emotion in
Hume offered some more depth to the understanding of the feelings that make up the
essential character of the individual passions. I argued in 1.5 that emotions appear to be
always valenced for Hume, and that the pains or pleasures associated with each
experience of emotion come in a variety of kinds, not merely degrees. I also suggested
that these pains and pleasures of reflection are distinct, for Hume, from the pains and
pleasures of bodily experience. In 1.6 I argued that pain and pleasure play a key role in
the production of the individual passions, and that in the case of the indirect passions
specifically we see particular valenced emotions not merely playing the role of the
‘essence’ of the particular passion, but also providing the distinct pleasure or pain of
reflection that is necessary in the production of that passion, via the double relation of
impressions and ideas. This distinction in Hume between the pain or pleasure of the
indirect passion, and the separately arising pain or pleasure involved in the doublerelation of ideas and impressions that produces the passion turns out to be very important
to the analysis of emotion, as it provides evidence in Hume of emotions that are not
identical to passions. These valenced emotions are not passions, or at least, not fully
realized passions. Rather, they play an essential role in the production of fully realized
passions. Thus this section concluded with two established roles for emotions: they may
be the valenced, felt component of individual passion experiences, but also may be the
valenced feelings that contribute to the production of the indirect passions.
I next considered the role of emotions, understood now as the valenced sensations of
reflection, in motivation. The role turns out to be central, as most of our willing begins in
our valenced emotional responses to pain or pleasure, and even the willing that begins in
our original or natural propensities is experienced as valenced feeling. Both the direct and
indirect passions are shown to have influence over the will as a result of their valenced
feeling. This is because that force and impulse comes from valenced feeling. Passions are
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motivating because what “constitute[s] their very being and essence” are these valenced
“peculiar emotions they excite in the soul” (2.1.5.4).103
Exactly how it is this force and impulse directs the will is more nuanced than might first
be assumed, and this was explored in section 1.8 on calm and violent emotions. Force of
feeling appears to fill the key role in motivation—how then can Hume explain instances
of motivation where calm feeling trumps violent feeling? I argue that strength of impulse
provided by an emotion is not identical to its force in the sense of its ‘violence.’
Violence, I argue, amounts for Hume to the disorder caused by mental events that go
against custom, habit and the otherwise ‘natural’ course of thought our minds take. It is
not identical to motivating strength of passions, nor is it rightly understood merely as the
measure of emotion involved. The analysis also showed how violent passions may be
dominated by calm passions, and in fact have the impulse of their force harnessed to the
direction of the calm passion (that is, in some cases, how calm passions may come to be
experienced violently). This phenomenon is explained in terms of the transfer of force
and impulse between impressions and ideas via attending emotion, bringing the analysis
to its last two topics: the question of attending emotion, and the transitive and fluid nature
of emotion.
The move into the last two topics of discussion in my analysis I take to include the more
original, and perhaps by extension controversial, claims in my analysis. The claims made
in sections 1.2-1.4 regarding, taxonomy, scope of reference of the term, and the basic
characterization of emotion as feeling are generally taken directly from text and therefore
(I would assume) uncontroversial. The claims of 1.5- 1.8 take us further into an analysis
of the text as the basic concept of emotion established in 1.2-1.4 is found to operate
according to the themes of valenced feeling, production of passions, motivation and
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I take it that the approach of my analysis and the arguments made in 1.7 are sufficient to explain why I

take all passions to ultimately be motivating for Hume, despite his comments about the indirect passions as
“pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”
(2.2.6.3). See 2.3.9.4 for a reminder of Hume’s account of how the indirect passions contribute to
motivation, albeit ‘indirectly.’
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violence/calmness. In the last two sections I begin to move away from what is obviously
found in Hume to an attempt to fill out a more robust conceptual role for ‘emotion’ as he
has used it and distinguished it in various discussions. The culmination of this discussion
is the identification of emotion as a key player in the feeling-driven nature of the Humean
mind, as it is distinguished from passion as the attending, transient and fluidly-valenced
impressions of reflection that provide for the diversity of mental experience. Virtually all
ideas and all impressions for Hume are attended with emotion. Attending emotion can be
thought of as a (conceptually, if not phenomenologically) distinct feeling that may dictate
the felt manner of our perceptions, and affect the judgments and beliefs we form, as well
as informing our passionate reactions and our actions. Their conceptually distinct role
from the passions becomes finally clear in section 1.10, where the difference between
attending emotion and fully established passions is illustrated to be the consistent nature
of the latter (with a characteristic valence that is essential to the identity of that passion,
and a particular set of causes, objects and subjects) and the transient, fluid, ‘mix-ability’
of the former (characterized as a valenced, motivating vivacity and force, that may move
between different passions, impressions and ideas, and even change in valence and
feeling to match the impressions they come to attend).
Thus Part One concludes with a Humean conceptual scheme of the workings of the mind
in which emotion (as distinct from particular passions) plays an essential role in
providing explanation for the diversity of mental experience. Hume’s governing mental
principles assume the existence of reflective feeling of the transitive character that I have
argued we should identify with ‘emotion’ in Hume. And indeed, I hope to have shown
that this term is the one that Hume most readily uses when describing the kind feelings
that fill this role. Passions are treated differently, more usually characterized as being a
category consisting in a list of named impressions of reflection with particular,
identifiable and consistent characters, causes, and objects. The characterization of
‘passion’ that I would suggest arises in my analysis is of impressions of reflection with
particular valence and distinctive emotions, which cannot change and that same passion
continue to exist. A ‘fully established’ passion for Hume has such a set character, and
beyond the feeling particular to it will have a certain logic and structure of attending
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beliefs, causes and objects that give it a more ‘cognitive’ flavor than the more fluid and
changeable ‘emotions’ (more on this in Part Two of this work). I would suggest that one
source of confusion in Hume’s use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ is that he is inclined to talk
about the connection between passions and emotions in two ways. Sometimes a particular
passion is understood as a particular emotion (instances in which he talks of passions as
‘original existences’). At other times Hume is inclined to talk about ‘fully established
passions’ inclusive of their ‘general bent or tendency from beginning to end,’ with
characteristic causes and objects. These are not identical to emotion, but are rather
attended by emotion, or even produce it. Why he should talk about emotion in these two
ways will be addressed in Part Two, where I will look at both the sensationalist and
cognitivist tendencies in Hume’s theory of the passions. The apparent tension between
these two approaches that appears to be inherent in his system, I will argue, can be
somewhat explained and reconciled with the introduction of the emotion/passion
distinction I have introduced here into his conceptual framework.
But before moving on to that discussion, I want to flag a couple of important questions
that my account of emotion has raised and not yet answered. The first is with regard to
the relationship between emotion and vivacity. In 1.10 I suggested that attending emotion
often introduces new vivacity to our experience of certain ideas and impressions as it
moves between them. It is clear that Hume takes felt experience to influence the
likelihood of our adopting beliefs, and we also know that the difference between a
believed idea and an idea we understand to be a ‘mere fiction’ is one of the felt manner of
experience. The question that all this appears to raise is, to what degree may we identify
the feeling of vivacity that constitutes a believed idea with the attending emotion that
flows between ideas and impressions and ultimately adopts valence that results in our
willing? Though Hume is clear that believed ideas themselves do not become
impressions, rather they approach impressions in their felt experience, he does talk about
them both as being lively ideas and as being attended by vivacity. This same language of
‘attention’, of course, is used in his discussions of attending emotion. One is lead to
question whether they are not related, or perhaps in some instances identical, phenomena.
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Should it be the case that attending emotion is able to constitute the difference between
believed and non-believed ideas, there would be fascinating implications for Hume’s
theory of motivation. I have argued above that valenced emotion is key to the motivating
power of the passions. Should beliefs turn out to be attended at times by emotion, then
they would appear to have potential power to motivate. This would perhaps seems
contrary to Hume’s famous claim that “Reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the
passions” (2.3.3.3), if one were to assume that beliefs are merely the product of cold
reasoning. On the other hand, the vivacity that distinguishes believed ideas is no where
suggested by Hume to have a particular valence, something I have argued is likely
essential for emotion in Hume. This appears to drive the attending feelings being
compared here farther apart. I will not speculate further here. But this question of the
relationship between attending emotion and attending vivacity in believed ideas will be
picked up in the second half of Part Two, as will the question of what my theory of
emotion in Hume might mean for his theory of motivation. On this latter topic, it is worth
noting that emotion shows up often as a key term, and appears frequently to be used as a
technical term, in Hume’s more technical discussions of motivation (see 2.3.3.3-4 in
particular).
Finally, it is perhaps clear at this point that the term ‘emotion’ shows up frequently in
Hume’s discussions of the sympathy mechanism. Indeed, in Hume’s technical
presentations of the mechanism it appears to surface as more of a technical term than
perhaps in some of his other discussions. There is a particular puzzle regarding the
application and working of the sympathy mechanism in the case of the indirect passions.
The workings of the sympathy mechanism more generally are no less puzzling, when
examined in detail. In particular, the question of how ‘fully established’ passions with
characteristic causes and objects are communicated between people is less clear than we
may assume at first glance. Further, despite the references to the term ‘emotion’ in the
context of sympathy discussions found in Part One of this work, I have not commented
yet on how emotion might work in the operation of that Humean mental mechanism. I
will consider this question in one of the last sections of Part Two, and propose not only a
potential solution to the apparent puzzle in the application of sympathy to complex
118

passions, but also suggest a way to think about the role emotion plays in this kind of
communication of feeling, sentiment, and even belief.
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PART TWO: The use of a concept of emotion in
Hume’s overall theory of the passions

2.1

Introduction: ‘Emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the
literature on Hume

The question of what Hume intended in his introduction of the term ‘emotion’ in the
Treatise has not, that I am aware of, been the primary focus of any thorough scholarly
investigation. This includes the kind of close textual analysis I have offered in Part One.
This does not mean, however, that there have not been interpretations of Hume’s use of
‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the literature on Hume. There are even instances where a
distinction has been posited that has some significance for the overall understanding of
Hume’s theory of the passions. The direction taken by these numerous interpretations is
remarkably varied—there are even accounts that offer the same general type of division
between the two kinds of mental states Hume is seeking to distinguish, but assign
‘passion’ where the other assigns ‘emotion’ and vice versa!104 The diversity of
interpretations alone makes a survey of some of the claims of interest to us here,
particularly combined with some of the reasoning given behind the accounts. I will
consider some of the positions I take to be of particular interest, offering some response
to the claims made in support of my own reading, though this will not be my main focus.
In fact, most of these accounts do not make strong enough claims, nor are they the
product of the sort of careful textual analyses that would make them ‘objections’ to what
I have said so far, as opposed to bald statements of a contrary opinion. Generally I will
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more cognitive and potentially calm.
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offer the reader these variations on interpretation for consideration with the aim of easing
this discussion into a consideration of the scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions.
Indeed, most theorists who have an opinion on Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ are really
interested in his theory of the passions, or even more broadly speaking, in his moral
theory. Therefore, though I may on occasion seek to clarify what I have already argued
for in light of the interpretations being considered, my main intention in presenting this
material is to introduce some of the trends in readings of Hume’s theory of the passions.
I will begin by giving in some detail the account offered by Thomas Dixon,105 as his take
on Hume is somewhat unique in that its context is not a Hume-centered work, but rather a
conceptual history of discourse on affective mental states more generally, with a
particular interest in tracing the move from ‘passion’ as the dominant, but not sole term
of this discourse, to the more recent era in which ‘emotion’ has become the dominant,
and generally sole term. I will then offer a brief survey of some of the various accounts
that have been offered by Hume scholars—varied not only in their content, but also in the
degree to which the authors take it to be an important question. I will finish this section
with what I take to be the strongest effort made towards developing a real distinction
between emotion and passion in Hume, found not in a work on his philosophy of mind,
nor his moral theory, but rather in a paper on his essay on tragedy by Alex Neill. This
account, though not identical to mine, has some interesting similarities and agreements,
for which reason I think it merits some particular consideration here.106
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121

We begin then with the account that Thomas Dixon offers in his book, From Passions to
Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Dixon of course notes
‘passion’ as the dominant term in Hume’s discussion, but also acknowledges that
‘emotion’ shows up not infrequently in his discussions of affectivity. Dixon has
suggested that the liberal use of the term ‘emotion’ by Hume in his Treatise of Human
Nature was “the earliest sustained use of the term in the English language in a way that is
similar to present-day usage.”107 However, Dixon sheds little light on Hume’s intention in
using the term ‘emotion’, spending only a little time on the question before moving ahead
with one of the main focuses of his book: a detailed discussion of those who picked up
the term and used it with such vigor over the next century that it became the dominant
term for affective experience. Generally speaking, Hume’s use of the term is left as
somewhat mysterious, frequent, but nonetheless apparently secondary to his use of the
term ‘passion’. But this notwithstanding, I will present the details of the insightful
suggestions that Dixon does make.
Dixon argues that generally Hume seems to “intend ‘emotions’ to be read as a rather
vague and general term to mean something like ‘feelings’ or ‘movements’ or ‘agitations’
of the mind.”108 He notes that it has been suggested that Hume’s use of the term in this
way may have been adopted from Descartes’ use of ‘émotion’ as “a broad umbrella term
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for the movements of the soul.”109 To a certain degree, Dixon argues, ‘emotions’ filled
“an undefined role, while ‘passions’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘affections’, remained the
established categories that Hume favoured.”110 He suggests that at times there seems to
be a contrast for Hume between emotions as closely connected to sensation on one hand,
and other more cognitive (that is to say, more intellectual) passions on the other.111
However, as ultimately both are included in the category of secondary impressions,
Dixon sees little in the text to support any sort of consistent distinction between the use of
the terms. Indeed, he suggests, often Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ appears to be identical
with his use of ‘passion,’ making the terms in Hume more or less synonymous.
Dixon argues that Hume’s apparent conflation of these terms is related to the increasing
secularization of the topic that he was engaging. Hume wanted to do for the science of
the mind what Newton had done for physical science. As such, passions were to be seen
as forces, “mini-agents…‘choosing means’ to achieve desired ends.”112 This picture of
the passions also fit well with the metaphor of motion and disturbance found in
Descartes’ émotion. Hume’s approach to the science of mind apparently motivated the
adoption of ‘emotion’ as a term to group all kinds of related affective mental phenomena
that in the past had been separated, but that Hume recognized now as playing a unified
and important role in the ‘mechanics’ of the mind.
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Dixon offers a useful starting point here for understanding Hume’s choice of the term
‘emotion.’ Certainly Hume would have been familiar with émotion as found in Descartes,
and there seems little question that his adoption of the term is at least a partial inheritance
from Descartes. Further, his Newtonian science of the mind frequently finds expression
in physical metaphor throughout the Treatise,113 particularly in the form of discussions of
moving and opposing forces. The connotations of agitation and movement are surely
intentional. But what textual evidence could be offered for the claim that ‘passion’ and
‘emotion’ are being used more or less synonymously? I would suggest (and in fact have
in Part One) that the textual evidence generally points to the opposite conclusion. I take it
that my analysis has shown that when the term ‘emotion’ is used in conjunction with or in
contrast to ‘passion’ it is because there is a conceptual distinction in operation. There is a
diversity in the characterization of the mental events being discussed that we overlook
when we assume ‘passion’ to be synonymous with ‘emotion’ in Hume’s work.
Moving away from Dixon, let us consider briefly what some other commentators have
said about the relation between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in Hume. Norman Kemp Smith
has suggested (in a move that flips the claim I made in 1.3) that Hume uses the term
‘passion’ broadly, “as covering all the various instincts, impulses, propensities,
affections, emotions and sentiments of the animal and human mind,” excluding only
pleasure and pain.114 115 This characterization appears to assume emotion to be a sort of
subcategory to passion. I have argued, of course, that textual evidence supports the
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reverse claim. But it is interesting to note that what Kemp Smith understands to be the
broad category of ‘passion’ is very much like the broad category of impressions of
reflection that I have suggested Hume aligns with ‘emotion.’ That is, there is something
similar in the kind of distinction we are making, between particular kinds of impressions
of reflection and “all types of feeling” considered more generally,116 though the
assignment of terminology in this instance appears to be reverse. Kemp Smith’s reasons
for attributing ‘passion’ to the broader category do not draw on textual analysis as I have,
but rather rest on an argument for Hutcheson’s influence in Hume, and attribute the same
use of ‘passion’ to both.117 Hume’s project was clearly influenced by Hutcheson, but I
would argue his choice in terminology to reference various aspects of felt experience in
his conceptual scheme differs in this regard.
Other commentators have been less inclined to note a distinction at all.118 Pal Ãrdal
appears to use ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ more or less synonymously in his discussion, as
Hume himself appears to at first glance.119 Like Hume, there are places where he is more
inclined to use ‘emotion’ (for instance, in discussing the violent passions he explains
them as having greater ‘emotional intensity’), but he does not address the variation in
terminology. His use of both terms is also presumably influenced by the fact that in
contemporary discussion the term ‘emotion’ is considered as having replaced ‘passion,’
but that really they have the same reference in the discourse. Ãrdal is not the only
commentator to use the terms this way—in fact, it is a very common move in discussions
of Hume’s moral theory.
The glossary in the Nortons edition of the Treatise offers some sense of the ways Hume’s
various terms for affective mental states have been viewed in the general scholarship, and
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generally used with only very fuzzy distinction. In this glossary entry for ‘emotion,’
‘passion’ is not suggested as a synonym; however, ‘emotion’ is listed as a synonym for
‘passion’, and is defined as: “a secondary impression, that is, an impression of reflection
‘arising either from the original impressions [of sensation] or from their ideas’ (2.1.1.2),
or arising from certain natural instincts (2.3.9.8).”120 ‘Emotion’ is interestingly given a
four-fold definition: it is “a feeling that may attend a passion, resemble a passion, be
related to a passion, or be produced by a passion.”121 The textual references that are given
as support for this definition are predictably many of the same passages that I have given
careful attention to in Part One. It is interesting to find in the Nortons edition the
enumeration of apparent uses and functions of ‘emotion’ in Hume.122
The Nortons’ glossary entries, however, appear to suggest, if nothing else, a kind of
confusion about the use of the various terms for affective mental states in Hume. The
suspicion that there is confusion in the understanding of Hume’s terminology choices is
born out in an article by Louis Charland.123 Charland argues that Hume does appear to
introduce the term ‘emotion’ in order to refer to something distinct from passion, a kind
of more fleeting, attending feeling, that is to be contrasted with his more complex and
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cognitive accounts of passions such as the indirect passions. This, Charland says, may
have been innovative of Hume, but it also appears (particularly when one looks at it
through the secondary literature) to be somewhat confused. Specifically, he takes Hume
to have failed to properly or clearly distinguish between ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, even
while he was popularizing the use of both terms in discussions of mind (a trend that
eventually ended in emotion being the category that dominated the discourse).
In a different strain, Philip Mercer offers a taxonomy of the contents of the Humean mind
that he claims is influenced by Ardal and Kemp Smith. Yet he offers his own, somewhat
unique, passion/emotion distinction, in which he claims that “properly speaking we
should call the violent impressions ‘passions’ and the calm ones ‘emotions’.”124 This
interpretation is presumably derived from comments from Hume such as that found at
2.1.1.3, where the passions are identified with violent impressions of reflection, while the
calm are described as “decay[ing] into so soft an emotion as to become, in a manner,
imperceptible.” Hume’s use of emotion in this paragraph, which aligns it with calm
passions, is of course in contrast to his discussion at 2.3.4, where calm passions are
distinguished from violent in that they “[direct] the actions and conduct without that
opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion”
(2.3.4.1). Considering the appearance Hume gives here of nearly contradicting himself, it
is not surprising that commentators should come to opposite conclusions without
recourse to the kind of in-depth analysis of the distinctions that I have offered.
And opposite conclusions have indeed been reached. In fact, the most common reading in
recent scholarship (not unlike Dixon’s) aligns ‘emotion’ with our more violently felt
passion states. Consider Amy Schmitter’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia on emotion
in the 17th to 18th century. She argues of Hume that “[w]hen the word ‘emotion’ itself
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appears in his writings…it seems to mean simply some kind of motion.”125 Here we have
a return to the more Cartesian understanding of emotion, where the violence or disorder it
occasions is understood either as a metaphorical motion and disturbance in the mind, or
as the phenomenological side of actual physiological motions and excitement.
This appeal to the more mechanical and physical sense of ‘emotion’ is also found in the
account offered by Annette Bair. The emotion/passion distinction that Baier offers is best
understood in conjunction with a footnote she provides with the following O.E.D.
account of the now “obsolete sense” of the term ‘emotion’: “A moving, stirring, agitation,
perturbation (in a physical sense).”126 Locke and Shelley are both cited as having used the
term in this older sense, and it is in this way that Baier takes it Hume uses the term. The
footnote also suggests that the earliest English use of the term in the more modern sense
of ‘feeling’ can be dated to 1808. This is in disagreement, of course, with Dixon’s claim
that Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ had more in common with our modern use. It also seems to
be in disagreement with Hume’s own placing of the term in the category of impressions
of reflection. Though Hume was very likely drawing on the term’s connotations of
motion and disturbance, as argued by Dixon and myself above, as impressions of
reflection, emotions cannot be understood to reference purely physical phenomena.
Baier is of course conscious of this to a degree; she is certainly not arguing that emotions
for Hume are physical disturbances. But non-physical ‘disturbance’ for Hume can be of
one of two kinds: an impression of sensation or an impression of reflection. Baier wants
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to suggest that emotions are more akin to impressions of sensation than impressions of
reflection such as the passions, perhaps running parallel to the physical disturbances
associated with the experience of strong passions. But I do not think this reading is quite
right. As I argued in Part One, Hume is more concerned with emotions as reflective
feelings, than he is with their potential physiological underpinnings. Emotions are not
merely sensations tied to the body: they are explicitly noted as impressions of reflection
every time this category is introduced. I believe that Hume is moving beyond the older
meaning of the term, and perhaps farther beyond it than Baier gives him credit for. But
Baier has reasons for positing this kind of passion/emotion distinction that go beyond a
discussion of terminology, and play a role in her reading of Hume’s theory of the
passions generally, and in particular her explanation of 2.3.3.5 in light of the cognitivist
reading she seeks to give of Hume’s theory. I will discuss this, and ultimately respond to
Baier’s claims, in 2.4.
I will finish this section with a look at a different account of the emotion/passion
distinction that, as in Baier’s case, is required to play an important role in the author’s
overall interpretation of Hume. But this account is not offered within the context of
exploring Hume’s theory of mind, or even his moral theory, but rather his aesthetics and
approach to the problem of tragedy. In “ ‘An Unaccountable Pleasure’: Hume on tragedy
and the Passions”127 Alex Neill seeks to give a Humean account for the puzzle of how it
is that the negative passions we experience when taking in a tragedy somehow result in
pleasure—and do so to the extent that Hume is able to claim that audiences “are pleased
in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears,
sobs, and cries…”.128 Neill argues that for Hume there is authentic distress at the tragic
events the audience takes in, as well as authentic pleasure that is somehow a result of this
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uneasy affectation. He argues that Hume is drawing on the ‘mutability’ of the passions to
explain this phenomenon. This mutability he argues must be understood in terms of
Hume’s account of “affective conversion,”129 an account that requires an emotion/passion
distinction.
Neill argues that there is good reason to think that generally speaking for Hume the
hedonic tone of any particular passion is essential to it (a claim I would agree with). He
supports this in part by noting that Hume’s account of the production of the indirect
passions requires that we understand them as having a particular hedonic charge (or
valence). Therefore, he takes it that the challenge of explaining the pleasure we derive
from unpleasant passions evoked by tragedy in Humean terms is the challenge of coming
up with a story where there is a transition of feeling and a subsequent change in hedonic
character of a part of our current feeling, without loss of identity of the passion being
experienced. After all, the pleasure experienced in watching a tragedy is often concurrent
with the pain that the portrayal produces. But the unpleasant passions themselves cannot
be also pleasant, without compromising their identity.
Neill’s solution is the following:
As it is in almost all of his talk of conversion in the Treatise…Hume‘s claim in
“Of Tragedy” is that it is the “emotion”-the “impulse” or “vehemence” or “spirit”
or “movements”-associated with the “melancholy passions” that is converted or
given “a new direction” in our experience of tragedy. And given contemporary
usage, in which the term “emotion” is commonly used to refer to what Hume calls
the “passions,” it is worth noting that (although on this as on other matters he is
less than consistent in his terminology) Hume does not treat the terms “passion”
and “emotion” as coextensive.130
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Neill argues that generally Hume does not speak of the passions when he presents
conversion of painful feeling to pleasant: rather he is inclined to talk about the emotions.
He references the maxim that I discussed at length in 1.10, that “any emotion, which
attends a passion, is easily converted into it” (2.3.4.2). This is the case even in instances
where the emotion must change to adopt the hedonic character of the passion it is
‘converted’ to, which of course is precisely the situation in the case of pleasure from a
tragedy.
The case he makes for the distinction between passion and emotion is not as fully
developed as mine, but makes many similar points: he notes the language of emotion
‘attending’ passions, as well as passions both being followed by and causing emotion. He
focuses on emotion as movement and violence of feeling. Here our interpretations part
ways: Neill takes it that the calm passions are experienced without emotion, and further
makes the claim that the hedonic character of a passion is not essentially tied to the
emotion of that passion. I will not recite my arguments against these claims here. Neill’s
analysis of this distinction is not the focus of the paper, nor does he delve very far into
the text to find support. His basic thesis returns to the case of tragedy specifically, and is
as follows:
On this picture, our experience of tragedy has two main affective components:
aesthetic delight, generated in us by the display of artistry in a well-written
tragedy, and the “uneasiness” of “the melancholy passions” which are generated
by our sympathy with the characters. The former is the “predominant” component
of the experience, and it appropriates some of the emotion (movements, impulse,
spirit, vehemence) of the weaker negative passions to itself, thus increasing its
“force.” However, it is the emotions or movements produced by the negative
passions that are appropriated and converted, rather than the negative passions
themselves…The latter contribute to pleasure—as Hume puts it, they “afford the
highest entertainment”—by generating emotion which is appropriated by and
hence “swells the delight which eloquence raises in us,” but that is not to say that
the negative passions themselves are transformed into aesthetic delight, nor that
they are somehow experienced as pleasurable while nonetheless retaining their
131

identity. What is true, however, is that the appropriation of their “movements”
renders them less forceful or turbulent than they would have been otherwise—
this, I suggest, is what Hume means when he says that in our experience of good
tragedy the negative passions are “smoothed, and softened, and mollified.” And
the result is that the character of our experience overall is pleasurable: “the soul ...
feels on the whole a strong movement, which is altogether delightful’’.131
Neill’s account is extremely interesting for my project, insofar as it arrives at some of the
same conclusions as I have about the transient, fluid, mixable nature of emotion in Hume,
though the approach that brings him to this conclusion is different. Whereas I was
looking for an account of the mechanics of the Humean mind as is found in the Treatise,
he was looking for the Humean psychological explanation of a phenomenon in Hume’s
writing on aesthetics. That the same general mechanism of conversion of impulse and
emotion between distinct passions was arrived at lends strength to both of our cases.
Here I will end my brief account of some of the readings of a potential emotion/passion
distinction in the literature. One aspect that I hope has become apparent is that there is a
general trend in the scholarship towards the suggestion that if there is some distinction
between emotion and passion in Hume, it is that emotion appears to be more sensational
in nature, even tied to bodily feeling, while passion seems a more highly cognitive
category, involving beliefs and associations that often make their characterization hard to
offer without reference to mental events beyond the immediate felt experience.132 This is
the kind of distinction to be found in Baier, who I take to have heavily influenced current
discourse on the topic of Hume’s theory of the passions. Such a distinction, between
affective mental states that are pure sensation and affective mental states that also
involved beliefs, attitudes, associations of ideas, etc., is itself a distinction between
general trends in reading Hume’s theory of the passions overall, and indeed, in forming
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any theory of the passions. At the level of contemporary debates on philosophy of
emotion, theorists are still generally divided between cognitivist and ‘sensationalist,’ or
what are now often called James-Langesian theories of the nature of emotions. I would
argue that this same debate is to be found internal to Hume scholarship on his work on
the passions. Therefore, I will now turn to look at how Hume scholars have characterized
Hume’s theory of the passions with a focus on arguments for either a cognitivist, or
sensationalist reading of Hume.

2.2

The debate between sensationalist and cognitivist
interpretations of Hume’s passions

Book II’s account of certain particular passions is certainly quite detailed and exact. Its
general conception of the passions as a category, however, is less clear. Beyond the basic
designation of a type of impression of reflection, Hume offers little in the way of overall
characterization of this category. The result in the scholarship has been a fairly wide
range of interpretive directions, all taking their cues from various aspects of his treatment
of the individual passions, as well as his claims about the nature of motivation, in which
passion plays a central role (as it does in his moral theory, another common source of
theorizing about his characterization of the passions). The reasons for the variety in
readings have a lot to do with the question of whether Hume conceived of the passions as
‘original existences,’ essentially felt in nature, or as part of a more complex cognitive
event, that involves beliefs, desires and logical relations between ideas. Both readings
have considerable support in different aspects of the text. But before launching into an
overview of the cognitivist/sensationalist debate as I will argue it is found internal to
scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions, it would be useful to offer a
characterization of the debate as it is found in the scholarship within philosophy of
emotions more generally. After this brief overview, I will turn to consider the basics of
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the debate as it has arisen in interpretations of Hume. After this set up, the next two
sections will deal with the textual evidence for each position, as well as some of the
arguments that have been given by advocates of each reading.
Jesse Prinz has suggested that “[t]he history of emotion research can be regarded as a
battle between two opposing sides,” cognitivism and non-cognitivism.133 The debate as
he characterizes it is over whether “emotions essentially involve judgments or thoughts,”
or if they are fundamentally felt in nature and in that sense are ‘non-cognitive.’134 A brief
account of how these approaches may be unpacked is perhaps best started with William
James.135 James famously identified emotions with bodily states—a non-cognitive theory
in the extreme. He argues that, “the emotional brain-processes not only resemble the
ordinary sensorial brain-processes, but in very truth are nothing but such processes
variously combined.”136,137 His identification of emotion with physical processes is not
meant to overlook the felt aspect, however; on the contrary, he is arguing that when an
emotion is excited “the bodily changes follow directly on the perception of the exciting
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.”138 The felt
perception of a bodily state is identical to the emotion for James.
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For the James-Lange type of position,139 as it has come to be known, Prinz says
“emotions can occur without judgments or other cognitions. Emotions have no essential
connection to cognition.”140 This is at the heart of a non-cognitivist account. Though
there have been variations on the James-Lange tradition that agree and disagree on
particulars in various ways, it is this claim that these particular kinds of cognitions are not
necessary constituents of emotions that set them apart from the cognitivist theories.
But common experience tells us that often we take the beliefs and ideas we have
surrounding an emotion to be an essential part of the experience of that particular
emotion. This is the sense of the more cognitive theorists of emotion, prominent among
whom is Robert Solomon. Solomon points out that feeling is not all there is to having an
emotion, and goes so far as to say that “even if [feeling] were essential to having an
emotion, it would not be at all interesting.”141 Emotions are not rightly characterized by
their feeling (after all, he argues, there are instances of emotion that appear to have little
or no feeling attached), but rather by their intentionality, conceived as “mental acts and as
propositional attitudes” of the individual subjects experiencing them.142 It is not enough
to identify certain beliefs and objects as part of a causal story about the emergence of
emotions; Solomon says that in fact “it is the person’s view of his or her circumstances
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which is essential to emotion.”143 An extremely cognitivist statement of Solomon’s
theory is captured in Prinz’s summary of Solomon’s position as arguing that “emotions
are evaluative judgments that provide the structure of our world.”144 Solomon thinks the
interest in the passions lies in “the total demolition of the age-old distinctions between
emotion and reason, passion and logic…[Emotions] are extremely subtle, cunning,
sophisticated, cultured, learned, logical and intelligent.”145 Emotions on a cognitivist
account bear only a causal connection to the feelings they produce; what is essential to
them are the judgments and beliefs of the individual that informs their formation.
A basic summary, then, of the two dominant schools of thought on the nature of emotion
is, on the one hand, emotions identified as essentially felt experiences (possibly with
particular physiological underpinnings) that are complete without reference to beliefs,
objects, judgments, etc, and other more ‘cognitive’ acts of mind, and emotions, on the
other hand, as essentially consisting in beliefs, judgments, and characteristic relations
between these things, and the typical objects indicated by the emotion’s intentional
structure. Prinz identifies this as the debate between cognitivist and non-cognitivist
theorists of emotion. I have already, in this work, characterized the debate in terms of
cognitive vs. sensationalist theories of emotion, and this would be a good time to note
why I have used (and will continue to use, in the context of the debate in Hume) this
terminology.
The cognitive/non-cognitive distinction as it applies to contemporary debate is of course
anachronistically applied to Hume. In fact, the apparent presence of posits typical of both
types of theories in Hume’s account of the passions may be in part due to a lack of
conceptual division of this sort in the discussions of his time. But this is not to say that
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there was not a developing awareness of the question of whether passion should be
identified as purely sensation, or as involving belief and ‘reason.’ Dixon argues that
Hume’s take on passions (and his introduction of ‘emotion’) occurred at a time when
there was a trend towards so called ‘sensationalism’ in the growing number of secular
accounts of the passions.146 According to Dixon, through the 18th and 19th centuries there
was a tendency to categorize theories of mind according as they fell on a scale that had A
Priorism on one end and sensationalism on the other. The former viewed mental faculties
as innate to the soul, the latter took them to be the products of experience. Sensationalism
was closely associated with ‘associationism,’ a school of philosophy with its roots in
Locke and the understanding that all the contents of the mind come from either
experience, or internal reflection on that experience (Hume, of course, being another
forerunner of this type of theory). The difference between the two approaches is, first,
“the often derogatory overtones” of the sensationalist designation, and secondly, that
sensationalism was “more crudely reductionist, and explained complex phenomena as
mere aggregates of basic bodies sensations, whereas the latter explained them as
properties of complex learned associations, and gave a greater role… to the mind’s power
of reflection.”147
Dixon argues that for Hume the passions were removed a step from their physiological
underpinnings because they were characterized as impressions of reflection. His account
doesn’t identify him directly with the sensationalist program (though Hume’s thought
certainly seemed to feed into the views of later theorists who would be accused of
sensationalism, such as Thomas Brown). But the sensationalist approach I take to be
more appropriately applied in questioning the nature of Hume’s theory of the passions
than seeking to determine if there is a James-Lange theory of emotions to be found in
Hume. Hence my decision to characterize the feeling-centric accounts of Hume’s theory
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of the passions as ‘sensationalist’ in nature, as opposed to James-Langesian or noncognitive.
My acceptance of the designation ‘cognitivist theory of emotion’ for readings that resist
the attribution to Hume of a simple, sensationalist account of passion, on the other hand,
is consciously done in order to acknowledge one of the central claims that commentators
who give Hume such a reading are often seeking to make: namely, that Hume’s theory
anticipates the contemporary cognitive theories of emotion that are often espoused by the
same authors who find them in Hume. This is perhaps most clearly seen to be the case in
the well-known analysis of Hume’s theory of the passions offered by Donald
Davidson.148 In the article that provides Davidson’s highly cognitivist reading of Hume
he evens states that his is not a claim that “this is what Hume really meant; it is what he
should have meant, and did inspire.”149
I have to this point characterized the debate between cognitive and non-cognitive
(sensationalist) theories of emotion, but I perhaps have not sufficiently motivated the
debate to those unfamiliar with it already. The non-cognitive account, with its emphasis
on feeling, is very much in line with our experience of emotion. Though our common
sense view may not include the assumption that our emotions are simply aggregates of
physical sensations (as the James-Lange approach holds), we do tend to think of them as
fundamentally felt, and often pre-cognitive experiences. Hence the tendency in our folk
psychology to contrast them with acts of reasoning. But there are good reasons to
question whether the felt experience is sufficient for understanding the nature of our
emotions. Consider the following statement, taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy entry on emotion:
That emotions typically have formal objects highlights another important feature
of emotional experience which feeling theories neglect, and which other

148

Davidson, D. (1976). “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride.” The Journal of Philosophy, 73(19): 744-757.

149

Davidson (1976), 744.
138

psychological theories attempt to accommodate: emotions involve evaluations. If
someone insults me and I become angry, his impertinence will be the aspect of his
behavior that fits the formal object of my anger; I only become angry once I
construe the person’s remark as a slight; the specific nature of my emotion’s
formal object is a function of my appraisal of the situation.150
Feeling theories appear to fall short insofar as they fail to recognize the place evaluation,
judgments and attitudes play in our experience of emotions. What is particularly puzzling
about the case of Hume’s theory of emotions, is that he appears to be at once explicit (and
rather insistent!) that his theory take the passions to be fundamentally and essentially
feeling states, and yet provide very detailed accounts of the (he claims) ‘causal’
conditions under which they by nature must arise. Despite his clear initial claims about
the simple, felt nature of the passions, as Book II progresses his characterization appears
increasingly cognitive.
Jeremy Neu151 comments on just this apparent tension, and critiques Hume for presenting
passions as felt states with thoughts incidentally attached. He argues that this is a
backwards portrayal of the nature of emotions. Neu emphasizes the importance of beliefs
to emotions, and argues that Spinoza presents a better picture of emotions, where they are
thoughts with affect incidentally attached. Neu claims that the only thing that
distinguishes Hume’s passions (and presumably his category of emotions generally) from
mere sensations is the causal story he tells for each. Of Hume’s initial account of the
difference between original impressions and impressions of reflection he says,
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This is a genealogy. Causal ancestry is what distinguishes impressions of
reflection from impressions of sensation…[We], however, must enquire whether
emotions viewed as impressions with a peculiar causal history will do justice to
the phenomena at all.152
According to Neu emotions for Hume are merely “discreet and simple feelings with a
complex causal history.”153 His so-called ‘causal history’ account of the passions Neu
sees as backwards, putting their sensitive nature ahead of their cognitive nature, and
making them little more than impressions of sensation with a different back-story.
This is the kind of critique of Hume that cognitivist readings are typically trying to avoid.
A more diplomatic commentator on Hume’s use of both the ‘essentially felt’ and
‘naturally suited to certain causes’ accounts of the passions is Amelie Rorty.154 Some of
the details of her approach are worth considering now. She claims that for Hume,
[T]he passions bear extremely complex relations to representational ideas and to
beliefs. For the passions are not in and of themselves representational: taken
simply as psychological facts, they are only contingently connected with
representational ideas. While they are in principle capable of motivating, their
particular motivational directions—to pursue this or avoid that—depend on the
beliefs and ideas with which they are conjoined.155
Rorty here understands the passions primarily with an eye to the motivating power that
Hume attributes to them. This motivating role she takes to be very much informed by our
ideas and beliefs. On the Humean account, the passions may be the only forces acting on
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our wills, but how they come to move us depends on their individual natures as they
relate to our ideas, impressions and beliefs. As Rorty puts it in considering the
motivational power of the indirect passions in particular,
…the motivational direction of indirect passions is given by the idea with which
it is conjoined [2.3.9]. It is this basically mutually reinforcing associative
conjunction between passions and specific correlated ideas that effectively
(though not strictly logically) makes the passions cognitive.156
Thus she seeks to offer a way to think of Hume’s passions as cognitive, while still
acknowledging the importance of his claim that they are essentially impressions, without
reference. Hume of course says that it isn’t merely our immediate sensations “which
determine the character of any passion, but the whole bent and tendency of it from
beginning to end” (2.2.9.11). Rorty’s point is that analytically we may very well be able
to isolate a particular, nonrepresentational feeling as being at the core of a passion. But
psychologically, the mental state is one that involves both affect and particular ideas and
beliefs. She would likely argue that Neu is wrong in his claim that Humean passions are
mere feelings with thoughts incidentally attached; there seems nothing incidental about
the ideas and beliefs that help form the character of a passion.157
Rorty often describes the passions in Hume as “motivating attitudes”, “primary” or
“internal sources of action.”158 Elsewhere she argues that beginning with the theories of
Descartes and Hume ‘passions’ gradually made the conceptual change to ‘emotions.’
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“Instead of being reactions to invasions from something external to the self,” she argues,
“passions became the very activities of the mind, its own motions.”159 This sort of
reading of the difference between passions and emotions reflects in part what Hume was
trying to touch on by using the term, and perhaps creating the category, of emotions.
Taking Descartes’ French word for the motions and agitations of the mind and turning it
into an English word to represent the impulses of a mechanical science of mind made
room for Hume to talk about our sources of motivation in a way that the traditional
category of passions perhaps did not make room for.
But Rorty has not avoided the apparent confusion and tension in Hume’s thought
regarding the cognitive vs. the sensational character of the passions. Rorty notes in
Hume the tendency to draw a distinction between analytic and psychological distinctness,
and further, to take the typical analytic distinctions of his day and argue for their
psychological wholeness.160 She explains his attitude towards these analytical distinctions
in the following:
Although they may be separable in thought, we would be unwise to separate
them. Like the analytic scientist, the analytic philosopher separates independent
variables that form an “uncompounded and inseparable motion” (T.493
[3.2.2.14]).161
Despite this kind of charitable reading of Hume’s project, I think there is ample evidence
in the text that there is easily a tension between Hume’s characterization of passions as
having a ‘psychological wholeness’ that constitutes their essence, while at the same time
putting heavy emphasis on the logic of the passions as it pertains to relations between
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ideas, impressions and ultimately beliefs. To prove it, I believe we only need consider the
amassed textual evidence for both sides of the debate.
Therefore, I will proceed in the next two sections to offer argument based on the text for
the sensationalist and cognitivist readings of Hume respectively. I will also highlight
some key arguments from various scholars who have made cases for each type of
reading. My goal is to demonstrate that there are in fact very good reasons for holding
either view. As a consequence, commentators tend to either hold one view, and are
pressured to either ignore, or do a lot of work to explain away certain passages that
appear to show the contrary, or they have conceded that in Hume there is at best some
confusion, at worst a glaring tension in his thought. In the section following the
presentation of each side, I will offer something of a resolution to this tension with the
application of my emotion/passion distinction. To Hume’s credit, I believe he had a more
conceptually rich theory of the passions than is usually attributed to him, with aspects of
both a good sensationalist account and a well-reasoned cognitivist account.

2.3

Support for a sensationalist reading of Hume on
passion

An obvious starting place for this discussion is to try to find a textual explanation of
‘passion’ in the Treaitse, and then move from there to the various references Hume
makes that may incline us towards a sensationalist reading of this category. But to find
something like a definition of ‘passion’ in Hume is likely to be somewhat fruitless. The
reason for this is that the very nature of Hume’s approach is such that he is unlikely to
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offer this kind of definition. Barry Stroud162 explains this by offering the following read
on Hume’s methodology.
Stroud contends that Hume’s project is driven by two ever-present, but not always
compatible methodological commitments: first, his naturalism, and second, his devotion
to the theory of ideas. Stroud takes seriously Hume’s contention that his work is meant as
an “attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects,”
where moral subjects are understood to include “human thought, actions, feelings,
perceptions, passions and language.”163 Stroud presents Hume as a sort of social or
human scientist, and whether or not the work he did holds up under contemporary
standards for such empirical investigation, is seems clear that Hume took himself to be
doing something like this. His method generally involves positing general principles of
the mind in an attempt to explain the diverse, complex phenomena he is very aware of by
observation. Hume, Stroud argues, “wants to do for the human realm what he thinks
natural philosophy, especially in the person of Newton, had done for the rest of
nature.”164
This methodological commitment runs side-by-side with a commitment to the theory of
ideas and associationism in Hume. Stroud argues that Hume’s naturalistic project is often
somewhat crippled by his unquestioning commitment to the theory of ideas. He argues
that it tends to direct Hume’s attention away from the proper objects of his naturalistic
study and leads him to oversimplify and even deny certain phenomena. His focus shifts to
be more about providing explanations with his general principles and other ‘Newtonian’
tools of his theory than the actual empirical content of what it is he seeks to explain. The
theory of ideas is an atomistic picture of distinct and separable perceptions. Hume
understands thoughts, beliefs and feelings to be individual, relatively distinct events that
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have the potential to combine, separate and interact in a nearly mechanical fashion.
Stroud notes that Hume is a Newtonian not only in method, but in the way he models his
system, in the explanations he tends to give and the very terms he uses.165 This desire to
provide first principles, often distracting Hume from the naturalistic requirements of his
project, Stroud characterizes as a developmental or genetic approach. He says the
following near the end of his book:
I have tried to show that [Hume’s] main concern is always with the origin of
perceptions in the mind, and not primarily with their content or definition. His
program therefore does not commit him to providing ‘analyses’ or ‘definitions’, in
the strict sense of expressions of meaning in alternative but precisely equivalent
terms, of the thoughts, beliefs and reactions themselves.166

This is relevant to the project at hand. Passions (and also emotions) for Hume, as
examples of the basic, atomic components of his theory of mind, are unlikely to be given
clear definitions or analyses. On the surface, this is not news. A first reading of Book II
of the Treatise reveals that these important technical terms for Hume are only defined in
terms of the theory of ideas he has already established and any deeper analysis needs to
be gained by reading between the lines. What it is about Stroud’s contention here that is
of further significance is the idea that Hume himself may not have had entirely clear
ideas of the definitions of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, as his program is not focused on
characterizing the atomic parts of the mind, but rather on explaining their origins, their
operations under general principles and their effects. With regard to the passions, Stroud
suggests that Hume was content to present a general outline of basic principles, without
actually working out a successful, scientific theory of human nature. If Stroud is right,
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this explains much of the looseness with which Hume speaks of the passions and
emotions.
Of course, the principle of charity pushes us to seek out some kind of well-reasoned
conceptual framework underneath the looseness of the terminology, as well as some
firmly conceived ‘natures’ for the atomistic mental events he posits. This is certainly
what I have sought to do in the case of ‘emotion’ in Part One. Now we can turn those
efforts to the case of ‘passion.’
Our starting place is the information that is provided through Hume’s account of the
passion’s place in his taxonomy. This aspect of the account is easily agreed upon by both
the cognitive and sensationalist interpretations of Hume’s passions. They are impressions,
and more particularly impressions of reflection. They arise through reflection on ideas or
impressions of pain or pleasure, or, in the instance of those passions that are ‘original’ to
us, reflections on some kind of present perception that we are by nature inclined to
respond to in a particular way (for example, all other things being equal, Hume assumes
that we will respond to children with feelings of benevolence and kindness). Hume
prompts our attention towards the passions by describing them as the more violent
impressions of reflection, but (as has been discussed above) does not hold to the
calm/violent distinction as a way to distinguish passions from non-passions.
Hume goes on to characterizes each particular instance of a passion as a simple and
uniform impression that cannot be broken down and explained by words,167 but must be
known through experience,168 which naturally limits the ways in which Hume could or
would try to describe them. In fact, one of the only characterizations of passions in
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general offered by Hume is the following passage, which follows the famous ‘Reason is,
and ought only to be, a slave of the passions’ argument of 2.3.3:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and
contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other
existence or modification. When I am angry I am actually possest with the
passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than
when I am thirsty or sick or more than five foot high. (2.3.3.5)
First we should clarify what Hume means by “an original existence.” Clearly he does not
mean “original” to be taken in the same sense as he does when he identifies our
impressions of sensation as ‘original impressions’ at the beginning of Book II.
Impressions of sensation are original in that they “without any antecedent perception
arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the
application of objects to the external organs” (2.1.1.1). The passions, on the other hand,
are original in the sense that they are not copies of previous impressions, as ideas are.
Thus the second claim in 2.3.3.5, that passions do not represent things. To be
experiencing a passion, is to be in the moment feeling an impression that has no
resemblance to anything beyond itself. Its existence is ‘original.’ When we feel a passion
we are directly experiencing the object in question, not a representation of it, nor an idea
pointing us towards some thing in the world. The passion is, in this sense, complete in
itself.
In context, Hume’s intention in this passage is to remind the reader that passions differ
from ideas in that they are not copies of impressions that can be more or less accurate.
Rather, they are ‘originals’, as they have no reference to anything else. Hume wants to
use this point to conclude that reason cannot contradict a passion, since such a
disagreement would require copies of things to be at issue, i.e. ideas. This intention of
Hume’s in this passage is generally agreed upon. But the implications of the passage
beyond that is a subject of some debate. I will, in 2.4, take the time to consider Baier’s
response to this passage in particular. The passage at 2.3.3.5 likely constitutes the best
single piece of textual evidence against a strongly cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory
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of the passions, and hence Baier’s concern with it (she being one of the primary
advocates for a more cognitivist reading of Hume). I will have more to say on this later.
Despite the attention this passage has received, it is not the only place where Hume
argues for the simple, non-representative nature of the passions. At 1.1.6.1 Hume states
that the “impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions;
none of which can possibly represent a substance.” Similarly, at 3.1.1.9 Hume reinforces
the point that passions do not have content with which reason can disagree, and are
therefore not representational. The non-representational characteristic of the passions is
further emphasized when Hume points out that the nature of the passions as impressions
is identical to the felt experience we have of the passion. Thus, he argues
Upon this head we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as
they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present themselves as
distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their
nature, but concerning their relations and situation. (1.4.2.5)
Though Hume is here talking specifically about impressions of sensations, the point
applies to all impressions, in that all are essentially felt in nature for Hume. Passions,
therefore, are in their identity as they feel, identical to the feeling. And, as has been
pointed out above, since that feeling is known and common to all through experience,
discussion surrounding the passions will not tend to be about seeking to describe their felt
nature, but rather seeking an accurate description of their relations and typical mental
situations—their ‘attending circumstances,’ or in other words, their causal story.
These causes of types of passions may be successfully identified on Hume’s account
because:
Passions are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than
external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of cause and
effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them. (1.3.2.16)
Thus the enumeration of causes and objects as they surround the passions (especially the
account of the indirect passions) in Book II. A more cognitive reading of these apparent
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characterizations of the passions is avoided by understanding them to be mere reports of
causal circumstances, just as in the external world, one object that causes another is not to
be considered constitutive of the effected object. Hume may discuss the various causes
and effects of the passions, without requiring that their natures include the ideas, beliefs
or relations that constitute these causes and effects as part of the passions.
Hume has more to say about the essentially felt nature of the passions, and of impressions
generally in other places as well. For instance, he argues that,
…every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains
and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other
differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true
colours, as impressions or perceptions... ‘tis scarce possible they should be
otherwise...” (1.4.2.7)
He then goes on to say it is impossible to feel a perception wrongly; the perceived
experience is exactly what the perception is. In fact, as I noted in Part One, Hume finds
the felt quality of a passion to be its essential characteristic. He says that this quality
…which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original
quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and
which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation,
and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in
reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond
feeling, ‘tis here in vain to reason or dispute. (2.1.5.4)
This is a familiar Humean sentiment in the context of the analysis of ‘emotion’. Emotions
(whether we take them to be distinct from passions or not) are without question felt in
nature, and these characteristic feelings are here identified as the “very being and
essence” of the particular passions.
Further evidence for a sensationalist reading of Hume on the passions comes from
Hume’s contrasting the ‘impenetrable’ nature of ideas with the potential for blending in
the passions. He says,
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[I]mpressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours,
may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and
contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole.
Some of the most curious phaenomena of the human mind are deriv’d from this
property of the passions. (2.2.6.1)
Feelings, unlike ideas, are the sort of things that can be experienced as mixed, and still be
a simple, uniform impression. In fact, as Hume reminds us here, much of the explanation
he gives for the workings of the human mind depends on the ability of felt experience to
blend, transfer feeling and establish a unified whole that moves us to act.
Hume offers an argument for a non-cognitive account of the passions in a slightly
different way at 2.2.6.6. There he argues that nature dictated the conjunction of
benevolence and anger with love and hatred, respectively, not the logic of the terms or
the beliefs they entail. Despite the agreement we may perceive between, say, an attitude
of benevolence and an attitude of love, the fact that the one follows from the other is
according to Hume actually contingent:
If nature had so pleas’d, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred
as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex’d
to love, and of happiness to hatred. If the sensation of the passion and desire be
opposite, nature cou’d have alter’d the sensation of the passion without altering
the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each
other.
This kind of insistence on the contingent relationship between various beliefs and
attitudes that appear to be essential to the production of the passions, and similar beliefs
and attitudes that appear to be essential to the production of other, mutually arising
passions likewise makes Hume’s account look highly non-cognitive.
There are two more things that can be said about the production of the passions that seem
to lend themselves to a more non-cognitive or sensationalist account of the passions in
Hume. First, recall that the double-relation of impressions and ideas mechanism
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responsible for the production of indirect passions, such as pride, includes as part of the
(apparently causal) scheme the association of the feeling of pleasure with the feeling of
pride. If this is the case it seems strange to claim that the ideas and impressions involved
in the double relation of ideas and impressions are constitutive of pride (as presumably
the cognitivist would want to do), since the feeling of pride is actually internal to the
production process. The pride is completed in itself, and the impression of it is half of the
relation of impressions that occasions the occurrence of the passion. The very story of the
production of the indirect passions seems in this way to support a sensationalist reading
of the essential nature of the passions.
But Hume takes the support for a sensationalist characterization of his passions a step
further when he offers an account of how the passion might be excited without the usual
pre-requisite attending causal circumstances (which the cognitivist would seek to show to
be not merely causal, but part of what constitutes the passion). Consider the following:
[M]en often fall into a violent anger for injuries, which they themselves must own
to be entirely involuntary and accidental. This emotion, indeed, cannot be of long
continuance; but still is sufficient to show, that there is a natural connexion
betwixt uneasiness and anger, and the relation of impressions will operate upon a
very small relation of ideas. (2.2.3.6)
In this case, anger does not arise because we have the right ideas and beliefs to produce
it. Rather, there is a resemblance between uneasiness and the passion of anger such that
the latter may arise merely because of the strong feeling of the former and the tendency
towards association. Anger has no reference—therefore it can be established despite a
lack of appropriate desires and because of its connection to uneasy feeling. It is only once
the strength of the felt anger subsides a little that the vivacity of our reason-generated
belief operates to change our feeling from one of anger (hence Hume’s claim that the
passion that arises in this way “cannot be of long continuance”).
This survey of some of the textual evidence one finds in the Treatise for a sensationalist
reading of Hume’s theory of the passions is seconded by multiple commentators’
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arguments that the passions in Hume must be considered sensational and non-cognitive in
nature.
Prominent among these accounts is certainly that of Pal Ãrdal. He notes that, “Hume
emphasizes the uniqueness of each different passion as a simple impression… [A]
passion is a simple impression, and can obviously not be constructed out of simpler
elements.”169 His claim in this context that the passion may not be built of simpler
elements is meant to show that for Hume, no passion is built out of more fundamental
perceptions—for Hume, there are not basic perceptions that serve as the building blocks
for more complex passions, as each individual passion is experienced as a single, simple
impression. He goes on to argue, regarding the simple nature of the passions, that
The simple cannot be reductively analysed, for such an analysis would be
tantamount to the denial that the simple really is simple. The analysis given is
indeed meant to be causal in nature…170

Ãrdal therefore comes to the same conclusion that the arguments from the text lead us to
above: the details of the analyses in Book II of the direct and indirect passions are not
accounts of the character or contents of the passions, as these are simple impressions
known from experience and feeling, not belief and the content of ideas. Rather, the work
of Book II is to give causal accounts.171 Ãrdal suggests that Hume’s detailed discussion
of the passions in Book II can be viewed according to the three ways he thinks we can
talk about a simple impression: “(1) by using a scale of intensity, (2) by pointing out its
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similarity or difference from other simple ideas,172 and (3) by describing the conditions
under which it arises.”173 Thus Hume can go into much detail about the passions, despite
their nature as simple, felt wholes.
Jane McIntyre174 has also argued for the understanding of Hume’s passions as whole in
themselves, as they exist as felt experiences. She emphasizes their non-representational
nature. She argues that Hume’s claim that a passion is an “original existence, and
contains not any representative quality” (2.3.3.5) is a response against claims that
passions and their causes and objects are not merely causally related, but suited to each
other by nature. Hume’s passions, she argues, “[contain] not any representative quality”
(2.3.3.5), and the nature of the passion is complete in itself. The relationship between the
passion and the objects and causes is therefore merely causal and contingent. Indeed, she
also argues that Hume’s concern in Book II is with causal mechanisms, and adds the
further claim that in fact at no point does Hume provide “a clear picture of his account of
the passions as a whole.”175
David Owen adds to this type of argument by offering a brief discussion of what it is for
ideas to be representative.176 He suggests that when Hume speaks of an idea
‘representing’ something else, it is best understood as ‘corresponding,’ not resembling as
an image might. The question of the way in which ideas represent is significant to
understanding the argument in 2.3.3.5 about passions as original existences. Here the
state of passions as having “not any representative quality” is contrasted with the
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‘reference’ to other objects had by ideas. On Owen’s suggestion we could say that this
amounts to the claim that while ideas correspond to impressions, passions are the
impressions themselves, and though they may be explained in terms of a causal story that
involves certain beliefs, ideas and impressions, they do not ‘correspond’ to any of these
in the way that ideas correspond to impressions. The argument would then proceed that,
as truth or falsity is understood as a disagreement between ideas and directly
corresponding impressions, passions cannot be true or false, though ideas may be.
Therefore ideas may be contrary to reason, but passions may not.
(Terence Penelhum, like the authors above, also takes 2.3.3.5 to be an indication that
passions are non-intentional for Hume.177)
Elijah Millgram178 makes a case for the necessity of understanding Hume’s theory of the
passions as non-representational, and therefore non-cognitive, based on the requirement
that passions be significantly different from mere vivacious ideas. Millgram notes an
apparent ‘vivacity scale’ to be found in Hume, with unfelt ideas of imagination at one end
and impressions at the other. If ideas, judgments of probability, beliefs, memories, desires
and the various impressions on this scale are mental events only distinguished by the
amount of vivacity they are experienced with, then you should be able to transform a
belief into a desire simply by making it more vivid. This is not the case for Hume, so
clearly he needs some way to distinguish between types of mental states other than their
level of vivacity. Millgram argues that this distinction is in whether or not they have
representational content. A desire, and the passions generally, are not distinguished from
vivacious ideas (and each other) by their level of vivacity, nor their representational
content, but rather “Hume can distinguish one kind of non-representational impression
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from another by its ‘peculiar’ feeling.”179 For Hume, he argues, mental states can have
either representational content, or motivational force, but not both.180
James Fieser makes an interesting historical case for the non-cognitive nature of the
passions in Hume by commenting on the difference between Hume’s and Hutcheson’s
accounts of the role of reflection in generating passions. He argues,
For Hutcheson, reflecting on a sensation (such as the visual sensation produced by
a new suit of clothes) is only the occasion for the passion of joy to arise. This
differs from Hume's meaning, which is that reflective impressions follow from
impressions of sensations either immediately, or "by the interposition of its idea"
(T 276). Unlike Hutcheson, reflections for Hume are not simply the occasion for
the passions to arise. Instead, the reflection is the passion.181
For Hume, the actual act of reflecting on an impression or idea is felt and is identical to
the passion, not a cause for the passion. Thus we find Hume bypassing an act of reflective
cognition in his account; instead, he has the impression felt on reflection as constituting
the character and essence of the passion.
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Finally, Philip Mercer182, in his work on Hume’s moral psychology assumes a
sensationalist account of the passions. The focus of his discussion is the sympathy
mechanism, which he takes to work as a kind of emotional infection, and to be therefore
non-cognitive.183 He states that,
For Hume, to experience an emotion or passion consists in perceiving or
recognizing some inner mental event. It is therefore conceivable that I might feel
proud of something which I believed had absolutely no connection with myself or
that I might love someone and yet hope for his unhappiness most of the time.184
Mercer supports this reading with Hume’s statements concerning the contingent
relationship between various passions and their objects, as well as between certain
passions and the desires that accompany them (such as love, and the desire for the
beloved’s happiness). Hume argues that these connections just happen to be the case
given our natures, and that it is not impossible that they could have been otherwise. This
Mercer takes to be a good indication that for Hume passions are not characterized by any
logic of beliefs and desires—rather they are “like all impressions, simple and
unanalysable.”185 He quotes Anthony Kenny on this topic:
It is because our minds happen to be made as they are that the object of pride is
self, not because of anything involved in the concept of pride; just as it is because
our bodies happen to be made as they are that our ears are lower than our eyes,
not because of anything involved in the concept ear. A passion can be, and can be
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recognized as, pride before the idea of its object comes before the mind: the
relation between the passion and this idea is one of cause and effect, and
therefore, on Hume’s general principles, a contingent one, inductively
established.186
Our natures determine what relations of impressions, ideas, beliefs, etc are causally
efficacious in producing particular passions, and nature also determines the objects that
the particular passions cause us to focus on. But there is no reason to make any of this
causal account internal to the characterization of the passion itself. The passion is just one
more element in the causal chain—and more importantly, in this case, it is a simple,
unified, non-representational element, characterized wholly by its felt experience.
Or so the arguments of this section would lead one to believe. As it happens, Hume
makes things much less clear than the arguments and text presented here would lead one
to believe. In the next section I will shift gears to take a look at some of the good reasons
to think that Hume’s account of the passions is more cognitive than sensational in nature.

2.4

Support for a cognitivist reading of Hume on
passion

This section will serve three general purposes. The first is the presentation of textual
evidence that appears to create problems for the straightforwardly sensationalist reading
of Hume’s theory of the passions that was just created. I will begin to make suggestions
as to why it is difficult to read Hume as not providing an account of the passions with
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strong cognitivist elements; that is to say, that Hume’s account of the passions has them
essentially including thought content, such as beliefs and particular associations of ideas.
Despite his own claims about their simplicity and the felt nature of their ‘essence,’ his
analysis points to strong cognitive elements. The second purpose of this section will be to
consider in some detail one of the stronger, and I would say more prominent, accounts of
Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion: that of Annette Baier. Her book, A Progression
of Sentiment187 has been rightfully well-received by the scholarly community, and her
reading of Hume on the passions has had broad influence. Therefore, the third task of this
section will be to respond to Baier’s cognitivist reading, and to remind the reader that
there is an authentic tension between her reading and things that Hume says that appear
to place him squarely in the sensationalist camp. I will pay particular attention to her
argument for a suggested distinction between emotion and passion that is different from
my own. Offering a response to this will therefore constitute offering a response to what I
take to be one of the better arguments that could be made against my account of the
passion/emotion distinction in Part One of this work.
The general content of this last discussion will be as follows: I will present Baier’s
argument concerning Hume’s calm and violent passion distinction as both support for her
cognitivist reading, and potentially providing an objection to my reading of the
passion/emotion distinction in Hume. Baier argues that it is in the distinction between
calm and violent passions in Hume that we can best understand his characterization of
emotion, which she takes to be violence of passion. I will respond to this by arguing that
Hume’s calm/violent distinction is not meant to outline a distinction between emotional
and emotionless passions, along the lines of the discussion in Part One concerning the
violent/calm passions. I will argue in particular that for Hume both violent and calm
passions are attended by emotion, it is the experience of the emotion and passion over all
that distinguishes them.
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But to be begin with, let us consider some of the evidence in Hume for a cognitivist
reading. In much of her work on Hume, Baier188 makes a strong case for the claim that
the three books of Hume’s Treatise are of a piece, and should be read not only in light of
each other, but also as presenting a sort of progression of ideas and attitudes. One
particular claim she makes on this front is the suggestion that all of the epistemology of
Book I is in service to the theories of passion and action in Books II and III. Baier argues
that Hume dealt with ideas first in his work because the impressions he felt most
important to deal with were passions, and an understanding of these depends on an
understanding of ideas. She points to the following quote from the very end of Hume’s
Abstract:
For as it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions,
and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of
the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend
on them.
The point Baier is seeking to remind us of is that for Hume the passions are indeed
central to human experience, but they themselves must be understood to necessarily
depend on the content of our thought given in ideas. Hence Hume could not address the
topic of this “cement of the universe” without first educating his readers on the more
cognitive content of the mind, and the relations and associations that govern ideas and
belief.
The very fact that Hume identifies the passions as ‘impressions of reflection’ should be
enough to tip us off to the more cognitive nature of these feelings. Fieser offers a brief
history of the term, pointing out that,
The term "reflection" (in contrast to "sensation") can be found in Locke who used
it to mean introspection, or the ideas of the mind when it takes notice of its own
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operations. For Locke, though, this does not involve passions, which are for him
"internal sensations." The word "reflection" becomes associated with the passions
in Hutcheson's Essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections
(1728).189
‘Reflection’ is appropriately contrasted with ‘sensation’ here, and this contrast is of
course found internal to Hume’s treatment of the category of impressions generally. On
the one hand, what separates the impressions of sensation from the impressions of
reflection might be said to be genealogy; the former arise spontaneously, “without
antecedent perceptions,” while the latter “proceed from” pre-existing mental content
(2.1.1.1). Fieser’s brief historical comment above reminds us that following Hutcheson,
Hume was adopting the introspective term ‘reflection,’ previously used by Locke in
discussions of ideas, belief and reason, and applying it to a certain kind of affective
experience. Therefore, another way to distinguish between impressions of sensation for
Hume and impressions of reflection is to consider their interaction with pre-existing
mental content. Indeed, if we are to hold that we can instantly distinguish between a
feeling that qualifies as an impression of sensation (say, the pain of stubbing my toe), and
a feeling that qualifies as an impression of reflection (say, the pain of being spurned by a
lover), the most obvious difference we can appeal to is the belief and idea content of the
latter, versus the spontaneously arising bodily pain of the former. There certainly seems
to be a case for the claim that were I to suddenly wake up feeling one of these two things,
I would be able to correctly identify each as an impression of sensation and an impression
of reflection appropriately, without considering their causal story. Something about the
experience of the two pains themselves would be different. And that difference would be
derived from the connection to my thoughts.
Of course, a James-Lange theorist may well object to this example, and claim that when
presented with nothing but the two feelings, we would find the content of both to consist
in bodily sensation. This would mean the distinction for Hume between his two kinds of
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impression would really be the differences in causal account. But I do not think this is the
case for Hume. He may at times refer to the physical underpinnings of impressions, but
as I have argued above, his focus is on the felt aspect, and for Hume there is an important
felt difference between the pain of an impression of sensation and the pain of an
impression of reflection. Such a distinction, it would seem, could only be explained by
insisting on the role that certain thought content plays in the experience of the passions.
The strongest case for cognitive content in passions in Hume is of course to be found in
his account of the indirect passions. Donald Davidson190 made much of this in his wellknown article, “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride,” where he argues that “Hume’s
account of pride is best suited to what may be called propositional pride.”191 Hume’s
characterization of pride is that we are proud of something, such that claims like, “she
was proud that she had made a delicious cake” are accurate descriptions of emotions. He
argues,
It is commonly thought that in Hume’s opinion, to be proud that one is clever
(say) is just to experience a certain “ultimate felt quality.” This would certainly be
wrong, since it would provide no way of distinguishing between being proud that
one is clever and being proud that one is kind to kangaroos… [B]eing proud that
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one is clever is a complex state of which the simple impression of “pride” is only
one element.192
Though pride of course tends to involve feeling, also essential to it, even on Hume’s
account, is the particular relation of ideas that obtains in the double-relation of ideas and
impressions that Hume takes to be the necessary attending circumstance of pride.
Davidson points out that the beliefs and ideas conjoined in this relation “must amount to
predication for Hume,”193 and this predication is essential to distinguishing between
different instances of pride, something we certainly can and do do. Davidson reminds us
that for Hume, “the effect of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our
impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions” (1.3.10.3) and that “belief
is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions” (1.3.10.4). Belief then plays a
central role in the formation and distinguishing of the content of our passions.
The details of the belief content in pride are of course provided by the double-relation of
ideas and impressions, which Davidson argues is not only Hume’s way of explaining the
causal relation between pride and certain beliefs and attitudes, but also the logical relation
between them. Though pride is typically experienced with a felt component, it is
necessarily experienced with a judgmental component. In fact, Davidson argues that the
judgment is identical to the passion of pride. On this account the relationship between our
believed judgment that we are clever, or have made a delicious cake, and our pride is not
contingent, but necessary. And to those who may object that Hume’s account of the role
of beliefs and ideas is causal in nature, Davidson responds that “there is no good
argument to show that causal relations rule out necessary connections.”194 Hume may
have presented them as causes, but his analysis of the passions themselves reveals logical
relations that make certain beliefs and ideas necessary constituents of the passions.
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Though it may seem that a Davidsonian account is too quick to dismiss much of what
Hume says concerning the essentially felt nature of the passions, there are additional
reasons found in the text to lean towards this kind of strongly cognitivist reading of
Hume. Consider, for example, Hume’s claim at 2.2.2.6 that when the appropriate
relations of ideas for producing pride are lacking, “’Tis plain, that to consider the matter
a priori, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected.” This language suggests the
kind of logical relation between certain beliefs and pride that Davidson was suggesting.
Hume goes on in this passage to say that our “reasoning a priori is confirm’d by
experience,” but the mention of a priori reasoning is telling: passions have certain
characteristic cognitive requirements that inform their very conceptualization. I only call
my feeling pride when I am aware of my holding the appropriate beliefs. Without these, I
would surely only be able to identify what I feel as some kind of pleasure.
The argument that belief content is necessary in identifying Humean passions gains more
support from his insistence on the possibility of calmly experienced passions. Consider,
for example, the following:
Now ‘tis certain there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which tho’ they be
real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their
effects than by the immediate feelings or sensations. (2.3.3.8)
Hume is arguing here that we take ourselves to be motivated by reason at times because
we assume that mental events are the same if they don’t feel different to us. This
assumption of course leads to our confusion of reason and the calm passions. Implicit in
this explanation seems to be this claim: feeling is in fact not enough to distinguish
between certain kinds of mental events. What then is enough? Attending circumstances,
observations about our beliefs, attitudes, etc (2.3.3.8, see also 2.2.5.3). But these then
seem to be more than merely causal circumstances; they appear to be constitutive of the
passions. How else is it that a calm passion may be identified as a passion, if there is no
characteristic feeling constituting its ‘essence’? Therefore, the more cognitive aspects of
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the passions must be essential in distinguishing them—passions must be characterized by
more than mere feeling.195
Passions are not only distinguished in some cases by their cognitive content, but Hume
also argues that this content is often what determines how they will interact with each
other. Consider this passage at 2.3.9.16:
Contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other, except when their
contrary movements exactly rencounter, and are opposite in their direction, as
well as in the sensation they produce. This exact rencounter depends upon the
relations of those ideas, from which they are deriv’d, and is more or less perfect ,
according to the degrees of relation.
Whether contrary passions may cancel each other out depends on the relations of ideas
connected to the passions in question. Therefore, in such circumstances, the interaction of
the passions, the effect they have on each other and ultimately on our motivation, has as
much to do with cognitive aspects of the passions as it does with the feeling and impulse
behind them. Hume goes on say of this kind of example,
The influence of the relation of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair. If the
objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two
opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the
objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alcali and an acid, which,
being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and consists
in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and
vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate.
(2.3.9.17)
The last two metaphors used here are telling. It is not aspects external to the fluids he
discusses that determine whether they mix, ‘imperfectly’ coexist, or destroy each other,
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but rather their internal natures. In these cases the metaphors seem to suggest that it is not
merely causal circumstances that determine how two passions will interact, but also
cognitive content that is in some way constitutive of them.
Finally, recall that Hume’s stated view on how we are to characterize a passion softens
from his initial statements about their simple, immediately felt natures [“their sensations,
or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and
essence” (2.1.5.4)]. Consider 2.2.9.2, a passage I made much of in Part One:
But that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must
consider, that it is not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure,
which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of
it from the beginning to the end.
The passions may have distinctive felt components, but they are only fully characterized
when our experience of them as wholes, including relations of ideas, beliefs, and
resulting tendencies, is considered. This claim we might pair with Hume’s mention at
2.2.2.7 that there is a difference between vague feelings of pain or pleasure, and a
“…constant and establish’d passion.” This is argued in the case of the indirect passions in
particular, but could be said of all the passions Hume characterizes in terms of beliefs and
ideas. These feelings appear to have authentic cognitive content.
Some reminder at this point of why Hume is so often given a sensationalist reading may
be useful. As has been pointed out above, one of the main sources for the strongly noncognitive reading is found at 2.3.3.5, which I will include in full here:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and
contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence
or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in
that emotion have no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty,
or sick, or more than five foot high. ‘Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion
can be oppos’d by, or contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction
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consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects
which they represent.
Note that there is something somewhat confusing about Hume’s claim here that passions
have no representational content. Consider Hume’s accounts of the characterization of
individual passions, such as pride. His analysis of this and other indirect passions seems
very much to depend on the way our ideas interact with each other, to the extent that
these passions seem in large part to be mental representations of the world with a
particular attitude (either preference or aversion) attached. How do we reconcile this with
their nature as original existences, having no reference to anything else?
Baier finds the 2.3.3.5 passage troublesome for related reasons. She claims that this “one
very silly paragraph…has perversely dominated the interpretation of [Hume’s] moral
psychology” with its assertion that passions are “original existences” without
representative quality.196 Baier here parts ways from commentators like Davidson, who
either seek to accommodate or merely shrug and overlook Hume’s claims about the
sensational nature of the passions. She rather claims that the contentions of this particular
paragraph are “at the very least, unrepresentative of Hume’s claims about passions in the
preceding and following parts of Book Two,” and at worst a clear contradiction.197 She
cites the complex nature of the passions as Hume has presented them in Book II as
evidence that this paragraph is a misstep for Hume and his program. Beliefs, she argues,
are essential to distinguishing indirect passions such as pride from other passions and the
analysis he has presented has made much of his ‘double relation of impressions and
ideas.’
Baier also questions what sense can be made of the claim that things like being thirsty,
sick or a certain height are free of reference to other things, never mind our passions like
anger with their complex cognitive structures involving beliefs. Hume has explained
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anger in terms of causes, objects, ends and attendant passions, what Baier calls the
“complex intentionality of anger.”198 All this, she argues, makes Hume’s statement that
passions are original existences a “surprise announcement.”199 She says there is no sure
answer to why it appears as it does, but argues that the uniqueness of the claim in Hume’s
work is a clear indication that it was not really his considered view. Whatever the reason
for its original composition, Baier wants to paint this passage as anomalous and then
excuse her reading of Hume from accommodating it as it appears at face value. Instead,
she proposes a “partial explanation” of how Hume could have come to generate such a
silly paragraph,200 and this involves her characterization of emotion in Hume and its
distinctness from passion generally, as was discussed above (and which I will return to
shortly).
I do not agree with Baier that 2.3.3.5 is an anomalous and problematic paragraph for
Hume. I don’t find the contradiction between Hume’s claim in this passage and his
account of the details of the indirect passions such as pride to be nearly as evident or
obvious as Baier suggests. Hume characterizes the passions as whole, unified and simple
experiences at various times and repeats the claim that they can only be known through
experience. No amount of describing the feeling of anger to you can acquaint you with
the sensation if you have never had it. On the other hand, Hume obviously thinks it is
possible to analyze the familiar experience of various passions and produce a sort of logic
to the passion, complete with analysis of causes, objects, effects etc. Thus, for him to
both claim that a passion is an original existence, not a copy of anything that in that sense
references anything else, and to claim that a passion has a particular causal history and
context involving beliefs and associated impressions seems consistent with his general
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approach.201 (Whether there is a tension to be found in this general approach is a separate
question.)
I also think Baier is wrong to claim that this is the only place where Hume claims that
passions are without representative quality or reference to things outside of themselves. I
have offered in 2.3 other instances where Hume appears to be making this same move,
but will remind the reader of some of them here. See for example 1.1.6.1, where Hume
tells us that passions and emotions cannot possibly represent a substance. Elijah Millgram
has argued that the argument at 2.3.3.5 is the same as the argument found at 3.1.1.9.202
He responds to Baier’s reading as follows:
Baier seems to take Hume’s insistence on the near ubiquitous causal role of
beliefs in the formation of impressions of reflexion as the view that passions
“incorporate the influence of reason…[and] presuppose beliefs” [Baier (1991),
159], but…Hume did not make the mistake of confusing causal with logical
influence.203
But even putting these instances of apparent corroboration of Hume’s account at 2.3.3.5
aside, one might question how Baier would explain the ‘anomalous’ passage. Baier’s
story as to how Hume came to write the “very silly paragraph” centers on the suggestion
that what he says there may be true of ‘emotions’, though it is certainly not of passions,
for the reasons offered above. Recall that Baier is one of the authors I mentioned who
presents a reasoned distinction between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the Treatise that ends
up playing role in her broader Humean interpretive approach. Her proposed distinction,
recall, focuses on the older sense of the term ‘emotion’ as involving agitation, motion,
perturbation, etc. She says emotions are therefore in some ways much more like
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sensations than like the more highly cognitive passions. This distinction has the potential,
she thinks, to explain 2.3.3.5, if what is said there can be claimed true of emotion, just not
passions. Thus, agitated feeling can be said to have no representative quality, but
passions cannot.
First, let me respond to Baier’s characterization of the emotion/passion distinction. That
Hume is using the term ‘emotion’ in a more contemporary sense than Baier wants to
grant I think is quite likely. Certainly in Hume’s day the term would have had the kinds
of connotations she is suggesting: agitation, movement, perturbation etc. But though the
older sense intended a physical sort of movement and agitation, Hume would have meant
to take that physical term and introduce it into his non-physical mechanics of the mind.
His talk of emotion in conjunction with and at times contrasted with specific passions is
not intended to be about what is physically occurring in the brain and nerves—as I have
argued above, this kind of discussion Hume leaves to the anatomists.204 And his
‘emotions’ are not merely the felt counterpart to such bodily events, at least in the sense
that his impressions of sensation are. Indeed, I think that while Baier’s characterization of
‘emotion’ has similarities to mine, this is one point on which we lean in different
directions: I would choose to emphasize their nature as impressions of reflection.
Emotion for Hume is the “sensible agitation”205 in the reflective mind; it is feeling
generated by consideration of our sensations and ideas of pain and pleasure.
Much of the strength of Baier’s argument for an emotion/passion distinction is taken
from Hume’s discussions of the calm and violent passions in 2.3.3.8-10 and 2.3.4. As has
been discussed in Part One, in these sections Hume initially explains the presence of
more or less violence in terms of the amount of emotion attending passions. He contrasts
‘calm’ passions, which produce in us little feeling as they are “settled principles of
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action,” with the “sensible agitation” of violent passions.206 Baier suggests her reading of
the emotion/passion distinction in Hume makes it crucial to his “explaining away the
rationalist error” of taking ourselves to be at times motivated by reason, not by
passions.207 “When our passions are calm,” Baier claims, “then there will be no internal
“combat”, so no violence… such emotion-free passions get confused with emotionless
reason…”208
I have already argued at length for a different understanding of the calm/violent
distinction, and its relation to the emotions, but I will seek to briefly re-present it here. On
my account, violence should not be understood as strictly synonymous with emotion. The
difference between the calm and the violent is not whether or not they are emotions, but
rather the degree to which the emotion of the passion, and any attending emotion,
constitute ‘violence’ has to do with the degree of disorder caused by movements of mind
that are not the natural or customary movements. Further, though Baier talks about
“emotion-free passions,” I have argued that for Hume (depending on the way he is
talking) either all passions are emotions, or all passions (and in fact, virtually all
perceptions) are attended by emotion (see for example, 2.2.8.4, 2.2.8.6, and 2.2.10.9).
My arguments from Part One are presented rather quickly here, but my hope is that they
are enough to convince the reader that Hume is not understanding ‘emotion’ merely to
mean ‘violence’, nor more generally speaking, is his use identical to the older sense of
the term suggested by Baier’s O.E.D. reference. It is likely that this sense of ‘emotion’ is
still very much in Hume’s mind (and perhaps at times he even uses this term in this more
limited sense). However, I hope that the passages and arguments I have presented are
enough to show that Baier’s suggested reading comes short of explaining all the use
Hume is making of this term.
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That being said, I believe there is ultimately a strong degree of resemblance between my
suggested distinction between emotion and passion, and subsequent approaches to
passages like 2.3.3.5 and Baier’s position. The difference, perhaps, is that where Baier
makes a case for a strongly cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions
generally, I am inclined to argue that Hume has elements of both a sensationalist (noncognitivist) and cognitivist theory of emotions in his picture of the mind. In the next
section, I will argue that the cases made for each reading in the last two sections can be
reconciled by the introduction of the conceptual distinction between emotion and passion
in Hume that I have argued for in Part One.

2.5

Reconciling the sensationalist and cognitivist
approaches with the introduction of an
emotion/passion distinction

That there is a case to be made for claiming Hume both as a cognitive theorist of
emotion, and a sensationalist or non-cognitive theorist of emotion I hope to have shown.
The various pieces of textual evidence and well-reasoned argument from commentators
on both sides of the debate I believe present us with a dilemma. Either we must find a
way to explain the apparent inconsistencies in what Hume said that are highlighted when
the two types of readings are brought together, or we must acknowledge that there is a
tension in Hume’s thought that he was unaware of. My aim is to show that the apparent
inconsistencies dissolve upon the application of the conceptual distinction between
‘established passions’ and ‘attending emotion’ that I argued for in Part One. This is not to
say there is no kind of tension in Hume considered as a theorist of emotion. But the
application of the cognitive/non-cognitive question to Hume’s theory of the passions is
without question anachronistic, and it should not be a surprise that on this type of
contemporary analysis Hume’s theory comes out a bit muddy. What I seek to argue,
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however, is that there is not the kind of tension internal to Hume’s system that the debate
between cognitivist and sensationalist theories seems to suggest. That is, Hume’s thought
is not in tension with itself insofar as he posits both highly cognitive and highly
sensationalist affective mental states, and he has the conceptual tools to account for both
types when we attribute to him an emotion/passion distinction, as emotions are for Hume
a more highly sensationalist mental category, and passions more cognitive. Though no
terminological distinction is made explicit (and, as I have noted above, his use of terms is
often loose), Hume did have these tools internal to his system to talk about the passions
and impressions of reflection generally in both a sensationalist and highly cognitivist
manner.
The form my suggested reconciliation will take may be evident by now, and since much
of the argument for it is internal to the arguments that have been made in Part One, I will
not so much give a detailed defense here, as guide the reader through the application of
my distinction to some of the key points of potential tension. It is perhaps best to start
where Baier left us, with the potentially troublesome passage at 2.3.3.5, the ‘silly
paragraph.’ Here is the central troublesome passage in it, one more time:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and
contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence
or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in
that emotion have no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty,
or sick, or more than five foot high.
The question of whether or not passions are intentional for Hume—or perhaps put more
directly, the question of whether they have representative components, like beliefs—does
indeed appear to have different answers depending on whether we think of the passions
as he often characterizes them as essentially the immediately felt mental event, or as part
of a more complex cognitive state that involves certain beliefs and associations. Baier
rightly emphasizes all the work that Hume does in Book II to describe the passions in
terms of the cognitive content. Her move to explain this passage by saying that here
Hume is talking about emotions, not passions, seems to me on the right track (though, as
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has been shown, Baier and I differ in our understanding of what exactly emotions are,
and how they relate to the calm/violent distinction).
As Baier seems to imply, I do not think that the switch from ‘passion’ to ‘emotion’ as the
term for the impression of reflection part way through the second sentence is an accident.
I have argued for a distinction between ‘fully established’ passions that have distinctive
valenced feeling, as well as characteristic relations of ideas and impressions as part of the
‘bent and tendency’ of the entire experience, and ‘attending emotion,’ which is a
valenced, but changeable feeling, often characterized as a transient force or impulse. All
passions have these felt components; and each particular passion has a distinctive felt
component. My suggestion has been that we accordingly find Hume talking about
passions in two ways: (1) as they are considered identical to that felt emotion that is their
phenomenology on the one hand, and (2) as they are considered as part of the broader
mental event, including the characteristic associations of impressions, ideas and beliefs
on the other. Typically, ‘emotion’ is used either to mean the attending feeling and
impulse [often when Hume is using ‘passion’ in the sense of (2)], or as a synonym for the
particular passion in question [typically when Hume is using passion in the sense of (1)].
What does this mean for the reading of 2.3.3.5? I would suggest that Hume’s insistence
on the non-representational character of passions is a use of ‘passion’ in the first (1)
sense. His intention in this argument is to show that reason cannot oppose passions,
because as a fundamentally felt state it is “not susceptible of… agreement or
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of reason”
(3.1.1.9). Emotions, as I have characterized them, certainly fall into this category. So do
passions, considered as emotions. And if Hume’s oversimplification of passion in this
way, in this passage, strikes the reader as objectionable given the complex picture of the
structure of various passions that he has just finished presenting in Parts I and II of Book
II, perhaps it is worth noting that his characterization of reason in this section is similarly
oversimplified given the characterization of reason and belief that Hume developed in
Book I. The argument of 2.3.3 concerns the impotency of reason to motivate alone,
unassisted by passion. Perhaps Hume is guilty of overstating the point, or at least using
misleading language, as his point seems to be primarily about the necessity of feeling and
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impulse to motivation. And feeling and impulse come from the presence of impressions
of reflection. Therefore, reason considered simply as the tool of discovering truth and
falsehood will not be able to move us along, lacking felt impulse as it does. And such
unfelt reason will also have nothing to say about the feeling that we do have—it isn’t true
or false, agreeing or disagreeing with what is in the world. It is what is in the world.
Emotions are in that sense ‘original existences.’ Neither passions considered as emotions,
nor attending emotions that can be identified as transient, valenced feelings independent
of the particular perceptions that they attends, contain representational content, and
neither considered in this sense have an impulse that may be opposed by reason.
Of course, anger considered as a passion in the sense of (2) is still not representational
exactly, but our experience of it has much to do with our beliefs, and as such we may find
that reasoned belief content actually does influence that passion. In 2.2.3 Hume points to
the particular effect that beliefs about the intention of the offending party have on our
anger response to them. He describes the effects of these beliefs as follows:
[A]n intention, besides its strengthening the relation of ideas, is often necessary to
produce a relation of impressions, and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness. For
‘tis observable, that the principle part of an injury is the contempt and hatred,
which it shews in the person, that injures us; and without that, the mere harm
gives us a less sensible uneasiness…A removal of the intention…must of course
cause a remarkable diminution in the [passion]… (2.2.3.5)
So the experience of the more cognitively conceived passion of anger is strongly colored
by our beliefs: it may not even occur with injury if we fail to attribute intention to the
offending party, and once felt it tends to diminish if we discover that no offence has been
intended.
It is interesting to note that in the case of anger, a passion Hume appears to take to be
more often experienced violently than calmly, the influence of belief has its limits. We
may get angry even when we know no offense was intended, or we may remain
somewhat angry when we are corrected in a false belief that offense was intended. Thus,
the cognitive aspects of Hume’s theory of emotion/passion importantly contribute to the
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experience of the passions without controlling them in all cases—feeling can linger, the
original existence of the felt passion can stay with us even when the beliefs appropriate to
it are not or no longer present. This was clearly an observable fact about human
experience for Hume, and his system needed a way to accommodate it. Thus the need for
the dual way of talking about affective experience that I have suggested is found in
Hume’s implicit conceptual distinction between the more sensational emotions and more
cognitive passions.
In the interest of clarity, let me restate the emotion/passion distinction in Hume that I
have suggested, now that I have sought to apply it to this discussion. First, there are the
two different ways of talking about passions that are found in Hume: (1) considered as
identical to the felt emotion that is their essence, and (2) considered as including both that
distinctive feeling, and the broader experience of the various causes, beliefs and objects
that constitute our complete experience of the passions. (1) allows Hume to talk about the
passions in a more sensationalist manner, and account for instances of human experience
where feeling appears to work against belief, or linger despite the adoption of beliefs that
it seems should extinguish the passion (for example, I remain angry with you even
though I realize that you had only accidentally injured me). On the other hand, (2) allows
Hume to talk about all the instances in which our passions arise, change, and even at
times desist according to changes in beliefs (such as when my anger ceases when I realize
that you had no intention of harming me). Both of these kinds of instances are observable
in human interaction. Hume allows himself two ways of talking about the passions, in
order to allow for both in his system. But the contemporary debate between sensationalist
and cognitivist theories of emotion seems to suggest that Hume is trying to have his cake
and eat it too, as it were. How can he justify the presence of both kinds of affective
mental events in his system?
This is where I think the emotion/passion distinction that I have argued is found in Hume
is useful. Hume can talk about the passions in these two ways exactly because his
category of impressions of reflection can accommodate both experiences of pure feeling,
uninfluenced by belief as they have no reference (what I have called, ‘attending
emotions’), and experiences of particular types of feeling that are by nature tied to a
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certain belief structure and set of causes and objects (what I have called, ‘fully
established passions). The difference between these two include the transient nature of
the former and the more settled nature of the latter, but we should not allow this to
mislead us into thinking of them as mutually exclusive kinds of mental events. Passions
are at their core emotions, but insofar as they are granted identity as particular feelings,
by nature occurring along with certain causes, objects and appropriate beliefs, which lose
their identity once these mental circumstances change, they are not mere emotions, but
fully established passions. The feeling of a passion is never extinguished by a change in
belief, however. This emotion component can transfer to other perceptions, change to
match the new dominate passion, or mix with our other feelings to create new feelings all
together. The rules and maxims outlining how our more simple emotions interact, move,
blend, etc., are in part what Hume is seeking to explain in Book II, Part III of the
Treatise. These emotions I have identified as ‘attending’ since this creates space for a
clear distinction between certain instances of fully established passions, and fleeting
instances of feeling that change to match whatever passion is currently dominant. But
‘attending emotion’ is the feeling that infuses all of our affective experience.
What this additionally gives Hume is two kinds of rule sets that he can apply when
talking about the interaction of his impressions of reflection. As discussed above, the
rules and maxims governing emotions tend to have to do with circumstances under which
they change in their felt nature (even their valence), and the degree to which they attend
all our perceptions. Hume’s observations about the patterns and apparent rules that our
fully established passions follow, on the other hand, have to do with how changes in
beliefs and circumstances affect the arousal or cessation of these passions. And because
we find that our beliefs have considerable influence on our passions (as Hume argues in
1.3.10), we find that we are often much more cognitivist in our experience of the passions
than the sensational nature of our ‘original existence’ emotions may suggest.
How strong, then, should we take the strain of cognitivism in Hume to be? I would
suggest that his characterization of the passions ultimately puts more or less equal weight
on their felt content and their cognitive content. Consider the following claim Hume
makes about pride:
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That we may comprehend this better, we must suppose, that nature has given to
the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar
impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign’d a
certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce. (2.1.5.6)
Here Hume talks about the two ways in which nature has determined our passionate
experience of this particular passion: on the one hand, there is a particular emotion or
feeling that is characteristic of the passion. On the other hand, there is the idea that the
passion always focuses us on. Hume’s language here is causal (“never fails to produce”),
but his insistence on the necessity of the connection, which we have seen used in other
places as well, makes him appear just as concerned with these more cognitive elements of
our experience of the passion as he is with our immediate felt experience of the emotion.
Hume’s theory of the passions really is only whole when we allow both the more
cognitive account of particular ‘passions’ and the more sensationalist account of the
phenomenon of ‘emotion.’ Consider, for instance, Hume’s claim that a passion is simply
identical to the feeling one has when experiencing the passion. This on the surface is a
purely sensationalist account. Pride is the feeling of pride, love the feeling of love, etc.
Hume’s initial presentation of the particular passions makes it sound as though he is
content with this simple theory. Put in the right causes in terms of ideas, impressions and
associations, and the natural outcome is a feeling predetermined by nature, common to
all, of (say) pride. But one may object that not all feelings of pride are the same. I am
proud of my lovely home, but I am also proud of my moral character. There is a
difference of feeling, and it isn’t merely a difference of degree (i.e., of my being more
proud of one than the other, and therefore feel more of the passion). The case of pride for
the success of my child or partner presents different felt qualities of pride again. The felt
experience of pride in each case will likely be similar—in Hume’s terms we might say
there is a strong relation of resemblance—but it seems that the feelings we identify with
pride are not always identical, and the difference in feeling has much to do with the
differences in the attitudes and beliefs that are the cognitive element of the pride.
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How might Hume account for this apparent multiplying of ‘peculiar emotions’ associated
with a general kind of passion? On the sensationalist story, with its strongly atomic
reading of the passions, this seems to be difficult. But Hume is aware of the difference
that variety of ideas, beliefs and other aspects of the situation make to the emotion
experienced. Close to the end of Book II he says of hope and fear in particular:
I have here confin’d myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most
simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may
receive from the mixture of different views and reflections. Terror, consternation,
astonishment, anxiety, and other passions of that kind, are nothing but different
species and degrees of fear. ’Tis easy to imagine how a different situation of the
object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion;
and this may in general account for all the particular sub-divisions of the other
affections, as well as of fear. (2.3.9.31)
Hume goes on to attribute a similar multiplicity of ‘species’ to love, and then says that all
sub-divisions of particular passion types
…arise from the same causes, tho’ with a small variation, which it is not
necessary to give an particular account of. ‘Tis for this reason I have all along
confin’d myself to the principal passion. (2.3.9.31)
This is a far cry from the initial presentation of pride, where it was treated as though there
were a single feeling we are all familiar with through experience, that consistently arises
due to certain ‘causes’ that were stated as certain very general kinds of beliefs and
feelings. Here Hume is talking about ‘principal passions’ which have multiple
instantiations depending on the circumstance, whether it be external or internal to us, that
affects the thought content we have when we experience the passion.
In general, by the end of Book II Hume is struggling to explain his theory of passions and
motivation in the simple (and generally more cognitivist) way he had when he began the
book with in the treatment of pride. His basic associationism of Book I is being
supplemented with new ‘maxims’ that arise to account for the diversity of feeling-driven
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mental experience. There are two particularly interesting maxims that were added as the
complexity of discussion in Book II began to make Hume’s topics unmanageable by
appeal to his basic associationism. The first is the maxim that “no object is presented to
the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d with emotion” (first
stated at 2.2.8.4). The second is that “any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily
converted to it” (first stated at 2.3.4.2). Notice that both these late-game qualifications to
his associationism involve emotion. Both of them arise well after Hume is done outlining
the basic causal structure of the indirect passions, the most highly cognitive of his
passions. It is as though the progression of Book II necessitates a conceptual distinction
between the highly cognitive impressions of reflection he has characterized according to
his rules of association, and the fluid, changeable, feeling that means these particularly
structured passions can be found to mix, blend, oppose one another, and ultimately
motivate. I have argued that Hume does provide this distinction with the difference
between the fully established passions, with their cognitive content, and attending
emotion, with its purely sensational nature and moving impulse.
I am not suggesting that any passage where Hume uses either ‘passion’ or ‘emotion’ can
be readily brought under this interpretation. This would be an overstatement of the
connection between the terms and the mental elements I have suggested they often
correspond to. Emotion is in most cases, though, used in a way such that slotting in my
characterization will not hurt the reading of Hume. This is likely because it is the term
with broader application, and includes the particular passions among the impressions of
reflection that it generally designates. ‘Passion’ on the other hand is a term that is, like
‘imagination’, context sensitive for Hume. Sometimes ‘passion’ is used to designate a
mental event that is essentially sensational in nature, albeit the sensation of an impression
of reflection. Other times it is used to refer to a broader phenomenon, which includes
causes and objects, relations of ideas and impressions, tendencies and desires, and even
sometimes belief.
Hume therefore appears to be drawing on both sensationalist and cognitivist elements in
the description of our passionate experience. I will not seek to determine whether there is
a tension in his thought despite the clarification of conceptual divides and ways of using
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his ‘technical’ terminology. For the moment, and for the purpose of this work, my
intention is to take a step back, and claim that the application of the emotion/passion
distinction I have developed to answer the debate between cognitivist and sensationalist
readings of Hume is a form of evidence in support of the reality of this implicit
distinction in Hume’s work. This is something of a reminder to the reader at this point—
the main thesis of this dissertation is to establish this reading of Hume. The proposed
solution to the cognivist/sensationalist debate is a secondary purpose, and suited to my
discussion precisely because, if it is successful, we have more reason to adopt the reading
I give in Part One. The next two sections are much briefer treatments, but similarly seek
to make more sense of interpretive questions in Hume scholarship by applying the
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for. The first is on an interpretive problem I
take there to be in understanding the workings of Hume’s sympathy mechanism. The
second—which will be a very brief treatment, given that the subject matter could easily
constitute a dissertation of its own!—is on the implications of my distinction for Hume’s
theory of belief and motivation.

2.6

Application of a concept of emotion in Hume to the
sympathy puzzle

On the surface, the basic mechanism of sympathy as Hume presents it in Book II of his
Treatise has an uncontroversial reading.209 Upon the perception of a passion in another
we acquire an idea of that passion. This idea is infused with the vivacity of our present
idea of the self to the degree that our mind finds a relation between our impression that is
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the source of our idea of the passion, and our idea of the self. The idea of the passion may
thereby gain vivacity sufficient to become the passion itself, and we come to experience
the same feelings that we perceive in another.210 This mechanism is introduced in the
context of Hume’s discussion of our pride and humility, and in particular our love of
fame.211 Hume builds his account on the principles of association he has established in
Book I. He is straightforward and methodical in its presentation and appears to find his
description quite complete.
But there is a puzzle in the application of this basic sympathetic mechanism, and this is
perhaps not surprising given the discussions above about the complexity of passion and
emotion in Hume. The most difficult case appears to be the indirect passions which will
be the focus of this discussion, though I take it that there is a general puzzle for any
passion that seems to require some kind of belief or object. The puzzle is captured
generally in a series of questions we may ask of the particular workings of Humean
sympathy. When I sympathize with your pride in yourself do I experience the emotion of
pride in self, pride in you or love of another (namely, you)? Does your pleasure in me
(love) become my pleasure in me (pride)? Or will I feel a sympathetic love? And if so,
who or what would be the object of this love? Similarly, were you to sympathize with my
hate of you, would you feel the passion of hatred, or the passion of shame (self-hate?) As
has been discussed above, Hume emphasizes that all passions are ‘original existences’,
lacking parts and non-representational, but he also presents the reader with detailed
analysis of the causes and objects of certain individual passions—particularly the indirect
passions—and the relations and attitudes necessary for their production. Put one way, the
puzzle I wish to present questions what the identity conditions are when Hume claims
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that sympathy is the mechanism by which we come to experience the same passion that
we perceive in another.212
My intention here is to set up the puzzle and potential solutions that might be applied
prior to any application of my emotion/passion distinction. The reason for this is that I
want to show how this part of Hume’s project presents an interpretive challenge when we
do not have the tools of the conceptual distinction I have developed. One way this puzzle
could be summed up is as the question of whether Hume intended the communicated
passions to be conceived as simple, original existences (the sensationalist reading) or as
involving beliefs, objects, etc (cognitivist reading). I will argue at the end of presenting
the puzzle and the multiple options for interpretation that might be suggested, that once
my emotion/passion distinction is applied, and the tension between a cognitivist and
sensationalist reading resolved, it is easy to see how the Humean sympathy mechanism
works—and it works, it turns out, in several different ways.
Before moving into the discussion of the problem, here is a quick refresher on Hume’s
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account of the indirect passions.
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that the sympathy mechanism causes me to experience the exact passion that I perceive in the other person.
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might acquire the feelings others have. But, he argues, Hume only requires that by sympathy “we get
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support seems necessary for this claim, as Hume often makes statements that suggest the opposite (see for
example THN 2.1.11.3 and 3.3.1.7).
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In this section I have striven, as much as possible, to assume a reading of Hume that sticks closely to the

text and the basic progression and accomplishment of Hume’s thought through THN 2.1.1-11. My reading
has been guided in part by the interpretations offered by both Smith (1960) and Ardal (1989) on these
topics.
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from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (2.1.1.4), while the indirect are “such as
proceed from the same principles [as the direct], but by the conjunction of other
qualities” (2.1.1.4). Hume emphasizes that passions of both types are “simple and
uniform impressions”, and that though we are all familiar with the meaning of the terms
through our own experiences of the passions, a definition of them is not possible. Hume
introduces the concepts of object, subject and cause of a passion as a way of talking
about the circumstances found to attend the passion. Whether these ‘attending
circumstances’ are passed on in the case of the sympathetic adoption of the indirect
passions- or whether it is some experience of the passions as ‘original existences’, with
no reference to anything else- is exactly the sort of question we need to be asking.
I first noted the puzzle in reading Hume’s discussion of fame,214 which follows his initial
presentation of the sympathetic mechanism.215 Hume’s purpose in introducing the
principle of sympathy in this section is to provide the reader with an explanation of
secondary causes of pride and humility. With primary causes, such as vice and virtue, or
beauty and deformity, the cause consists in a subject and quality that are related to us in
some way strong enough to provoke pride or shame. When the opinions of others or our
reputation act as causes of pride or humility, it is not of that form. Thus, it requires a
special kind of explanation, and that is the role that sympathy is meant to play. Our
tendency to adopt the sentiments of others in a way takes the place of the usual cause of a
passion. In the other cases a cause, composed of subject and quality, has the effect of
producing the passion of pride or humility, which in turn makes the self its object. In the
case of the admiration or disapproval of others as cause our passion of pride or humility
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THN 2.1.11.9-19.
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As the reader will see as this paper progresses, my considered view now is that Hume does not actually

provide us with an example of the puzzling ambiguity in his discussion of fame. It is rather that on a
shallow reading of this section the ambiguity appears to surface. However, as it was discussion of this
section that first alerted me to the puzzle, I have opted to introduce it in this way. The smaller puzzle that
this micro discussion introduces I believe can be answered. But the larger ambiguity in the workings of
sympathy generally that it suggests I am not sure can be so easily dealt with.
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is acquired sympathetically. Take the case of pride. I perceive in others an admiration of
myself. I have an idea of this admiration. Assuming the relation between myself and
those who admire me is strong enough, I find that my present impression of self infuses
my idea of their admiration with vivacity, until it becomes an impression. I thereby come
to feel the passion of pride, as a result of sympathy.
The problem, as may already be apparent, is that it doesn’t look like it is really the
sympathetic mechanism taking effect in this example. How is it that when the perceived
sentiment is admiration I come to experience the passion of pride sympathetically? Isn’t
the purpose of the principle of sympathy to offer a ‘first principles’ explanation of why it
is we humans are so inclined to adopt the very same passions and opinions of those
around us?216 How could my fame—the admiration of many people of myself—through
the principle of sympathy create pride in me?
It appears that sympathy is not straightforward when we are dealing with the indirect
passions. For the sake of contrast, consider briefly what it would be to sympathize with a
direct passion, like grief over the loss of a loved one. Suppose I know that you have
recently lost a loved one, and as I perceive you now I see all the signs of deep sorrow and
grief. Assuming that my conception of you is closely enough related to my conception of
myself, I will find my idea of your grief enlivened to the point of becoming the
impression of grief. I would thus experience sympathetic grief over the death of your
loved one. This is an easy and obvious example of the principle of sympathy at work. But
consider now the case of an indirect passion, such as pride. My sister has recently
redecorated her room. When I see her I perceive in her all the signs of someone who is
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This is why at times Hume calls the mechanism the ‘principle of communication.’ It is an explanation of

our propensity to “receive by communication [others’] inclinations and sentiments” (2.1.11.2). This
happens because our idea of their passion “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the
very passion itself” (2.1.11.3; italics added). This point is made again in Book III in the following way:
“When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes
from these effects to their causes, and forms such as lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted
into the passion itself” (3.3.1.7).
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very proud of herself as a decorator. I have an idea of this passion, and since she is my
sister I am sufficiently related to her for my impression of myself to enliven my idea of
her pride, until it becomes an impression. I thereby experience the passion of—what? If it
is pride I am feeling, then its object must be the self. But what is the subject? In Hume’s
picture of the indirect passions usually we find the subject of our pride in the cause of the
pride. But the cause in this case is not a subject with a particular quality, but rather an
idea of your pride that has been converted to an impression through sympathy. And
Hume does not address how the sympathetic mechanism does or does not communicate
the beliefs about the subject and quality that have caused the passion in the individual we
are sympathizing with.217
Furthermore, it is unclear that pride is what I would feel at all as I sympathize with you
and your pride. If I adopt the same pleasure and admiration of my sister’s skill as a
decorator that she is experiencing, wouldn’t that result in my feeling love for her, not
pride? Your pleasure in something related to you will result in pride. But for me that
same pleasure in you and admiration of you would be a cause of love. This latter case
seems related to the phenomenon that Hume is getting at in his discussion of pride
through fame. Your admiration of me becomes my admiration of self, i.e. pride. But this
feels unsatisfactory. Why should the principle of sympathy work to make me feel proud
of myself, and not a sentiment of admiration in another as those who admire me are
feeling? Wouldn’t the latter be a case of feeling the same passion (as sympathy is meant
to accomplish), while the former is the acquisition of a new passion altogether?
In Hume’s discussion of our love of fame I think that a closer reading of the text will not
provide a solution to the puzzle, but rather sidestep it altogether. The reading that I
presented immediately above was not so much taken from exactly what is said in 2.1.11
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One may even argue that the point of the sympathetic mechanism is that it needn’t communicate the

associated beliefs about the subject and quality that have acted as cause of the passion in order to
communicate the passion. In the direct case it seems simpler: I can imagine sympathizing with someone's
grief or fear without knowing what causes it. It seems as though the indirect case should be similar; I see
the symptoms of pride on your face and then, even without knowing the cause, I feel a sympathetic passion.
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after Hume’s presentation of the principle of sympathy (in which he shows exactly the
part it plays in the pride we feel from the admiration of others). Rather, it was a
presentation of what I think the reader would likely assume to be Hume’s application of
the principle of sympathy in this context, given his initial presentation and description of
the principle. That is, the reader would be justified in thinking that what would follow
Hume’s presentation of the principle of sympathy here would be an illustration of the
principle at work in a case where a passion is felt through the perception of (the same?)
passion in someone else. But this is not actually what Hume goes on to do. For though
Hume presents sympathy in general primarily as a means by which we come to feel the
passions that we perceive in others, the application of the principle he immediately
presents to the reader is not of the sympathetic adoption of passions at all, but rather of
opinions or beliefs.
Consider the following, which Hume states in presenting sympathy’s role in our pride in
the admiration and opinions of others:
We may observe, that no person is ever prais’d by another for any quality, which
wou’d not, if real, produce of itself, a pride in the person possest of it. …’Tis
certain, then, that if a person consider’d himself in the same light, in which he
appears to his admirer, he wou’d first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards
a pride or self-satisfaction… (2.1.11.9)
Here it is clear that what Hume is concerned with is not a passion of admiration or love,
but rather praise of an individual based on the belief that they possess a certain quality.
As it happens, if the quality were actually possessed by someone it would be a source of
pleasure. But that sentiment is not the content of the praise. The content of the praise is a
belief. From here, Hume goes on:
Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this
particular; both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately
present to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a
kind of argument for what they affirm. (2.1.11.9)
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Here we have a double confirmation that what is being sympathetically communicated is
a belief. Not only does Hume refer to the principle of sympathy as causing us to embrace
opinions, but he argues for their adoption being further assured through reasoning about
the judgments of others as sources of belief.
It is in the following way then, that sympathy plays a role in the pride we gain from the
opinions of others. We perceive in another a belief about our praiseworthiness in a
particular regard. We thereby have an idea of their belief, and as a result of a strong
relation we find between our impression of our self and their self, that idea is infused
with sufficient vivacity to become a belief.218 This belief about our praiseworthiness is
pleasing to us. The pleasant belief about our own praiseworthiness acts as a cause of
pride in us. This pride, true to the account above, would have as its object the self, and its
subject would be the pleasant belief in our own praiseworthiness. In a sense our pride is a
result of sympathy, though certainly not in the direct way that we might have initially
assumed would be the case. It is not a passion of another that sympathy helps us to feel in
this case, but a belief that would lead to the passion that we are facilitated in adopting.
So the puzzle that appeared to arise from this section can be avoided entirely by pointing
out that Hume is not actually claiming here that sympathy with admiration or love can
directly produce the passion of pride. Unfortunately for Hume, however, the broader
puzzle is still present. There presumably are instances of the principle of sympathy
operating on indirect passions such as pride, and it is not yet clear what the results of such
sympathizing would be. As I see it there are four possible ways that the principle of
sympathy could operate in the case of the indirect passions. The first I think can quickly
be dismissed as not the route that Hume would take. But the other three options I take to
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Of course for Hume believed ideas are no different from other ideas in content, only in the way they feel

or the ‘manner of their conception’. Thus it is easy to see how an infusion of vivacity from our conception
of the self could turn a mere idea into a believed idea, in the same way that it can turn a mere idea of a
passion into the passion itself.
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all conceivably be supported at various times by things Hume says or assumptions he
makes. It is to a discussion of these options that I will now turn.
The first possibility is an interpretation of sympathy as we may construe it from
descriptions such as the following:
The minds of men are all similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one
be actuated by any affection, of which the others are not, in some degree,
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates
itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and
beget correspondent movements in every human creature. (3.3.1.7)
This reference to our natures is reminiscent of Hume’s discussion of passions as original
existences, certain dispositions of the human mind present in virtue of our nature. The
metaphor suggests that when a passion is resonating with one person it is easily passed on
to another, because our like natures can communicate passions as easily and effortlessly
as strings of the same tone may communicate sound and vibration. In contemporary
discussions this would be identified as empathy operating as a sort of emotional
contagion. There is no cognition of the particular emotional state involved, merely the
adoption of the feelings that we perceive. Think of the way a dog may mirror the
nervousness of her owner in an unfamiliar place. Though there has been no recognition of
the nervousness as nervousness with a particular cause or object, there has been an
adoption of the mood and general feeling of anxiety sensed in the owner by the dog.
If Humean sympathy in the case of indirect passions works in this way, as a sort of precognitive, purely sensitive emotional contagion, then it would make sense to conclude
that when I sympathize with your pride what I feel is the identical passion of pride, the
identical feeling that I take you to be having. But this account seems unlikely. First of all,
it doesn’t seem to help us make much sense of the differences between the passion of
pride you feel in yourself due to a particular cause, and the pride I would feel
sympathetically (obviously with my self as the object) and how I would make sense of
the subject and cause of that pride. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it just doesn’t
seem to match up to the steps of the mechanism as Hume outlines them. Before I can
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have an idea of your pride I must attribute the passion to you based on the signs I
perceive in you of the passion. It is difficult to imagine how I could come to attribute
pride to you without recognizing in you pleasure at something you are related to. And if
this kind of recognition is necessary, how could it be that the sentiment is passing to me
in that most primitive, emotional contagion form, like the owner’s anxiety to the dog? It
would seem that attributions of indirect passions require the formation of certain beliefs
about the person we are attributing the passion to, or rather the belief that the individual
holds a particular belief about themselves that makes them, say, proud. Otherwise it
would not be pride that we attribute to them, as Hume points out that self as the object of
pride is the distinguishing characteristic of the passion.219 Therefore sympathizing with
indirect passions cannot be a matter of mere unreflective resonating and precognitive
emotional contagion.
This brings us to the three options that seem to me all possible, and perhaps all intended
by Hume at various times. These three options, A, B and C, I have put into a chart below
(fig.1), with the examples of the indirect passions of pride, humility (shame), love and
hate to illustrate how sympathizing in each way would play out.220 Briefly, in option A
we perceive the passion in another and have an idea of that passion in a way that is
identical to how we take the passion to be experienced in the other in all respects (i.e.,
same object, subject, cause etc). As it is enlivened we come to experience that exact
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Though I will only look in particular at these four passions here, my suspicion, as has been indicated, is

that this problem with the sympathetic mechanism would occur in all cases of sympathy with indirect
passions. For instance, it seems conceivable that the same three kinds of options would appear in the case
of sympathizing with your envy of me: Do I feel a sympathetic envy of myself, just as you do? Or does my
envy find a new subject, to mirror your state of envy of another? Or, do I feel vanity as a sympathetic result
of your envy of me? In this way the three options may play out in the case of envy. But it is not clear
whether we would find the possibility of these variations on sympathetic communication in all the other
indirect passions, mostly because Hume does not offer the same in-depth analysis of these passions as he
does for pride and humility. For now I will have to leave it as mere speculation, that each could be
sympathetically communicated in the ways I am outlining here.
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passion ourselves, in all respects. This type of sympathy seems to necessarily involve a
kind of suspension of disbelief. I am, in effect, experiencing your pride in your self as
though I were you and experiencing my pride in my self. To do this I obviously have to
ignore for the moment that I am not identical to you. Perhaps a good way to think of this
is to compare it to what happens when we let ourselves become completely engaged in
the situation of a character in a play or movie. The distinction we know exists between
our self and the other must be ignored for a moment in order for us to fully experience the
passion of the other.
Fig. 1
Passion perceived in another:

Passion I feel

Pride in self

Shame of self

Love of me

Hate of me

Option A Pride in self

Shame of self

Love of me

Hate of me

Sympathetically: Option B Pride in other
Option C Love of other

Shame of other Love of other

Hate of other

Hate of other

Hate of self

Pride in self

In option B I perceive the passion in you, and have a corresponding idea. But the idea is
of that passion alone, that is, that particular feeling that all humans by their natures have
the same capacity to experience. This idea is therefore independent of the particular cause
and subject the passion I perceive may have (though not the object, as at least in the case
of pride and humility it must always be the self). The idea is then converted to the
passion. The subject of my passion would usually be understood to be part of the cause.
In the case of sympathetic passions the cause is not a subject conjoined with a quality, but
rather my idea of the passion in you. In an indirect way, the subject of your passion could
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be identified as the subject of my sympathetic passion.221 Thus, I will find that
sympathizing with your pride makes me feel proud of you, sympathizing with your love
of me (who is other to you) will make me feel love of another (likely you).
Option C has the sympathetic communication working more as it was initially assumed
Hume wanted it to in his discussion of pride through fame. I perceive in another a
passion, and have an idea of that passion. But my idea is not of the particular indirect
passion they are experiencing, but rather of the feelings of pleasure or pain that I take
them to have, combined with the beliefs that they possess about the object and cause of
their passion.222 In other words, I understand their passion more in terms of the
circumstances that attend the passion.223 When the idea(s) of the circumstances is (are)
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It is also quite possible that I would not try to trace the causal chain that lead to my experience of the

passion to find the subject, but would rather upon experiencing the passion light on some other potential
object and make that the subject of my passion, though it had been completely unrelated to that point. This
kind of behavior has been noted in patients with brain disorders that cause sudden bursts of emotion,
unconnected to the normal emotional life of the patient. Often a patient experiencing such an episode, say
the sudden onset of sadness, will find something in their current experience to attribute the emotion to, like
some family matter that until that moment had not really been bothering them. There is further discussion
of this kind of case in Damasio (1994).
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Ardal (1989) criticizes J.A. Passmore for drawing an analogy between the relation of simple ideas to

complex ideas and the relation between direct and indirect passions. It would be a mistake to think that the
indirect passions are somehow combinations of direct passions and beliefs for Hume. The indirect passions,
as has been repeated above, are original existences themselves, simple and no easier to define than the
direct passions. It is the case, however, that in the description of the circumstances attending them we find
various beliefs and even pleasures and pains, propensities and aversions. These are the types of things I am
suggesting we are receiving by sympathy in option C, which provide the context necessary for certain
indirect passions that are sympathetically gained, yet not the same as those of the person we are
sympathizing with. I do not mean to suggest, however, that in this process the sympathetic passion is
somehow constructed out of the sympathized sentiments and beliefs that are part of the ‘attending
circumstances’.
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Recall that Hume insists that this is the only way that passions can be talked about: “by enumeration of

such circumstances as attend them” (THN 2.1.2.1).
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enlivened, I will not find myself experiencing the passion of the person with whom I am
sympathizing. Rather, if I experience an indirect passion it will be one that is appropriate
to the sentiments I have had communicated to me. For instance, if it is pride in her newly
decorated room that I perceive in my sister, the principle of sympathy will cause in me
not pride in myself, nor even pride in my sister, but rather love for my sister.
Each of these options has its own strengths and drawbacks as a solution to the puzzle.
The strength of option A seems to be that it preserves the mechanism of sympathy in its
most basic form. We are affected in the ways that others are affected. Not in an entirely
felt, non-cognitive way, as it was with the first option discussed and dismissed. Rather,
we have the mental tools to enter into mental lives of others, and gain an understanding
of both the feeling and the thinking of that individual. On the other hand, option A does
not seem to properly reflect what we often take to happen in instances of sympathizing.
For instance, I would expect that sympathy with my sister’s pride in her decorating would
make me proud of her, not proud of myself. An account of this experience of
sympathizing with indirect passions is perhaps more a strength of option B. The passion
of pride as an isolated original existence is preserved, while the subject of that passion
shifts in a way that reflects my awareness of the source of the passion. Option B certainly
seems to reflect the experience we often have of sympathizing- I see you proud of
yourself, and I too feel proud of you. The difference is that in your case the subject of
your pride is (for instance) your decorated room, while the subject of my pride is you.224
But this option ultimately lacks the strength of option C, which is able to accommodate
the sympathetic adoption of the passion of pride through the praise of others, which
seems most appropriate for the task Hume wants sympathy to accomplish in its
introduction. It is then able to account for the way we respond to the opinions of others,
whether feeling pride at their love, shame at their hate or loving them when we see their
pride and hating them when we see their shame. But, if Hume also wants the principle to
be a means for adopting the same passions as those around us, this option seems a
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In both cases the object of the pride is necessarily the self.
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somewhat forced and weak use of the term ‘sympathetic passion’. After all, it is not, in
this case, an identical passion I feel. To use Hume’s metaphor, my strings are
‘sympathetically’ resonating at a different tone than those of the person I am
sympathizing with.
It could be that the most charitable way of trying to answer this puzzle about the
application of sympathy to the indirect passions is to assume that Hume would have been
willing to draw on variations on all three potential solutions I have offered as appropriate.
But this answer will not be satisfactory for every reading of Hume. The reason for this is
that I take it that the option that will be preferred for each reader or commentator will be
a function of what kind of reading they are inclined to give Hume as a theorist of the
passions. For instance, someone who insists on sticking closely to a sensationalist reading
of Hume will likely choose option A, where I gain an idea of a particular, familiar feeling
in someone else (indicated by the appropriate behaviors in the person, and the presence of
cause and object). When my idea of the passion is enlivened, it will become the identical
passion itself. But this would be unsatisfying for someone who holds Hume to be a more
cognitive theorist of the passions. Option B might be most appealing to someone who
takes the passions to indeed have a characteristic sensation, but insist that certain beliefs
are constitutive of the passion. Thus, the adoption of the particular feeling would have to
include the adoption of aspects of the cognitive content surrounding it. Finally, if one
were inclined to an even stronger cognitivist reading of Hume, the only feeling to be
sympathetically adopted would be a basic pleasure or pain, as on this reading anything
more to the experience of the passion is tied to cognitive content. Thus, as in option C,
the sympathizing would take the basic felt pleasure or pain, and otherwise be focused on
adopting the beliefs about cause and object that we perceive. This option has the curious
feeling of breaking the passion into parts, and reassembling is in a way appropriate to our
own context and perspective. It is still the communication of passion, just not in the direct
sense one would assume Hume intended.
Now let us consider how my suggested reconciliation of the cognitivism/sensationalism
debate with a conceptual distinction between emotion/passion might be usefully applied
here. I believe understanding Hume’s take on passions as such makes room for the
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possibility that passions are sympathetically communicated in Hume in all three ways.
Consider option A. Here we perceive the passion in another as the characteristic emotion
that is the ‘essence’ of that passion. We know from experience what this feels like, and as
our impression of self lends this emotion vivacity, we will come to feel the actual
impression. But we need not continue to feel that exact passion, as the emotion we are
experiencing has a transient and fluid nature. Though the sympathetic communication
may have been of an original existence, with no beliefs or representational content
attached, it will be immediately introduced into a mind where there are other beliefs,
ideas, sources of emotion and vivacity, and instant associations that will be made.
Therefore, depending on our psychological landscape, that emotion may quickly be
adopted by a different passion. For instance, suppose I perceive pride in my sister, and
come to feel sympathetically the emotion of pride. That feeling will likely ‘wheel about’
and find associations and perhaps a dominant passion. Let’s say that independent of the
pride I perceive in my sister, I am inclined to love her for the accomplishment that she is
at the moment proud of. The emotion of pride I feel sympathetically will likely come to
attend my passion of love for her. Thus, though the initial sympathetic mechanism will
cause in me the emotion of pride (which is self directed), I will find that without the
appropriate relations of ideas and impressions the emotion of pride will not be lasting, but
the feeling and vivacity will pass to sentiments more appropriate to my perspective and
situation.225 The emotion here operates something like the emotion of anger in instances
where we know that no offense was intended, but feel angry anyway. Of such cases
Hume says that the “emotion, indeed, cannot be of long continuance… [W]hen the
violence of the passion is once a little abated, the defect of the relation begins to be better
felt…” and the passion, unsupported by the appropriate relations of ideas, cannot last
(2.2.3.6)
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My choice to use the term ‘sentiment’ here is intentional, given its connotations of both passions and

beliefs. Recall that the sympathy mechanism applies to belief as well as to impressions of reflection.
Therefore there is no reason to think that the sympathetically acquired emotion will only lend vivacity and
force to passions—it may well come to attend some belief.
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Therefore, on my reading the sympathy mechanism may well communicate the precise
passion (in the sense of the emotional essence) we observe, as in option A, but unless we
have the appropriate supporting beliefs and associations, it is unlikely that the feeling of
that particular passion will persist long. Instead, the emotion and vivacity will move to a
dominant passion, or spread to various associated ideas, impressions, beliefs, etc, as
appropriate to the individual.
What then of options B and C? In both of these cases what is communicated appears to
be part(s) of what constitute(s) the ‘whole bent and tendency’ of the experience of the
passion, possibly including particular beliefs. Considering the passions as more complex
cognitive events opens up different aspects of the mental experience of the individual we
observe for us to gain ideas of and have subsequently enlivened by the sympathy
mechanism. We may gain the idea of the emotion of the passion, or we may gain an idea
of the general pain or pleasure being experienced. We may gain an idea of particular
beliefs. All of these elements may be lent vivacity and come to be experienced by us
sympathetically, or only some or one of them. In any case, how the passions, emotions,
pains, pleasures and beliefs come to be experienced by us will depend in part on the
mental context they enter into, i.e., our own package of perceptions, associations,
dominant passions, and customs and habits of mind. In the end, the sympathy mechanism
can be seen to work in an incredibly broad way, and result in a large range of types of
sympathetically acquired mental states.
This reading seems consistent with the diverse application Hume attributes to the
sympathy mechanism. Not least of these attributed functions is the communication of
belief in particular via sympathy. Philip Mercer seconds this, arguing that the sympathy
mechanism must work in the case of belief, due to the sensitive nature of Humean belief.
He states,
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In so far as Hume thinks that belief is merely a lively idea or impression,226 there
can be no objections to saying that an idea that X is the case can, through being
associated with an impression, be so enlivened as to become a belief that X is the
case. It follows that beliefs, opinions, and attitudes are just as susceptible of
communication from one person to another by means of the sympathetic
mechanism as passions and emotions are.227
I noted close to the end of my arguments in Part One that emotion seems closely
connected to Humean ‘vivacity.’ Vivacity, of course, plays several key roles in Hume. I
questioned what the relationship might be between vivacity broadly construed in Hume,
and the vivacity he refers to in his discussions of emotion in particular. This question
seems highlighted by consideration of the sympathy mechanism, since it seems that the
vivacity gained from the impression of self is capable of both turning an idea of an
impression into that impression, and turning an idea of someone else’s belief into the
belief itself. Hume talks about beliefs being attended by vivacity, and passions being
attended by emotion. He also allows for considerable influence of passions over beliefs
and vice versa. Now we find in the case of sympathy the same vivacity capable of
creating beliefs and passions. This all together seems to suggest the more direct question:
is the vivacity that attends a believed idea a kind of emotion?
I take this to be a very difficult question to answer, and not possible to do within the
restrictions of this project. I will, however, offer the beginnings of this discussion about
the connection between emotion and belief in the next section, along with some
suggestion on how this might affect Hume’s theory of motivation.
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I do not think that Hume anywhere explicitly identifies belief as an impression—rather, he is inclined to

talk about our believed ideas as ‘approaching impressions’ in their force and vivacity, due to the vivacity of
some present impression (see 1.3.7.5n1). Therefore, Mercer may be somewhat overstating the case here.
His general point, however, about the felt and enlivened nature of believed ideas, and the possibility of
these being communicated via the sympathy mechanism seems to me correct.
227

Mercer (1972), 34.
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2.7

Application of the emotion/passion distinction to
Hume on belief and motivation

Potential connections between Hume’s account of belief and his work on the passions
and impressions of reflection generally have not gone unnoticed in the scholarship. For
instance, Norman Kemp Smith has suggested that Hume’s doctrine of belief is modeled
on his doctrine of sympathy.228 James Fieser has questioned whether passions exhaust the
category of impressions of reflection, suggesting among the possible additional
candidates for inclusion the feeling of causal connection (the “internal impressions”) that
Hume suggests plays a role in our belief in necessary connection in Book I.229 Annette
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Fieser, (1992). Ultimately, Fieser suggests that Hume doesn’t give us enough to know whether the

internal impression of a feeling of causal anticipation (or the impression of willing, which he also suggests
as a potential candidate) could be classified as impressions of reflection. He suggests two potential
interpretations, “(1) internal impressions, (which include the will and expectation), are distinct from
[impressions of reflection] (which are the passions), and, (2) [impressions of reflection] are identical to
internal impressions and include the passions, as well as the will and the feeling of causal anticipation” (13)
The first of these interpretations he suggests is preferable because of Hume’s description of impressions of
reflection as including passions, emotions and desires, “none of which seem proper classifications for the
will and the feeling of causal anticipation” and because the term ‘internal impression’ is only used in
Hume’s discussions of will and causal anticipation, never the passions (13). (Fieser also mentions that these
two kinds of feeling do not fit into either the calm nor violent classification, which he takes to be a part of
Hume’s taxonomy of impressions of reflection, a point I have argued against earlier in this work.) It may
be, however, that his question about the possible status of Hume’s ‘internal impressions’ as impressions of
reflection merits new consideration given the distinction between emotion and passion that has been
suggested here, as it makes room in the category of impressions of reflection for a broader range of feelings
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Baier, among others, has noted that Hume’s discussion of passion and motivation at 2.3.3
must be read in conjunction with his discussion of the influence of belief at 1.3.10, which
in many ways runs parallel to it.230 I suggested at the end of the last section that there is
an important connection between the vivacity of believed ideas and the vivacity that turns
ideas of particular passions into the passions themselves. It is clear that there are many
different angles from which one might enter a discussion of the relationship in Hume
between his general category of impressions of reflection and his characterization of
belief. Any such discussion will also have implications for Hume’s famous claims in
2.3.3 about the impotency of reason alone—often understood in terms of rational
beliefs—with regard to motivation. In fact, any reading of Hume that aligns his doctrine
of belief with his doctrines concerning impressions of reflection in some way is of
particular importance in understanding 2.3.3 since a standard reading of that section
attributes to Hume a strong distinction between belief and passion.
I will not be able to treat this subject in much detail here, though I do wish to suggest to
the reader some potential implications of my emotion/passion distinction on some of the
recent discussion surrounding the relationships between passion, belief, reason and
motivation. I will set up this short discussion by presenting a potential tension in Hume’s
account of motivation as presented in 2.3.3, a tension that was the focus of a paper
written by Nathan Brett and myself.231 I will then consider some related work by Rachel
Cohon, David Owen and Lorne Falkenstein, and the bearing it may have on the questions
the paper presents. Finally, I will suggest how my reading of the emotion/passion
distinction might further clarify aspects of the Humean doctrine of belief and motivation.
I will suggest that beliefs in Hume can be ‘attended’ by emotion, and that ultimately this

than can be generally intended by ‘passions.’ But I will not pursue the questions surrounding these kinds of
internal impressions here.
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means that Hume actually grants more power to influence the will to reasoned beliefs
than a superficial reading of 2.3.3 may suggest. The influence that such reason may have
on the passions, and ultimately action, will be argued to obtain partly due to the sensitive
nature of Humean belief (as it is contrasted with the activity of reason), and the particular
kind of vivacity that may ‘attend’ our motivating beliefs.
In a paper entitled, “Reason in Hume’s Passions,” Nathan Brett and I focus on an
apparent tension in Hume’s claims about motivation that is captured in the comparison of
the following two passages, both taken from a section in Book II titled, “Of the
influencing motives of the will”:
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion
and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (2.3.3.4)
The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of
any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. (2.3.3.7)232

There is clearly context for each of these claims that could be argued to soften the
potential conflict, but this side-by-side comparison brings the apparent tension in Hume’s
thought clearly to the forefront: How can Hume at once claim that reason can never
oppose the passions, but merely obey them, and also that passions may be instantly
extinguished upon rational recognition of the falsity of certain kinds of beliefs? At the
very least, Hume has some work to do to explain how and in what way ‘impotent’ reason
can come to halt motivating passions in their impulse. The purpose of the paper is
therefore to consider this “passage in which Hume appears to go too far in the direction
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We note that Hume makes a similar claim at Intro. 9: “[N]othing is more certain, than that despair has

almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility
of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” [Brett and Paxman, (2008), 43].
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of rational control, attributing to reason a mastery of the passions that it does not seem to
have.”233
A brief reminder of the arguments of 2.3.3 would be useful. Recall that there are two
points that Hume attempts to prove in 2.3.3: “That reason alone can never be the motive
to any action of the will, and … that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the
will” (2.3.3.1). The first point Hume supports by presenting reason as operating in two
ways: from demonstration and from probability. Reasoning by demonstration involves
“abstract relations of our ideas,” such as mathematical and logical truths. Such reasoning
may help me determine what course of action will have the effect I desire; for example,
how much money I need to pay my debt at the market. But beyond directing judgments
concerning cause and effect, Hume claims that such reasoning “never influences any of
our actions” (2.3.3.2). Similarly, reasoning from probability, which concerns relations
between objects of our experience, can inform us about the existence of objects, and their
causal relationships to each other, but, Hume argues,
It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such
others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects
themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence;
and ‘tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it
cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us. (2.3.3.3)

Hume therefore finds that neither kind of reason can result in an impulse to act
independent of a passion (in particular, some kind of propensity or aversion) that has
determined an end for us. Thus, reason alone cannot act as a motive to the will. The first
point leads to the second for Hume. If reason cannot alone produce action, he takes it as
obvious that “the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the
preference with any passion or emotion,” since it cannot provide an independent impulse
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(2.3.3.4). Only impulse can oppose impulse, and since reason is without impulse it is
relegated to be a ‘slave’ of the passions—acting only to inform desires concerning means
to achieve the impulse-driven ends.
While we did not in the paper set out to question the first point (“That reason alone can
never be the motive to any action of the will”), we did challenge the second (“that it can
never oppose passion in the direction of the will”), which “appears to be at odds with the
view that passions disappear when reason discovers that they are based on a false
supposition, or discovers insufficient means to obtain that to which passion directs us.”234
Beyond the quotation given above from 2.3.3.7, there are other aspects of Hume’s theory
of the passions that appear to put reasoning and belief at centre stage. We found that in
Hume reason clearly plays a role as the source of causal information that can inform and
re-direct our passions and therefore ultimately our actions. Desire and aversion for Hume
have built into their very concepts the requirement of reasoning concerning the prospect
of pleasure or pain, and ‘prospect’ here is certainly being used as a causal term.235 There
is also the highly cognitive structure of the passions (in particular, the indirect passions)
which appears to suggest that belief plays a key role not only in causing, but also in
determining and sustaining our passions. Following Baier, we pointed out that Hume’s
account of passions like pride (in which he claims to be offering the causal conditions of
passions) offers certain beliefs as constitutive of the passions, along with distinctive
feelings. Thus, I will feel proud of my daughter for quitting smoking until I am informed
that my belief that she has quit is false. Without this key belief, I will not feel pride. Thus,
despite Hume’s claims that reason is a slave to passion, we find that our reasoned beliefs
can, on his account, instantly extinguish passion and any accompanying motives for
action.
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emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or
satisfaction… ‘Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any
object” (2.3.3.3).
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If this reading is right, then Hume is not only faced with a potential tension in the claims
he makes concerning the power of reason as it pertains to passions and motivation, but
also some problems with his theory as an account of human nature generally. If our
perceptions of mistakes in reasoning and belief are really so key to sustaining our
passions, how can Hume explain the phenomenon of akrasia or ‘weakness of will’? If
our passions must yield to reason upon the discovery by reason that our desire will not
help us obtain our preferred ends, how can we explain instances when our passions
apparently drive us to act against our own acknowledged best interests? Another typical
human experience that appears to create problems for Hume’s account of the power of
reason over passions is when circumstances change such that there is no longer any
prospect of pleasure from some previously desired object, but the desire for the object
continues. An example offered is of the realization that my plane has left, while I am still
in the taxi headed to the airport. I may continue to desire to catch the plane, even though I
now know it to be impossible. Hume appears to have causal anticipation built into his
concepts of desire and aversion—when our desired ends are no longer possible means to
the pleasure we seek his account seems to suggest we no longer desire them. But this is
clearly not always the case. A very strong case of such continued desire in the face of the
impossibility of fulfillment we argued can be found in a particular kind of experience of
grief.236 The pain of grief at the loss of a loved one is a pain that actually appears to
depend on the impossibility of getting what we want. Thus in such a case it is the very
fact that my reason tells me that it is impossible to ever speak to my loved one again that
causes me the pain of the continued desire to do so. I do not cease to feel the passion of
desire when I recognize that there is no prospect of pleasure from its object in such cases.
To recap, Hume appears to claim that reason has the power to remove desires by
undermining the judgment that the object is a means to my desired end, changing our
beliefs that are apparently constitutive of the motivating passion (such as in the case of
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concept of grief that Hume includes in his taxonomy of the basic passions. See Brett and Paxman (2008), p.
49 for further discussion of the distinction between our use and Hume’s use of the term.
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pride), and by judging that there is no possible means to achieve my desired end (such as
in the case of grief). But it seems that these “ways in which reason can limit what we
desire grant reason some fairly hefty powers of directing and disabling our passions.”237
This is a problem on two counts: first, because of the way it apparently conflicts with
Hume’s claim that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the passions” and, one
might add, his subsequent argument at 2.3.3.5 that passions are original existences,
simple and non-representational. Second, it is a problem because these claims about the
power of reason over our passions just don’t seem to match up with aspects of human
experience, in which both desires and aversions often arise and persist despite reasoned
belief that should, on this reading of the power of reason in Hume, cause the passions to
‘yield without any opposition.’
I will not repeat the conclusions of our paper here. Rather, I would like to offer a
different take on how to approach this topic and the tensions we suggest can be found to
arise in Hume concerning the interactions of reason, belief and motivation through
impressions of reflection. To do so I will look briefly at work by Cohon, Owen and
Falkenstein, and end with the application of my emotion/passion distinction to the topic.
I will start with a consideration of some of the work done by Rachel Cohon on the
subject. In her book, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, Cohon argues that the
common reading that at 2.3.3 Hume argues that “Beliefs alone cannot motivate us” is in
fact mistaken, and that Hume does not actually hold this conclusion.238 She argues that
common readings of Hume, which typically includes this claim, lead to apparent puzzles,
errors, and contradictions in his writing, which must either become difficulties that
somehow must be explained away by commentators seeking to defend Hume, or taken as
evidence that Hume was indeed an inconsistent thinker by those who would critique him.
Cohon thinks that neither approach is the right one, and instead opts to reveal some of the
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problems with the standard reading, and then offer an alternative reading which
ultimately denies the claim that for Hume “belief alone cannot motivate us,” and suggests
instead a distinction be made between ‘reason’ and ‘belief.’
First let us look at some of the problems she finds in the text for the common reading.
Like Brett and myself, Cohon points out that for Hume beliefs about the prospects of pain
and pleasure can cause desire or aversion—that is to say, can cause passions to arise in
us. She argues,
The prospect of pain or pleasure would certainly seem to be the belief (the lively
idea) that pain or pleasure is available from an object, and this belief causes
motivating “aversion or propensity”. Before our rational discovery of causal
relations can come in to direct the aversion or propensity that is present in us to
appropriate means of fulfillment, the impulse itself apparently arises from
belief.239
The idea that a kind of belief is the source of the initial impulse for desires and aversions
may be surprising given Hume’s rejection of reason as providing any impulse of its own
in 2.3.3.4. But Cohon finds further support for the claim that
…even on the most subtle interpretation of the text, the best evidence shows that
for Hume beliefs about available pleasure and pain cause new motivating passions
and do not merely direct existing passions.240
She cites as additional evidence Hume’s reference to passions as founded on suppositions
(2.3.3.6), his claim that passions yield to reason (2.3.3.7, the passage of central concern to
the Brett and Paxman article), the claim that reason can excite passion (3.1.1.12), and,
very importantly, Hume’s claim that belief makes ideas like impressions, with a like
influence on the passions (1.3.10.3).
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This last reference to the text is worth citing at length here:
Tho’ an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of
those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser
degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to
the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to
an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the
passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression
in force and vivacity. For as the different degrees of force make all the original
difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the
source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions, and their removal,
in whole or in part, the cause of every new resemblance they acquire. Wherever
we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity, it will
likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where it
imitates them in that influence… this must proceed from its approaching them in
force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects
of an impression, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing
but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea. (1.3.10.3; italics Hume’s)
There is much that could be said about this passage. Most important to note for the
current discussion is that Hume is clearly claiming that, (a) believed ideas can have
similar effects on us to those of actual impressions, and (b) passions can arise from
beliefs. Cohon combines these two observations, and suggests that for Hume, “beliefs of
a particular sort—beliefs about forthcoming pleasures and pains—are the immediate
causes of (new) motivating passions.”241
But how, one might ask, can one claim this reading of Hume where beliefs are the causes
of action while still taking seriously his arguments regarding the impotency of reason
alone to provide impulse at 2.3.3.4? Key to the success of Cohon’s argument here is her
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insistence that we need to understand there to be a distinction in Hume between the
process or activity of reasoning and the ideas accompanied by vivacity that are our
beliefs. That such a distinction needs to be borne in mind while reading Hume is easily
overlooked, but (to this reader at least) seems quite obvious once pointed out. One of
Hume’s main projects in Book I of the Treatise is the characterization of reasoning as a
particular kind of process or activity, involving the discovery of relations between ideas
or the movement from one idea to another by means of some relation. Cohon argues that
reason as it is presented in Book I is an activity of comparing ideas and finding relations
between them. The production of something by reason alone must be through this
process, a kind of causation distinct from that which causes us to take action (which is
causation through impulse and feeling242). Reason alone, therefore, fails to motivate us
because it is not a causal agent of action, being an activity of mind, not a mental event
with impulse. Cohon explains,
To invoke the notion of a causal chain, one must link items with causal efficacy—
whether objects, as Hume tends to call them, or events—that can occupy nodes on
the chain. To invoke the notion here, one must assume that reason is such an
item… But as we have seen, Hume’s empiricism does not permit him to think of
reason as an independently identifiable item. Rather, he identifies it solely as
reasoning activity. Consequently, reason cannot in the same way [as beliefs or
passions] occupy a node in the causal chain.243
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A belief may indeed by formed by the process of reasoning. And that belief may in turn
be the cause of a passion. But this no more means that the reasoning was the cause of the
passion than the fact that a headache caused me to lie down means that a headache was
the cause of a depression in the bed (an example Cohon uses in a footnote244). Thus
reasoning and belief are distinct in their causal roles, and while the former cannot be said
to cause passions, the latter may be found to. In short, Cohon’s argument is that
…when Hume says that reason alone cannot produce a passion, what he means is
that a passion is not the outcome of a reasoning process; he does not mean that a
passion is not produced by a belief without the help of a prior passion.”245
The distinction between ‘reason alone’ and belief may be further emphasized by looking
at David Owen’s take on reason. Owen has argued that reason for Hume should be
understood, not as a God-given faculty for the production of truth (as it often was
considered by his contemporaries and those who went before him), but (like Cohon) as a
particular kind of interaction between impressions and ideas.246 He further explains the
classic Humean claim from Book I that probable reasoning is not based on reason by
appealing to the central role played by associative principles of the imagination. That is
to say, the traditional conception of reason that Hume was responding against did not
include reference to the role of the imagination in infusing ideas with vivacity to create
beliefs, but Hume’s new conception of reason did. Owen draws a parallel between
Hume’s claim in Book I that the understanding alone “entirely subverts itself, and leaves
not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common
life”247 and the Book II claim that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of
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the will.”248 In both instances Hume is identifying ‘reason alone’ as the interactions and
relations between ideas and impressions, as well as the vivacity infusing processes of the
imagination. The conception of reason that Hume ultimately develops, he argues is that
…everything required for an inference to a belief in an unobserved event, upon
the receiving of an impression, counts as a principle of the imagination that
constitutes reason. This includes not only those principles, such as experience and
habit, that explain the transition from the impression to the idea , but also that
property of the imagination, vivacity, that turns a mere idea into a belief.

249

Thus Humean reasoning is a complex activity that involves comparison and relations of
ideas, as well as the associations of impressions in the imagination that infuse ideas with
vivacity as they become beliefs. Humean reasoning is therefore a particular kind of
activity and process, not, as Owen points out, God-given mental states that have their
own impulse or existence.
How then might we understand Humean beliefs in contrast to this reasoning process?
Owen includes in his conception of reason the activity of infusing ideas with vivacity
such that they become beliefs, but the vivid mental states that result, i.e., the beliefs, are
not identical to that activity. Lorne Falkenstein has provided a useful and detailed account
of the various belief-forming mechanisms found in Hume, only one of which he identifies
as reason produced belief.250 He points out that for Hume beliefs can vary in vivacity, and
therefore in strength, and that not only are there multiple ways that vivacity may be
transferred, but in fact these mechanisms sometimes “work at cross purposes,” resulting
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in contradictory beliefs, weakened beliefs and even inducing “a suspension of belief.”251
He argues that though Hume’s
…account can be partially captured by the deceptively simple maxim that belief is
“nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression” or memory [1.3.9.8; see
also 1.3.7.6], the maxim is both too partial and deceptively simple. For Hume, not
all beliefs are in fact produced by the transmission of vivacity from an impression
or memory to a related idea.252
Included among the kinds of belief that are not produced by transmission of vivacity from
current impressions or memory are our beliefs produced by reason and education, the
former being a product of the demonstration of relations of ideas, the latter of the
repetition of ideas.
Reason is considered a ‘natural cause of belief’ which “as exhibited paradigmatically in
arithmetical calculations, does impress us with the ‘evidence’ or even ‘certainty’ of what
has been demonstrated,” generating belief with vivacity equal to that of memory, and
often exceeding the vivacity of our beliefs from causal reasoning.253 Despite the strength
of such naturally formed and generally true belief, however, belief through reasoning is
easily upset; though “[o]ur reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is
the natural effect” it’s efficacy in producing belief in us is threatened “by the irruption of
other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers” (1.4.1.1). Thus our reasonproduced beliefs are challenged, not generally by other strong and vivid beliefs, but
rather by interruptions to our reasoning process by other mental activities (such as the
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passions; see 1.4.1.11), or general mental weakness. Either way the vivacity that usually
comes to attend ideas produced through reason can be lessened.
Education, on the other hand, produces vivacious beliefs through sheer repetition of
ideas. Falkenstein describes this “odd” way of gaining belief as “not only nonassociative, but entirely non-demonstrative, in the sense that it does not proceed from any
previously given premises, impressions, passions or memories.”254 Hume argues that an
idea that makes frequent appearance in the mind will “by degrees acquire a facility and
force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and
unusual idea” 255(1.3.9.16). More particularly, Hume argues that education produces
belief by unintentional and un-designed (at least on the part of the individual being
educated) repetition of the idea. Falkenstein explains that for Hume, “the healthy mind is
aware of its volition in producing the repetition, and this realization leads it to consider
the idea to be its own invention.”256 Despite the frequent exposure, and subsequent
enlivening of the idea, our awareness of our own part in its production keeps it from
becoming a belief.257
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The other mechanisms for belief formation are all variations on vivacity transferring
associations. The belief-forming mechanisms of association Falkenstein argues are of
most interest to Hume. The basic mechanism for transference of vivacity in such cases, as
pointed out by Kemp Smith, is similar to the sympathy mechanism. An idea in the
imagination is associated with some present impression or a memory. Both of these kinds
of perceptions are experienced with a high degree of vivacity. The association causes a
transfer of vivacity between the associated ideas and impressions, and when an idea is
transfused with sufficient vivacity it becomes a belief (just as the idea of the passion, in
the case of sympathy, becomes the very passion when it is attended with sufficient
vivacity from our ever-present impression of the self). Conviction of the belief is
proportional the quantity of vivacity transferred to it (as strength of the passion is
proportional to the degree of vivacity it gains from our impression of the self, which is in
turn determined by the closeness of association between our idea of self and our idea of
the person we are sympathizing with).
Falkenstein offers analysis of multiple versions of belief-forming mechanisms by
association, including associations through causal inference, and associations of
resemblance and contiguity. He also details how the transference of vivacity through
association is in part governed by variations in the “quality or character of [the]
components” involved in associations, such as strength of current impressions, potential
doubts surrounding memories, the history of past experiences of constant conjunctions,
experience of contrary experiments, degree of reflection on our experiences, etc.258
Finally, he finds Hume’s associative mechanisms include the mixtures of fantasy with
fact (which may transfer vivacity to what would otherwise be un-believed ideas) and the
associations of passions with ideas [which can likewise transfer vivacity to mere ideas
and make them believed; consider for instance Hume’s example of the man in an iron
cage, who feels fear of falling despite being supported (1.3.13.10)].

258

Falkenstein (1997), 38.
211

I will not try here to reproduce the details of Falkenstein’s complete analysis of the
various ways in which associative belief-forming mechanisms work. What is important
for our purposes is to note the great lengths that Hume goes to in generating principles
and explanations in order to account for his picture of mind in which beliefs are formed
by acquisition of vivacity. Whether through the ‘natural’ belief-forming mechanism of
reason, the sympathy-like mechanism of belief formation through associations, or the
slightly curious case of increased vivacity through repetition, belief for Hume is a
phenomenon centered on the acquisition and transfer of vivacity to our ideas.
Why is such an analysis of belief important to our current project? To recap, Cohon has
suggested that one key step in making Hume’s writing consistent is in reading 2.3.3 as an
argument for the claim that reason alone cannot motivate passion, but belief can, in that
beliefs about pains and pleasures are causal agents in forming passions of desire and
aversion. Both Cohon and Owen make the case for a distinction between reason and
belief by presenting Humean reason as an activity or process that involves relations and
comparisons of ideas—as well as (potentially) the natural production of vivacious ideas
that are beliefs—not to be confused with the vivacious individual ideas that are beliefs.
Falkenstein shows that in fact reason is just one process that may result in the successful
enlivening of ideas to the point of belief production—and, incidentally, not obviously the
most important method of belief production (particularly since there are key beliefs, such
as those about causal relations and external existence, that cannot be generated by reason
alone259). Reason the process is thereby shown to be something quite different from
individual existing beliefs, which are created, determined and have their influence via
vivacity.
How is this to be brought to bear on the claims of 2.3.3.4 and 2.3.3.7 that Brett and I
found to be potentially in tension with one another regarding the power of reason over
motivation? One possible response, based on some of the arguments made by the authors
discussed above, is that when Hume claims that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave
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of the passions” he is talking about reason the process. As has been argued by Cohon and
others, this process alone cannot move us to act. However, when Hume states that “[t]he
moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means
our passions yield to our reason without any opposition” he is talking about the power of
the beliefs produced by reason. Beliefs about pain and pleasure, as Cohon argues, have
the same effect on our passion formation and subsequent motivation as currently
experienced impressions of pain and pleasure—belief makes ideas equal to passions in
their ability to “actuate the soul” (1.3.10.2260). Therefore, our relevant beliefs about the
prospects of pain and pleasure will have similar effects to our impressions of pain and
pleasure in creating and re-directing passions—possibly even causing contrary passions
to yield without any opposition. Note that this type of explanation of Hume’s claims has
further implications for Hume’s picture of the power of belief with regard to motivation.
It is surely not only our rationally formed beliefs about pains and pleasures that may act
as the impulse to form passions of desire and aversion. Beliefs formed by the acquisition
of vivacity in the multiplicity of ways that Falkenstein has suggested will have similar
potential to influence action, insofar as they are beliefs about prospects of pain and
pleasure.
Does this explanation go far enough? Brett and I suggested that Hume needs a response
on two fronts: first, he needs to show his theory to be internally coherent, and second, he
needs to show that it can account for the diversity of human experience. There are indeed
instances in which our passions appear to ‘yield’ to our reasonable beliefs (“when I
discover that my car-lottery ticket does not have the winning number, I drop it in the
wastebasket, though a moment before I was treating it like a prized possession”261), but
there are also instances in which passions persist in the face of beliefs that should be
damaging to them, such as the particular case of grief that was discussed above. The
application of the distinction between reason and belief brings us a step closer to
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interpretive coherence. With such a distinction, Hume is able to account both for his
claims about the impotency of reason, and his claims about the apparent power of our
rational (and perhaps at times our non-rational) beliefs to create, direct and redirect our
passions. Add to this Falkenstein’s analysis of the multiple belief-formation mechanisms
in Hume, and his explanations of how beliefs for Hume can come to be of varying
strengths and work at cross-purposes, and we begin to have the tools to make sense of a
greater diversity of instances where belief does and does not have the necessary ‘impulse’
to govern our motivating passions. But I wish to build on these accounts, and will suggest
now that this picture becomes even clearer when we apply the emotion/passion
distinction to Hume’s discussion, and use it to more explicitly draw a connection between
the vivacity of our beliefs about pain and pleasure and the attending emotions that
provides the transient impulse found in impressions of reflection generally.
One way to understand the problem highlighted by the contrast between the reason-slave
passage, and the passions-yield passage is to understand it in light of the tension between
the cognitivist and sensationalist readings of Hume’s theory of the passions. On the
cognitivist account, our passions clearly will yield to reason without opposition because a
certain cognitive structure is essential to the passions conceived in this way. Thus,
reason’s discovery of truth and falsehood, and the subsequent beliefs generated, will
mean a change in the cognitive content of the passion, which will result in a change in the
passion, all without the ‘opposition’ characteristic of conflicting impulses of the passions.
This is the kind of picture that Brett and I had in mind when we claim that “human (and
Humean) passions are complex in their cognitive structure… There is… no pride without
beliefs about one’s self and about some properties, possessions, or dispositions, that
connect with oneself.”262 On the other hand, Hume’s claim that “Reason is, and ought
only to be, a slave of the passions,” can be taken to assume a sensationalist reading of
Hume’s theory of the passions, particularly as it is found to be supported by the argument
of 2.3.3.5 that passions are original existences, without representational content. Thus, a
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reader who is inclined to read Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion will be inclined
to play down the power of reason, privileging 2.3.3.4-5 over the claims of 2.3.3.7. The
passions-yield passage will be read as a claim merely about how our instrumental
reasoning may come to affect our particular desires for means to certain passion
determined ends, but not govern or direct them in any stronger sense. The reader inclined
to interpret Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion, on the other hand, will point to
2.3.3.7 in conjunction with all that Hume has to say about the double-relation of ideas
and impressions attending the indirect passions, and the implied cognitive structure and
belief content in the Humean analysis of particular passions generally. Thus the claim
that passion yield to reason will be given a stronger reading, taken to be clearly the case
given the internal logic of the passions.
How then might the emotion/passion distinction be brought to bear on this issue? My
suggestion above was that the reason/belief distinction could mean that while reason
alone is impotent to move us, beliefs, with their impression-resembling vivacity, have a
kind of impulse of their own, which makes them function more like passions. Thus it is
no surprise that relevant beliefs about pain and pleasure will redirect, and perhaps even
extinguish passion in some instances. But this is not wholly satisfying. The claim Hume
makes is that “our passions yield to reason without any opposition” (my emphasis).To
grant our beliefs power over motivation in virtue of their “like influence” to impressions
of pain and pleasure, i.e., their ability to provide the initial impulse to aversion and
propensity, appears to put them in the position where they may actually oppose our
potentially motivating passions. Hume’s claim at 2.3.3.7 that the passions yield without
opposition would be inaccurate—in fact, beliefs would generate new, conflicting
passions, which may have the strength of impulse to dominate the contrary passion. An
explanation of 2.3.3.7 that brings beliefs to the level of impressions in their influence
creates conflicting impulses, not a change in motivating passion without opposition.
The ‘cognitivist’ reading of 2.3.3.7 at this point seems more in keeping with Hume’s
intention in this passage. But this is not to say that the circumstance in which beliefs
generate new directing passions could not also occur on the Humean picture. Cohon is
quite right to point to Hume’s doctrine found in 1.3.10 that particular beliefs—beliefs
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about pain and pleasure—have an influence on the passions much like our impressions of
pain and pleasure. Such beliefs are indeed causes of new passions, and their particular
vivacity appears to provide the initial impulse for desires and aversions. What appears to
be needed, therefore, is a way to talk about the passions in Hume both as original
impressions, with non-representational impulse that has its own existence and influence
that is untouched by discoveries of truth and falsehood, and a way to talk about the
passions as involving more complex cognitive structures, including certain necessarily
constitutive beliefs, that are altered ‘without any opposition’ when those constitutive
beliefs change. This dual way of understanding Hume’s theory of the passions is what I
have argued my proposed emotion/passion distinction provides. Passions considered for
Hume as original existences, essentially the felt component of the experience, are
emotions. ‘Fully established’ passions, understood as the ‘full bent’ of the experience
from beginning to end, have identity partly determined by varied cognitive content,
including beliefs. The term ‘emotion’ used in either case denotes feeling that is
potentially transient and fluid, and provides impulses that can move us to act.
These concepts play out in this discussion in the following way: emotions cannot be
‘extinguished’263 without contrary impulse. Therefore discovery of truth or falsehood
alone will not affect them. But emotion can easily be redirected, and attend different
perceptions, even taking on different hedonic tones. The emotion attending a fully
established passion, which depends on certain beliefs, will not cease to exist when reason
causes us to “perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any
means” (2.3.3.7), but it will ‘yield’ in the sense that it will likely move to attend whatever
has become the ‘dominant’ passion. Thus, if I desire a piece of fruit because I believe it
to be delicious, but reason comes to form in me the belief that it has been laced with
poison, my desire will turn to aversion, the passion of desire for the fruit immediately
yielding to the relevant change in belief. The felt emotion of that passion, however, will
likely not disappear, but rather will attend my new, more dominant passion of aversion to
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the fruit. The impulse and feeling remain, but attend another passion. Meanwhile, reason
alone is still clearly impotent to move the will—vivacity and impulse in some form is still
needed.
This brings us back to the question of the connection between the attending vivacity to
belief, and the emotion which attends passions. Here I would like to suggest an
interpretation that I cannot fully defend here, but I think is a plausible direction, and
potentially an interesting application of the emotion/passion distinction I have developed.
Vivacity in and of itself cannot be identical to emotion. The term ‘vivacity,’ along with
its common companions ‘force’ and ‘liveliness’,264 is a description of the immediacy of
felt experience, and is used to describe the difference between ideas and impressions
generally. A key difference between the feeling of vivacity generally and the feeling I
have characterized as emotion is that emotions, as impressions of reflection, have a
particular valence (even if it is changeable). Consider, however, that the particular kind of
vivacity that Hume is most concerned about when he discusses the influence of belief is
the vivacity that attends beliefs about pain and pleasure. When our ideas about pains and
pleasures are attended by belief, these ideas come to have a like influence on the passions
to our experiences of pain and pleasure. Hume argues that “impressions always actuate
the soul, and that in the highest degree; but ‘tis not every idea which has the same effect”
(1.3.10.2). It is only when “an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity” that
“it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind” (1.3.10.3). Impressions of pain
and pleasure have influence on the mind through providing the “chief spring and moving
principle of all its actions” (1.3.10.2). Our beliefs about pain and pleasure likewise
activate the will. Impressions of pain and pleasure are the source of valenced vivacity that
becomes the felt impulse of our passions. I have identified this felt, valenced impulse
with emotion. I would therefore suggest that our vivid beliefs concerning pain and
pleasure likewise act as a source of valenced, felt, impulse. There is a sense in which, on
my analysis, it appears to be appropriate to claim that our beliefs about pain and pleasure
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are not attended merely by general, belief-making vivacity, but by the particular kind of
valenced, impulse-giving vivacity I have identified as emotion.
This emotion would have the same properties of transitivity and fluidity that I presented
as part of Humean emotion in 1.10. In fact, it might be quite interesting to compare the
principles and maxims Hume offers in Book II as governing the transitivity of emotion
with the various ways in which the vivacity necessary for creating belief moves between
impressions and ideas. A comparative project that starts with Falkenstein’s analysis of the
various belief-forming mechanisms in Hume and then turns to look at whether Hume’s
treatment of the movement of emotion might reveal interesting similarities. This also
makes the parallels between belief and sympathy in Hume seem very natural, as well as
Hume’s contention that the sympathy mechanism applies to beliefs as well as impressions
of reflection. In all cases, the concern is with the way in which feeling is extended to
ideas. In the case of ideas about pain and pleasure, ideas with added vivacity will come to
acquire the impulse that comes for Hume from feeling with valence. Hence, as Cohon
also concluded, Hume is not committed to the thesis that belief alone can never motivate.
Beliefs about pain and pleasure provide valenced, felt, impulse that is the attending
emotion of the passions, and is part of the changeability and motion of the mind that is
animated by feeling, and ultimately governed by passion.
This suggestion is here presented as only an outline of a possible interpretive move to be
made in understanding reason, belief, passion and motivation in Hume as informed by the
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for. Certainly a full defense is a larger project,
and too much to undertake here. But I hope to have shown that Hume’s claims
concerning the potential influence of reason over our passion-governed wills—
particularly as reason is the activity whereby we come to have beliefs about pain and
pleasure—are not inconsistent, and can be shown to fit together quite coherently in his
overall picture. I also think this interpretation addresses the second concern expressed in
the paper by Brett and myself: that of whether Hume accurately reflects human emotional
experience in his claims about the influence of rational beliefs on our passions. Reason’s
power is lessened when the diversity of belief-forming mechanisms and factors that
influence the adoption of beliefs are considered. Falkenstein’s main purpose in his article
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is to make room for normativity in Hume’s naturalistic take on belief, and that project
involves showing all the ways that the formation of rational belief can be foiled on the
Humean picture. That is not to say that there are never instances when clear reasoning
results in our passions immediately yielding to the discoveries of truth or falsehood. But
the power that belief has to influence action is sometimes going to be in virtue of belief
content changes effecting passions more cognitively conceived (which then ‘yield
without opposition’), sometimes due to opposing impulse being provided by new
influencing beliefs (cases in which opposition is present), and yet other times belief will
contribute the transient emotional impulse, which will come to attend the dominant
passion (as in the special case of grief discussed, where the vivacity of the belief that our
desire cannot be filled, along with the emotion of the desire, come to attend and add to
the felt pain of the grief).
I have argued that for Hume the sensitive nature of belief means that these vividly
experienced ideas about pains and pleasures are (in a sense) attended by emotion.
Motivation in Hume is therefore not subject to the strong belief/passion distinction often
attributed to it, though the impotency of reason alone is maintained as part of his
approach. However, this does mean that belief as a product of reason has more potential
influence over the will for Hume than a superficial reading of 2.3.3 may suggest. And the
transient, attending nature of emotion in Hume, as distinct from the set nature of
particular fully established passions, makes them a key player in explaining Humean
motivation both in terms of our impressions of reflection and our beliefs.

2.8

Conclusion and suggestions for further study

The main objective of this project was to suggest a textually based reading of Hume’s
concept of ‘emotion’ that provides a way of understanding it as distinct from passion.
What I believe I have shown is that Hume’s theory of the passions, and his treatment in
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general of affective mental states, is best parsed when we attribute to him a conceptual
distinction between changing, transient, valenced, ‘attending’ feelings (emotions) and
more cognitively complex structures of feeling, natural causes and beliefs that he
identifies as the individual passions (or, as I have often called them, the ‘fully
established’ passions). This distinction, I have argued, can help to explain why Hume’s
theory of the passions has inspired a debate between more sensationalist and more
cognitivist interpretations. I have presented textual evidence that supports a reading of
Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion, and also as a cognitive theorist of emotion,
and sought to show how each approach can be shown to be part of Hume’s system once
we grant him the conceptual distinction between passion and emotion that I have argued
for. I finished this work by applying the distinction to two major topics in Hume studies:
the workings of his sympathy mechanism, and the relationship of belief to motivation. I
have argued that interpretive questions in both areas receive new and helpful direction
from the application of the emotion/passion distinction. The success of this application of
my thesis I hope to be two-fold. On the one hand, I hope these discussions provide
additional support for the argument that such a distinction is to be found in Hume, in
virtue of the sense that can be made of his broader philosophical projects when we
assume his theory of affective mental states takes the form I argue it does. On the other
hand, I hope to have successfully suggested new approaches to these topics, new
directions for interpretive solutions to the puzzles these topics tend to present to
interpretive projects in Hume studies.
The last thing I would like to do is suggest some additional directions and topics for study
of this general topic. There is much that can be explored as pertains to the
emotion/passion distinction in Hume that I have not been able to fully develop and
include in this work. A brief overview of some of the directions I see work on this
interpretive line taking in the future will have to suffice for now. My suggestions will fall
generally into two camps: (1) Further study to be undertaken in the area of Hume studies
and the general history of theories of emotion, and (2) application of this historical and
interpretive account of Hume to contemporary debate within the philosophy of emotion.
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There is certainly interesting work to be done in continuing to explore the
emotion/passion distinction in the context of Hume’s other work. I have suggested how
the distinction might apply to discussions about the nature of belief in Hume, and the
implications for his theory of motivation, but my sketch was preliminary, and there
certainly remains more to be said. I have also touched on what the distinction can do for
understanding the sympathy mechanism. I have not yet, however, said anything about the
potential implications of this distinction and the modified understanding of the sympathy
mechanism for Hume’s moral psychology and moral theory generally. Most of the
scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions is written in the context of scholarship on
his moral theory—my approach is somewhat unusual in that I focus on his theory of
mind, prior to its moral application, as it is found in Books I and II. One of the reasons
my study took this form is the simple fact that the vast majority of uses of ‘emotion’ in
the Treatise are to be found in Books I and II.265 This is not to say that the
emotion/passion distinction I have outlined would not have implications for Hume’s
moral theory.266 My suggested interpretation of the working of the sympathy mechanism
in the context of Hume’s moral psychology needs to be further pursued as it pertains to
his moral philosophy. It is also worth noting that the sensationalist/cognitivist interpretive
debate can be extended to readings of Hume’s moral theory, and in particular to questions
of the nature of moral judgments. My thesis that Hume has both cognitive and noncognitive conceptions of passion-like experiences in his account might have interesting
implications for how we understand his moral judgments.
There is also the question of how or whether this distinction plays a role in his other
published works. Hume’s A Dissertation on the Passions is his mature reworking of his
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theory of the passions, though it is less of a reworking, and more of an edited version of
the material in Book II of the Treatise. There is, however, significant reorganization in
the order of presentation of topics, and omissions of some material, including most of his
account of the sympathy mechanism. This is of particular interest for our purposes, as I
have noted that the term ‘emotion’ shows up frequently in Hume’s discussions of
sympathy in the Treatise. Also omitted is the ‘silly paragraph’, 2.3.3.5, which gives the
strong reading of Humean passions as nonrepresentational. The term ‘emotion’ is still
present with some frequency,267 however, with a couple of the passages that my
interpretation takes to be key fully intact, including the distinction between an
‘overflowing of emotion’ and a ‘fully established passion’ at 2.2.2.8, and the much of the
discussion of the maxim that ‘any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted
into it’. Whether the distinction that I have outlined exists in this work remains to be
shown, though it seems likely, given the appearance of these key arguments.
Outside of interpretive issues internal to Hume’s writing, we may also consider how the
emotion/passion distinction may be found to come out of Hume’s intellectual inheritance.
Descartes, Hobbes and Hutcheson are three obvious influences on Hume’s account of the
passions, with Descartes’ émotion in particular apparently being the source for Hume’s
use of the term ‘emotion.’ I would suggest that there is also significant influence on
Hume’s theory of the passions from two less acknowledged sources: Cicero (and his
brand of Stoicism) and Malebranche (and his brand of Cartesianism).
There is also the question of the reception of Hume’s theory of the passions, both in his
time and in the work on the passions that came after him. The term ‘emotion’ was
adopted by many of Hume’s contemporaries, and Dixon argues that the term‘s use over
the century following Hume’s Treatise culminated in the popular lectures of Thomas
Brown (1778-1820), who he calls, ‘the inventor of the emotions.’ Brown used ‘emotion’
as a sort of umbrella term for what had been multiple, often distinguished, kinds of
affective mental states- ‘passions’, ‘active powers’, ‘appetites’, ‘desires’, ‘affections’, etc.
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His reinvention of the emotions emphasized their passivity, making them non-intellectual
feeling states and pushing them farther away from the ‘intellectual judgements’ of reason.
It would be interesting to investigate how Hume’s famous discourse on reason and the
passions created a reason/passion dichotomy, in which ‘passion’ was eventually replaced
with the (less cognitive term) ‘emotion.’ This influence of Hume’s work I would suggest
was not intentional, but rather is a predictable result of his failure to clarify the
distinctions that can be made in his work between the concepts of passion and emotion.
Louis Charland offers a kind of alternative, or at least supplementary, story to Dixon’s, in
which he finds Alexander Crichton in particular to have embraced a category of emotions
in conjunction with a category of passions, offering a clearer and more useful distinction
between these mental contents than Hume did.268 It would be useful to trace this history
with an idea of the emotion/passion distinction implicit in Hume in mind, and note that
the emotion/passion distinction, though unclear in Hume, did enjoy some notice as a
useful distinction to make in understanding the workings of the mind- a distinction that
(as Charland suggests) may yet be useful in the discourse on affective mental states.
In general, the question of how the term ‘emotion’ was adopted and developed postHume provides a bridge between Hume’s work on the passions, and the contemporary
debate surrounding the category term emotion. As was mentioned in the introductory
section of this dissertation, I believe that my analysis of the emotion/passion distinction
in Hume is of some significance to this debate, and will spend the remainder of this
section setting up briefly why I take Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ to be of particular
importance to this investigation.
In From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category,
Thomas Dixon presents a history of psychology that follows in large part the appearance
and progression of the use of the term ‘emotion’ in English language discussions of mind.
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Dixon argues that an examination of the history of Western thought prior to the
appearance of this category of mental state reveals that discussion of what we would now
label ‘emotions’ involved several categories and distinctions, such as affections,
appetites, sentiments and passions. These various categories had strong ties to the
religious systems being adopted in philosophical and psychological approaches to the
mind. Dixon argues that there is a correlation between the secularization of studies of
mind and the dissolution of the diversity of these psychological categories into the
overarching category of ‘emotion’. Along with this conflation he argues that a certain
degree of richness may have been lost in discussions of the various affective mental
states. For instance, discussions that contrast emotion and intellect as a simple dualism
become a possibility, and indeed this seemed to be a common attitude. Discussions of
affective mental states prior to the common use of the category ‘emotion’ could involve
attributing to them various levels of rationality, as well as influence of the individual’s
will, depending on whether it was sentiments, affections, passions etc that were being
discussed. On the other hand, inclusion of all such mental states under the umbrella term
‘emotion’ encourages sweeping generalizations and a lack of subtlety and diversity in the
claims made about the nature of emotion. This is to be lamented, according to Dixon.269
And perhaps, this loss of diversity in terminology could in part explain contemporary
difficulties in agreeing on a characterization of ‘emotion’ at all.
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The entry on emotion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes the following useful
insight into one of the problems faced in approaching the topic of emotion in
contemporary discussions: “…it is not obvious that the states we call emotions have
anything interesting or important in common that distinguishes them from all other
mental states.”270 In its everyday use, and even often in its use in various scholarly
treatments, the term ‘emotion’ is employed with little reflection. It is generally assumed
to refer to a certain category of mental states, often affective in some way, that can be
compared and contrasted with other mental states, particularly with those we associate
with intellect. In its entry on emotion the Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes its earliest
appearances as having connotations of “agitated motion, or turbulence,”271 and applied in
a somewhat metaphorical way to certain ‘disruptive’ mental states. Of course the
extension of the term in contemporary use tends to include mental states once included in
the older category of the passions. Modern application can range from denoting mere
physical, affective states to desires and aversions to complex attitudes and dispositions
towards ideas of particular things. With such diversity and, at times, disagreement about
the proper use and meaning of the word ‘emotion’, it is becoming increasingly common
for scholars to question whether there is actually a class, or “natural kind” that properly
corresponds to the concept of emotion.
Louis Charland offers an answer to this debate in his article, “The Natural Kind Status of
Emotion,”272 as well as a helpful summary of the recent contributions scholars have
made. Charland is careful to distinguish between debates over whether emotions are
natural kinds and whether emotion itself is a natural kind. In the former debate the
question is whether mental states such as anger, fear, joy etc, are natural kinds, basic
emotions that have identifiable manifestations regardless of the individual. The later
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debate, the one of interest both for Charland in his article and our purposes here, is
whether the category of emotion itself is a natural kind, uniting all mental states we
would label as individual emotions as distinct from other mental states, for instance
phenomena like cognition.273
Charland references Paul Griffiths as offering strong argument for treating emotions as
natural kinds. He quotes Griffiths in saying that natural kinds are “ways of classifying the
world that correspond to some structure inherent in the subject matter being classified”,
and points out that they are useful in referring to “any fundamental theoretical posit in a
scientific domain”, with a strong need to be categories in at least an epistemological and
ontological sense.274 It is largely through empirical research that Griffiths supports his
thesis of the natural kind status of particular basic emotions, and Charland suggests that
similarly we can find support for the natural kind status of emotion. He also examines the
arguments for the natural kind status of basic emotions found Jaak Panksepp’s work,
which is generally neurological in character. He uses aspects of the approaches of both of
these authors to argue for, at the very least, the plausibility of the natural kind status of
emotion. He proposes that there is a natural class of organisms, ‘emoters’, that respond to
the world in ways that reflect particular biological values, which are themselves in turn
reflected in our emotions. Emotion as a category is then united in “a shared evolutionary
heritage of a distinct kind of organism that comes to the world designed to appraise it
according to specific biological values and priorities.”275 It is the category of affective
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response that reflects the development of an organism that places particular value of
various aspects of its environment. He argues that emotion has both “its own special
regularities” and “its own special affective representational posits; namely appraisals,”
and that these are strong premises for the conclusion that emotion is a natural kind.276
Key to his arguments is a conception of natural kinds that does not look for necessary and
sufficient conditions and a certain set of shared properties (as a traditional Aristotelian or
Russellian approach may do), but rather is focused on “homeostatic property clusters”277
and homology. He quotes Griffiths in saying that a natural kind is a category that “brings
together a set of objects with correlated properties.”278 The properties are correlated, not
necessarily by analogy or resemblance with each other, as many categories tend to bring
together their various objects, but rather by homology, which is focused more on history
and origin of the objects. Thus, the evolutionary homology of emotions would be
considered more important than the shared function or resemblance that may provide us
with common properties or necessary and sufficient conditions. This allows for flexibility
and diversity in particular properties and functions of various emotions, as certainly is to
be found, without denying the possibility of a uniting category of emotion that includes
each of them as examples. Further, in the case of emotion, when we look for a common
homology and understand it in the context of a particular organism we can understand
certain values to be reflected in the members of the category, and from there even
understand a uniting purpose in the various individual emotions.
At this point the reader may ask why this information about the contemporary debate
about the natural kind status of emotion is of importance to an application of an
emotion/passion distinction in Hume to contemporary debate. I would suggest that we
can ask ourselves whether Hume had developed a concept of emotion as a natural kind.
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When I ask how it is that’ emotion’ in Hume could be considered a distinct concept from
other mental state concepts (such as ‘passion’), I am asking in part for an account of how
Hume conceives emotion as a natural kind (and indeed whether such an approach to
emotion can be attributed to Hume at all). The answer to this could usefully inform
contemporary debate about conceptions of natural kinds. Meanwhile, the contemporary
approach could interestingly shape our reading of Hume’s development of the concept of
emotion. For instance, in characterizing the concept instead of trying to produce a list of
necessary and sufficient conditions, or a set of properties, we can think of the category of
emotion as indicating a common history or origin and a particular uniting purpose that
Hume sees emotion as playing.
Another interesting direction that further study on this topic could address is whether the
term ‘passion,’ which fell out of use as ‘emotion’ became more popular, would be a
useful term to reintroduce into discourse on affective mental states and philosophy of
emotion generally. Charland in particular argues that ‘passion’ is a useful additional
category that perhaps needs to be reintroduced to the discourse.279 He argues for the need
to reintroduce passion to denote affective states of long duration that would be contrasted
by our more intense and temporary bouts of emotion. This might in turn have interesting
application to Hume interpretation, where it is assumed that some calm passions are such
because they are part of the individual’s disposition. These are longer lasting affective
states, and Hume could have intended to contrast them with the fleeting bouts of
disruptive emotion that attend our more violent passions.
Future topics of investigation aside, it is my hope that at this point I have motivated my
general project, and made it clear why it should be of interest to gain clearer
understanding of Hume’s use of the term ‘emotion.’ My hope is that accomplishing this
will not only answer an exegetical question in Hume scholarship, but also offer historical
perspective to contemporary discussions surrounding the question of what exactly the
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term ‘emotion’ should be understood to denote. That this is a live topic of investigation,
and worthy of the pursuit may be captured in the following:
It is one thing… to recognize the need for a theory of mind that finds a place for
the unique role of emotions, and quite another to construct one. Emotions vary so
much in a number of dimensions—transparency, intensity, behavioral expression,
object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment—as to cast doubt on
the assumption that they have anything in common. However, while this variation
may have led philosophers to steer clear of emotions in the past, many
philosophers are now rising to the challenge. The explanatory inadequacy of
theories that shortchange emotion is becoming increasingly apparent, and… it is
no longer the case that emotion is treated as a poor relation in the philosophy of
mind.280
Perhaps the greatest significance of the work I have sought to achieve here is that, if
successful, I have shown Hume to have developed a theory of passion/emotion that offers
a rich conceptualization and organization of these feeling states, and ultimately offers a
much richer (and much more contemporarily relevant) theory than he is generally
credited with.
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